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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the recall of temporal information in very long 
term memory, particularly event duration. Experiments 1 through 4 examine 
the estimation of public event duration, for example, how long the Falkland's 
war lasted. Subjects in Experiment 6, Part a, were asked to date events they had 
personally experienced (autobiographical events) and thus indicate the time 
elapsed since the event's occurrence. Subjects in this Experiment were also 
asked to recall other information about events, such as where they occurred: 
the event aspects 'what', 'where' and 'who' were used both as prompts to recall 
and as the aspects to be recalled. In Experiment 6, Part b, subjects estimated the 
duration of two types of autobiographical events: empty and filled duration 
events. Events typical of these two types of event are respectively, 'How long 
after you ordered the computer game did it arrive ?' and 'How long were you 
in hospital for ?'. 
Experiment 6 employed a method new to memory research, the 
undirected-diary method. Diarists were used as subjects in this experiment. 
Their diary records, which were recorded with no prior knowledge of any 
possible use in research, were obtained and used as a source of information 
about events they had experienced, for example, the nature and actual duration 
of events was obtained for Experiment 6, Part b. Because of the development of 
a new method, Experiment 5, a survey of diarists, was conducted. The results 
of this survey are reported in Chapter 3, in which the undirected-diary method 
is compared to other methods used to investigate autobiographical memory. It 
is suggested that the undirected-diary method is a useful method, and one 
which overcomes a number of problems associated with the study of 
autobiographical memory. 
Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' model of duration estimation was 
examined in Experiment 2 and Experiment 6, Part b. In general, little support 
was found for this model and an alternative model was developed: the 
reconstructive model of duration estimation. Predictions made on the basis of 
this model were tested in Experiment 4, the results of which generally 
supported the model. Experiment 6, Part a, found results consistent with other 
studies of event dating and studies which have examined autobiographical 
memory. Absolute dating error increased and signed dating error varied 
systematically with retention interval. Reltall of event aspect information 
varied systematically with the cues provided for recall and was interpreted 
within a uniqueness explanation of autobiographical memory organization. 
CHAPTER 1 
RETROSPECTIVE DURATION ESTIMATION: THE 
PHENOMENA UNDER INVESTIGATION 
1.0 Introduction 
1 
Each of us has probably wondered at some point about the concept of 
time, most of us are certainly ruled by it. Our activities, in particular, are 
determined by it; it helps to be in the right place at the right time. At the 
universal level time is difficult to comprehend, stretching beyond our 
imagination; and yet our own time, our life, must be lived within a 
conceptualization of it, a sense of the past, present and future. One's 
conceptualization of these three temporal perspectives produces a sense of 
duration, or time in passing. The present is linked to both the past and the 
future by the concept of duration, which we regularly use to define the 
relationship between now and then. In order to do this one generally makes a 
duration estimate, and it is this process~ duration estimation, that this thesis 
explores. 
The psychological study of duration traditionally divides itself into, (a) 
the perception of duration, where an on-going event, whose elements are 
unquestionably linked, is perceived to have duration (e.g., watching a fall star); 
and (b) the estimation of duration where a single event, or two related events 
which occurred in the past, can be recalled as having a particular duration 
(Fraisse, 1984). Fraisse has suggested a further duration 
estimation/retrospective duration estimation distinction based on retention 
interval, that is the time elapsed between the experience of an interval or 
event and the estimation of its duration. Duration estimation occurs when, 
for example, "You go to see a friend who is not home, decide to wait, your 
friend soon arrives and asks you how long you have been waiting", or "You 
are watching a documentary on television, someone enters the room and asks 
you how long it has been on for". In both of these situations the estimate is 
made immediately after experiencing the interval or event. A retrospective 
duration estimate, on the other hand, is made when the duration estimate is 
of an event which did not occur in the immediate past. 
2 
Three definably different scenarios where retrospective duration 
estimates are requested can be defined: (a) where subjects are asked how long 
they engaged in some particular past activity, for example, "How long did you 
work at Mt. Cook last summer?"; (b) where the duration of an event that was 
not directly experienced is enquired about, for example, "How long were the 
Japanese climbers trapped on Mt. Cook?"; and (c) where the duration between 
a past event and the asking of the question is asked, for example, "How long is 
it since you left Mt. Cook?" 
Although it can be argued that all duration estimates are retrospective in 
that they relate to an event that occurred in the past, in terms of Fraisse's 
operational distinction the focus of this thesis is retrospective duration 
estimation, specifically estimates made in the three scenarios described above. 
Duration estimation accuracy, the nature of estimation error and the strategies 
adopted by subjects when making a duration estimate are specifically 
considered. Because it is proposed that duration information is routinely 
recalled in everyday situations like those described above, everyday situations 
are used in the various studies. That is, every effort has been made to ensure 
that each experiment is ecologically valid, and that duration information is 
recalled under conditions typical of those encountered in everyday life. 
The events described by scenario (a) have been referred to as 'time eras' 
(Reiser, Black & Kalamarides, 1986) and 'extendures' (Linton, 1986). These 
authors have examined the significance of such events in terms of memory 
organization, rather than the recall of associated duration information. 
Neisser (1986) has also discussed such events in terms of memory organization, 
stating that 
"the occurrence of two similar or related events creates an extended 
event that exists in its own right ... each of the separate events leaves its 
own trace in memory, but there is also the trace of the the pair itself." (p. 
78) 
Neisser's event description complements the above example of a scenario (a) 
event, and indicates that such events can be divided into two categories; 
events, such as going on a holiday or working at a job, which are basically a 
continuous succession of related events, and events, such as ordering 
something by mail and receiving it, or buying a raffle ticket and finding out the 
3 
result, which are simply two related events separated by a succession of 
unrelated events. In terms of the amount of associated information which is 
acquired during these two types of events, and using traditional duration 
estimation research terminology, the former might be described as a 'filled 
duration event' and the later an 'empty duration event'. Experiment 6, Part b, 
of this thesis examines retrospective duration estimation of these two types of 
duration event. 
Scenario (b) events are continuously occurring around us and are often 
brought to our attention by the media. They are clearly distinguished from 
scenario (a) events by the fact that they are experienced indirectly via the media, 
rather than personally experienced. The example used above: "How long were 
the Japanese climbers trapped on Mt. Cook?" describes an event which might 
have received extensive media coverage relating to the fact that climbers were 
overdue, the resulting search, and the subsequent rescue. The media coverage 
of the event essentially defines its duration. Experiments 1 through 4 of this 
thesis explore subjects' ability to estimate the duration of such public events. 
A response made under scenario (c) conditions ("How long is it since you 
left Mt. Cook?") is considered by some authors to be a retrospective duration 
estimate (e.g., Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Fraisse, 1984; Furlong, 1951). 
However, in this situation the duration estimate equals the retention interval 
(the time elapsed since the events occurrence), and it is probable that the 
cognitive processes involved when generating the duration estimate are 
different from those adopted in scenario (a) and (b) situations. The scenario (c) 
situation is essentially an event dating problem. That is, the question "How 
long is it since you left Mt. Cook?" can be easily transformed into "When did I 
leave Mt. Cook?" and "What is the duration between that date and the present 
date?". In accordance with this, the recall of duration information in scenario 
(c) situations is examined in this thesis (Experiment 6, Part a), indirectly via an 
examination of event dating: subjects were asked when an event occurred, 
rather than how long ago it occurred. 
Adopting an event dating procedure in Experiment 6, Part a, as opposed 
to asking how long ago questions, allowed the results to be compared with 
other studies on event dating. Furthermore, because some event dating 
studies have specifically investigated the effect of event memory, event 
memory was also examined in Experiment 6, Part a: subjects' were asked to 
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recall who was involved in the event, where it occurred and what occurred. A 
procedure similar to that used by Wagenaar (1986) was employed. This allowed 
event memory to be assessed objectively, and scaled. 
In general the duration estimation experiments reported in this thesis 
are unique. In relation to Experiments 1 through 4, no similar study of the 
estimation of public event duration was found by this author. Similarly no 
reference to a study such as Experiment 6, Part b, (retrospective duration 
estimation of naturally occurring personal events) was found in the duration 
estimation research literature, although some data relating to these types of 
estimates has been reported in relation to other types of research. 
Furthermore, both parts of Experiment 6 are unique in that subjects' diaries 
were used to verify that they had experienced specific events and to obtain 
details of the events (e.g., the actual duration, the date, who was involved, 
where it occurred). Because Experiment 6 uses a new method, Chapter 3 and 
Experiment 5 (a survey) are devoted to an assessment of its research potential. 
Specifically, Experiment 5 examines the behaviour of diary-keeping and the 
implications this has for the use of diaries in autobiographical memory 
research. 
The following sections have three aims: first to review the relevant 
findings in relation to duration estimation and event dating which can be 
compared with the results obtained in this thesis. Secondly, to illustrate why 
the methods used in this thesis were adopted and why they should be used to 
study duration estimation. Finally, to illustrate why the results obtained in 
this thesis might be different from those traditionally obtained in duration 
estimation research. 
1.1 Duration Estimation Research 
Research on duration estimation has generally used very short actual 
durations, typically less than one minute. The interval to be estimated is 
invariably presented to the subject under controlled laboratory conditions 
using, for example, the onset and termination of a light (e.g., Rule & Curtis, 
1985) or tone (e.g., Kane & Lown, 1986) to define the interval. Often 
immediately after the presentation of the stimulus interval, but sometimes 
after a brief delay (retention interval), the subject is asked to estimate verbally 
or perhaps to reproduce the duration of the experienced interval. There are a 
5 
few studies which have adopted slightly different procedures, but in general 
this procedural description is applicable to the majority of duration estimation 
research (Eisler, 1976; Fraisse, 1984). 
There are obvious parallels between the duration estimation research 
methodology described above and the list-learning (Ebbinghaus type) 
experiments ( Ebbinghaus, 1913) traditionally used to investigate various 
aspects of memory encoding, storage and retrievaL In both types of 
experiment, the stimulus material, the learning or stimulus acquisition 
context, retention interval and, to some extent, the dependent measures used 
can be described as artificial. That is, they do not represent the characteristics 
of the environment in which the systems that are being investigated (duration 
estimation and memory) typically operate, nor how the systems themselves 
normally function in the environment. Traditional laboratory studies may, 
therefore, produce results which only allow the experimenter to model the 
functioning of these systems under highly artificial laboratory conditions. 
The reliability of Ebbinghaus type memory experiments is rarely 
questioned, but the issue of their ecological validity has been raised by a 
number of authors (e.g., Baddeley, 1982; Bahrick, 1979; Bahrick & Karis, 1982; 
Bruce, 1985a, 1985b; Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Hirst & Levine, 1985; 
Lockart, 1979; Neisser, 1976, 1978, 1982, 1985; Rubin, 1986). Neisser argues 
that the traditional approach should be completely rejected in favour of the 
investigation of memory under natural conditions. Other authors have not 
been so explicit in their demands, but have vigorously criticized various 
aspects of Ebbinghaus methodology. 
The ecological validity of the methods used in duration estimation 
research does not, however, appear to have been questioned at all, although 
the problems raised in relation to Ebbinghaus type memory research are 
equally applicable to most studies of duration estimation. Those problems 
relate to every aspect of Ebbinghaus methodology, and are discussed in the 
following sections in relation to duration estimation research. 
1.1.1 The Interval To Be Estimated 
The rationale behind the use of meaningless material such as letter 
sequences, lists of words or paired associates as the stimuli to be remembered 
6 
in Ebbinghaus type memory experiments is to control for the confounding 
effect of previously acquired information (elaboration) and the use of 
inferential or reconstructional processes at the recall or recognition phase 
(Marshall & Fryer, 1978). However, in eliminating the possibility of 
associating the material to be remembered during its initial presentation with 
existing knowledge, and the subsequent use of these associations and other 
knowledge when trying to retrieve the material, the researcher is largely 
ignoring the system which is the object of study, since memory normally is of 
meaningful material. 
The same objection might be made for duration estimation: intervals of 
time or durations that are usually recalled are generally associated with 
meaningful experiences or events. It can reasonably be argued that flashes of 
light or a burst of tone do not constitute meaningful units of information of 
the same kind as, for example, leaving for and returning from a holiday. Not 
all duration estimation research has, however, defined the interval to be 
estimated using flashes of light or bursts of tone. Other stimuli employed 
include clicks (e.g., Doehring, 1961; Jones & MacLean, 1966; McConchie & 
Rutschmann, 1971; Ross & Katchmar, 1951), electrical current (e.g., Ekman, 
Frankenhaeuser, Levander & Mellis, 1966; Hawkes, 1961a, 1961b), a moving 
spot (e.g., Mashhour, 1964; Rachlin, 1966), music (e.g., Kowal, 1987; 
Richards, 1964), time under hypnosis (e.g., Brown, 1984; Schwartz, 1978; St 
Jean & Robertson, 1986), performance of a mathematical task (e.g., Burnside, 
1971), an action video (e.g., bank robbery - Loftus, Schooler, Boone & Kline, 
1987; Marshall, 1966), and a staged assault on a university campus (Buckhout, 
1977). Obviously some of the above studies have had subjects estimate the 
duration of meaningful events, although it is questionable whether the 
duration of such events is normally recalled in the course of everyday life. 
The use of reconstruction (the ability t<;> infer something on the basis of 
past experience rather than actually recalling it) when estimating an event's 
duration has not been widely investigated, the exception being studies which 
have examined event dating; as already noted, event dating can be used to 
produce a duration estimate. Event dating studies (see Section 1.3 ) have 
found ample evidence that dates are often reconstructed rather than recalled. 
There is also evidence that suggests recall in general is often reconstructive 
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, 1975). There is, therefore, every reason to expect 
that reconstructive processes may be involved when estimating event 
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duration. Indeed, in some situations a duration estimate may have to be 
reconstructed; for example, a painting contractor may be asked "How long it 
will take to paint a particular house?", or a park ranger "How long it will take 
to tramp to a certain mountain hut?" from a specified point. Under these 
conditions a duration estimate must be either a guess, or an inference. As a 
highly inaccurate guess may have serious consequences in these situations, it 
is probable the required duration estimate is inferred on the basis of past 
experience. If reconstruction is used when retrospectively estimating an 
event's duration, studies which attempt to explain the estimation process and 
that deny the opportunity of using this recall strategy, may produce misleading 
results. 
Elaboration at encoding or 'depth of processing' (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), 
in contrast to reconstruction, has been explicitly considered in relation to 
duration estimation (e.g., Block & Reed, 1978, Experiment 1). Such studies 
have examined event-memory hypotheses which argue that duration 
estimation is mediated by stored and retrievable information associated with 
the experienced interval. That is, duration estimates are directly related to the 
information "remaining in storage" (Ornstein, 1969, p. 104), or "the number 
of events stored and retained" (Block, 1974, p. 158) from an interval being 
estimated. 
Depth of processing has been manipulated using traditional memory 
research methodology. For example, Block and Reed (1978) had subjects either 
count the number of words with a particular type-style (e.g., upper-case), or the 
number of words that belonged to a specific category (e.g., body parts) that were 
presented during the interval to be estimated. Structured level processing 
(counting words in a particular type-style) was considered to be 'shallow', with 
little elaboration within the existing memory structure, while semantic level 
processing (counting words that belonged to a specific category) was considered 
to be 'deep'. Level of processing was found to affect memory of the material 
presented during the interval to be estimated, but not estimated duration. 
Another depth of processing distinction with perhaps more ecological 
validity might be to consider events directly experienced by an individual as 
'deep'; and those indirectly experienced via the media as 'shallow'. This 
distinction is similar to that between the events described by scenario (a) in 
Section 1.0 (e.g., "How long did you work at Mt. Cook last summer?"), and 
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those described by scenario (b) (e.g., "How long were the Japanese climbers 
trapped on Mt. Cook?"), The former type of event, a personally experienced 
event, is likely to be more elaborately encoded within the memory structure. 
Evidence for this greater elaboration was reported by Kuiper and Rogers (1979) 
where other-referent decisions were found to produce slower reaction times 
that self-referent decisions. Loftus and Fathi (1985) also noted that self-related 
information is "more affect-laden, more familiar, more robust and more 
complex" (p. 294). 
Despite the artificial nature of the interval to be estimated that is typically 
used in duration estimation research, numerous studies have reported a 
significant effect on duration estimates when this variable is manipulated. An 
interval which contains complex, unfamiliar, less predictable or more 
numerous components is estimated to be significantly longer than an interval 
of similar duration containing simpler (e.g., Block, 1978, Experiment 2; 
Ornstein, 1969; Schiffman & Bobko, 1974), more familiar (e.g., Avant & 
Lyman, 1975), more predictable (e.g., Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Ornstein, 1969), 
or fewer components (e.g., Buffardi, 1971; Burnside, 1971; Fraisse, 1963; 
Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Hall & Jastrow, 1886; Ornstein, 1969; Poynter & 
Homa, 1983; Roeloefs & Zeeman, 1951; Schiffman & Bobko, 1977; Thomas & 
Brown, 1974). The latter finding, relating to the number of components 
within the interval, is frequently referred to as the 'filled-duration illusion' 
and has been extensively investigated. 
As well as the above findings, the extent of the filled-duration illusion 
has been reported to vary in relation to the position of intervening elements 
within the interval (e.g., Buffardi, 1971) and the actual durations used (e.g., 
Ihle & Wilsoncroft, 1983). Although a number of studies have failed to find a 
filled-duration effect (e.g., Jones & Natale, 1973; Kane & Lown, 1986), the 
number of studies that have, suggests that it is a reasonably robust effect. 
However, the procedures used to define filled and empty durations must be 
questioned. Gilliland, Hofledt and Eckstrand (1946) noted that the stimuli 
typically used to fill the interval (e.g., flashes of light, bursts of tone) may have 
little attentional value for a subject, while the subject's thoughts and fantasies 
during an unfilled interval may constitute important interval filling. 
In line with the present discussion, a more ecologically valid 
filled/ empty duration interval distinction might be between the two types of 
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scenario (a) events described in Section 1.0. As already noted, events such as 
these are used in Experiment 6, Part b, as filled and empty intervals. 
The stimulus interval's actual duration has also been found to affect 
duration estimation. Many studies have sought to determine whether the 
estimation of duration follows Stevens' psychophysical power law and to 
measure the exponent B, which describes the relationship between actual and 
estimated duration. Eisler (1976) examined 111 duration estimation studies 
spanning 100 years, in which actual duration ranged from .005 to 4800 seconds. 
Approximately 90 percent of the studies used actual durations of less than one 
minute. Exponents from each study were compiled and found on average to 
approximate .9. Thus, duration estimates, when plotted against actual 
duration, were best fit by a power function with a slope less than 1.0 and an 
intercept greater than O. Similar results have been reported in more recent 
studies (e.g., Kane & Lown, 1986; Kowal, 1987). Two conclusions can be 
drawn from these results: (a), that duration estimation is not veridical, with 
estimation error being a function of actual duration (over- and under-
estimation of short and long intervals respectively), and, (b), that in general 
very brief actual durations have been used. The last point is vividly illustrated 
in Eisler's review, where only a handful of studies used durations longer than 
one minute. 
Arguably, many of the duration estimates that individuals routinely 
make relate to much longer intervals of time than a few minutes. This raises 
the question of whether the exponent value typically found with a relatively 
short actual duration range applies in situations in which duration is typically 
estimated. Some evidence that the same systematic estimation errors occur 
when events are dated has been found (e.g., Ferguson & Martin, 1983) and this 
is discussed in Section 1.3.1. 
1.1.2 Stimulus Context 
The learning situation or presentation of the stimulus to be remembered 
or estimated in the traditional type of experiment further reduces the 
possibility of elaboration at encoding and reconstruction at recall. As noted by 
Anderson (1980), the context in which an event occurs can provide useful 
information to aid reconstruction at the time of recall. A laboratory setting 
hardly mimics the complex environment in which events are usually 
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experienced. Learning or information encoding is generally incidental in real 
life, as opposed to the 'learning' to a set criterion employed in many 
traditional memory experiments. 
A questionable aspect of such experiments concerns the effect of 
attention. Does being directed to observe something, as opposed to simply 
experiencing it, influence the way the memory system works? In relation to 
duration estimation there is ample evidence that knowing that a duration 
estimate of an interval is required (prospective paradigm) and being asked for 
an estimate after stimulus interval presentation (retrospective paradigm) 
produce markedly different results. Using the retrospective paradigm, 
duration estimates have been found to increase with the amount of 
information processed during the interval (Ornstein, 1969; G. Underwood & 
Swain, 1973) and as the amount remembered about events within the 
stimulus interval increases (Block, 1974; Ornstein, 1969). On the other hand, 
studies using the prospective paradigm have reported decreases in estimated 
duration as information processing during the stimulus interval increases (e.g., 
Burnside, 1971; Devane, 1974; Essman, 1958; Hicks & Brundige, 1974; 
Vroon, 1970; Warm & McCray, 1969). Furthermore, when the prospective 
and retrospective paradigms have been specifically compared, significantly 
different duration estimates have been obtained (Hicks, Miller & Kinsbourne, 
1976). It is probably fair to assume that in the prospective paradigm a subject 
would be actively attending to duration. Thus the major difference between 
the prospective and retrospective experimental set-ups is one of attention 
during the stimulus interval's presentation. 
Prospective duration estimates appear to be the more artificial. 
Generally, duration information is recalled retrospectively, often long after the 
event's occurrence. There are, of course, situations where one knows before 
an event that duration information is required, such as for a race or the time to 
reach a destination. However, in these situations duration information is not 
normally estimated but accurately timed using a stop-watch or wrist-watch. In 
addition it would be advantageous from the point of view of ecological validity 
for the estimator to experience the intervals to be estimated as they occurred in 
the course of everyday life, rather than under controlled laboratory conditions. 
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1.1.3 Retention Interval 
Retention interval, the time between encoding and retrieval, is typically 
very short in both Ebbinghaus type memory experiments and duration 
estimation experiments (some notable exceptions in the memory field are 
Cofer, 1943; Smith, 1951; Titchener, 1923; Wicklegren, 1972; Worcester, 
1957). In relation to memory research, Bahrick, Bahrick and Wittlinger (1975) 
proposed several reasons for this: 
"Investigators are reluctant to wait many years for answers to their 
questions . . . the same subjects are frequently no longer available for 
testing years after the original learning experience . .. methodological 
and conceptual changes diminish the relevance of results from an 
inquiry designed to answer questions posed many years earlier." (p.55) 
Another reason is to avoid the confounding effect of overt rehearsal and other 
events which might occur during the retention interval on retrieval 
performance. 
Retention interval effects on duration estimation have been reported 
and are often referred to as time-order error (e.g., Allan, 1977; Hellstrom, 
1977; Woodworth & Schlasberg, 1954). Typically, when two intervals of equal 
duration are presented to a subject in succession and an estimate of both 
intervals' duration is obtained, the first interval presented is estimated to be 
shorter than the second. The phenomenon is adequately accounted for by 
Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' model of duration estimation which suggests 
that some of the information stored during the presentation of the first 
interval 'decays' over time and thus the interval is estimated as shorter than 
the second interval presented (see Allan, 1977, and Hellstrom, 1977 for other 
explanations). 
The retention interval involved in studies of time-order error is, 
however, typically very brief; Le. the two intervals to be estimated are 
presented in quick succession. The duration of an event is often recalled long 
after its occurrence, thus retention interval is often substantially longer than 
that used in time-order error studies. Furthermore, studies such as Loftus et 
aL (1987) and Marshall (1966), which required subjects to estimate the duration 
of a single interval, 48 hours and one week respectively after its presentation, 
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. do not provide much relevant data on the effect of retention interval on 
duration estimation. A valid test of retention interval effects requires the 
estimation of a number of intervals (preferably of equal duration) experienced 
at various times in the past. 
1.1.4 Dependent Measure 
The dependent variable in duration research, the duration estimate, is 
generally analysed in terms of accuracy or, more specifically, the nature 
(under- or over-estimation) of the estimation error. However, the methods 
used to obtain duration estimates vary between studies and create results that 
are neither comparable nor homogeneous (Carlson & Feinberg, 1970; Clausen, 
1950; Fraisse, 1984; Hicks et al., 1976; Hornstein & Rotter, 1969; McConchie & 
Rutschmann, 1971). 
One of three methods of obtaining a duration estimate is usually 
adopted: (a) verbal estimation of the duration of an experienced interval, (b) 
production, where a verbalized interval is produced physically (e.g., 'Press this 
switch for 48 seconds'), and (c) reproduction, where an experienced interval is 
reproduced physically. Other less usual methods include comparison 
(Clausen, 1950), where two intervals are experienced and are judged relative to 
each other (also see McGrath & O'Hanlon, 1967), and the use of a time-line to 
indicate subjective duration (e.g., Ornstein, 1969). In the latter method the 
subject marks off a distance on the line which represents the duration of the 
experienced interval. 
Studies comparing verbal estimation, production and reproduction 
have found significant between-method differences in terms of estimation 
accuracy (Clausen, 1950; McConchie & Rutschmann, 1971), the nature of the 
estimation error (Hornstein & Rotter, 1969) and intra- and inter-subject 
variability (McConchie & Rutschmann, 1971) (also see Fraisse, Bonnett, Ge1ly 
& Michaut, 1962; Hawkes, Bailey & Warm, 1961; Kruup, 1961; Ochberg, 
Pollack & Meyer, 1965; Treisman, 1963). The extent of the method effect is 
vividly illustrated in relation to the nature of estimation error. Studies have 
consistently found that duration is underestimated using the method of 
production (e.g., Clausen, 1950; Postman, 1944) and overestimated when a 
verbal estimate is given (e.g., Eson & Kafka, 1952; Hornstein & Rotter, 1969). 
Although the variation in results could be partially an artifact of 
..... subject variables, stimulus variables (modality, intensity, filled 
versus empty, etc.), response variables (reproduction and 
production: switch pressed for duration of estimate versus discrete 
presses at onset and termination of estimate versus single press for 
termination of estimate), standards and distribution of standards, 
grouping, order and sequence of methods within and between 
sessions, etcH (McConchie & Rutschmann, 1971, p. 323), 
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the number of studies which have found method differences suggests that 
there is an effect of method on duration estimation. Indeed, contradictory 
results within a number of specific research areas have been attributed to 
between-study method differences; for example, sense modality differences 
(e.g., Brown & Hitchock, 1965) and stimulus interval effects (e.g., Kowal, 
1987). 
The solution to the dependent variable dilemma appears to be simple. 
Duration is routinely reported verbally in terms of natural language time 
measuring words (e.g., hours, days, weeks, etc.), therefore, in order to study 
the process of duration estimation the method of verbal estimation should be 
used. The literature on the development of the time concept - duration being 
one aspect of this concept - supports the argument that verbal estimates are the 
most valid measure of duration estimation. As noted by Oakden and Sturt 
(1922) the development of a sense of time 
It ••• gives us the power to think in dates, to make and keep 
appointments, and to form plans involving temporal factors. It is 
obvious that in making such plans adults, at least, think directly in 
conventional units of time, e.g., minutes and seconds, and not in 
subjective sensations of duration. It (p. 310) 
Furthermore, routinely adopting verbal estimates as the dependent variable 
measure would not only increase ecological validity, but would also allow the 
results of studies to be more readily compared. 
1.1.5 Ecologically Validity and Duration Estimation Research 
The result of many memory researchers' acceptance of the Ebbinghaus 
approach is the fact It ••• that we have almost no systematic knowledge about 
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memory as it occurs in the course of ordinary life" (Neisser, 1976, p. 141). It is 
this author's belief that the same argument applies to duration estimation 
research, and for similar reasons. Furthermore, statements made in relation 
to the limitations of the available experimental data on memory, and 
suggestions that theorizing is premature, and that contemporary theories of 
memory simply attempt to explain highly artificial phenomena (e.g., Bruce, 
1985a; Hirst & Levine, 1985; Neisser, 1985) are equally applicable to duration 
estimation research. 
Why has this situation occurred? Perhaps, as Neisser (1985) noted in 
relation to memory research, it is " ... far easier to stay in the laboratory where 
experiments can be explicitly designed to test the implications of the latest 
hypothesis" (p. 273), implying it is not easy to conduct ecologically valid 
research. Indeed, the difficulties associated with obtaining suitable 
information on experienced events and establishing its authenticity has 
undoubtedly contributed to the lack of ecologically valid memory research 
(Brewer, 1986; Robinson, 1976). This problem is perhaps even more salient 
in terms of duration research, but it can be overcome, as I hope to demonstrate 
in the studies presented in this thesis. There is a current trend developing 
within the memory research field toward the acceptance of alternative 
methodologies and more ecologically valid research. It is perhaps time for a 
similar trend to develop within the field of duration estimation research. 
What is required is a philosophical commitment on the part of researchers to 
try and understand duration estimation in the context in which it typically 
occurs. 
Rather harsh criticisms of laboratory methods have been made in the 
preceding sections. However, some of the criticisms may not be justified if the 
results of more ecologically valid research are found to agree with laboratory 
research results. Indeed, although not specifically designed to investigate 
retrospective duration estimation, there are already a few studies which have 
reported duration estimation data relating to everyday life events. Loftus et al. 
(1987) note a study conducted by Schneider, Griffith, Sumi and Burcart (1978) 
in which crime victims estimated the time it took for the police to arrive at the 
crime scene. Estimates were matched with official police records; generally the 
estimates made by the victims were longer than those recorded. No data on 
the actual durations involved or the time between the incidents and when the 
estimates were made were reported. Baddeley, Lewis and Nimmo-Smith 
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(1978) asked members of an experimental psychology research panel to recall 
the duration of previous visits to the laboratory. Again no data on actual 
duration or retention interval was reported, the only data given showing that 
the estimates were not significantly different from the actual durations. 
A few studies on child-bearing and child-rearing have also reported 
duration estimation data. Douglas and Blomfield (1956) used hospital records 
to assess the accuracy of mothers' recall of their child's hospitalization 
duration. A correlation of .94 was found between actual and estimated 
duration, yet they were found to be significantly different. The overall 
tendency was towards overestimation of hospitalization duration, a tendency 
that increased as the retention interval increased and the actual hospitalization 
duration decreased. Mednick and Shaffer (1963) also found a tendency towards 
overestimation when 14 mothers were asked to estimate how long they had 
breast-fed one of their children. Pediatricians' records were used to check the 
estimates. No data was reported on actual duration or retention interval. 
Pyles, Stolz and MacFarlane (1935) used archival records obtained from 
hospitals, physicians and public health nurses to assess the accuracy of 
mothers' estimates of gestation period and duration of labour. Mothers' 
estimates were obtained approximately 21 months after the events. A 
correlation of .61 was obtained between estimates of duration of labour and 
recorded duration. Overall the 158 mothers sampled tended to under-estimate 
the actual duration by approximately 30 minutes. The mean actual duration of 
the event was reported as 8 hours and 57 minutes. Duration of gestation was, 
on the other hand, generally estimated accurately with no discernible error 
tendency. No data on actual duration was reported for this event, although, 
one might assume that it would have been around 9 months, as the 
respondents probably did. 
The above studies suggest that duration estimates under ecologically 
valid conditions are not veridical, a finding which is consistent with the 
laboratory study results reported earlier. The tendency towards event duration 
overestimation reported by Schneider et al., (1978), Douglas and Blomfield 
(1956) and Mednick and Shaffer (1963) is, however, difficult to interpret as it 
can not be established on the basis of these results, what factor, or factors, 
produced the tendency. It is unclear if it was the events themselves (a 
possibility considering Pyles et al.'s 1935 results), the duration of the events, or 
perhaps retention interval which produced the overestimation tendency. 
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1.1.6 Models of Duration Estimation 
The general nature of duration estimation research, described in the 
preceding sections, suggest: (a) that because of between-study procedural 
differences, it is difficult to make conclusive statements on the factors that 
mediate duration estimation, and (b) that the experimental methodology 
typically used lacks ecological validity and it is doubtful whether the results of 
much of the existing research apply to everyday life situations (such as those 
described in Section 1.0) in which duration information is routinely recalled. 
Despite this problem, it is still necessary to consider the results of this type of 
duration estimation research, since models proposed to account for duration 
estimation are typically based on it. 
Both biological and cognitive models have been proposed to account for 
the process of duration estimation. Contemporary research, however, tends 
to favour cognitive explanations, which more adequately accommodate the 
majority of research results (Poynter & Homa, 1983). Metabolic functioning 
may perhaps be better considered as a factor which indirectly mediates duration 
estimation rather than directly forming the basis of such estimates. That is, 
although the experimental manipulation of factors such as body temperature 
(e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Fox, Bradbury, Hampton & Legg, 1967; Hoagland, 1933; 
Pfaff, 1968) has been found to affect duration estimation, it should not be 
concluded that physiological processes are directly responsible for the nature of 
duration estimates. Physiological reactions may simply appear to relate to 
duration estimation because they vary with external or internal stimulation. 
This stimulation may well also affect other processes, including cognitive 
activity. Furthermore, a biological clock explanation of duration estimation 
(e.g., Francois, 1927; Hoagland, 1933) cannot account for how duration can be 
estimated long after an interval was experienced. 
Four cognitive models of duration estimation have been put forward. 
Guyau (1890) proposed possibly the first formal duration estimation model 
based on human information processing (Ornstein, 1969), although the 
relationship between cognitive activity and duration estimation had been 
noted much earlier, as illustrated by Aristotle's comment that "only those 
animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive 
time is also that whereby they remember" (cited in Block, 1974, p. 153). Guyau 
suggested that the experience of duration is related to the stimulus interval in 
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terms of the intensity and number of elements within the interval, and the 
differences between these elements. The attentional value of the interval's 
elements, as well as their associative characteristics, was also considered 
important. Obviously, Guyau's model is not very specific. However, it does, 
at least indirectly, make reference to all of the information processing activities 
which have since been specifically incorporated in models of duration 
estimation; 
informa tional, 
Reed, 1978). 
these models have been referred to as the attentional, 
contextual-change, and event-memory hypotheses (Block & 
Common to each of the above models is an implied positive relationship 
between an increase in cognitive activity and duration estimation. The 
attentional hypothesis (see Underwood, 1975; Underwood & Swain, 1973) 
emphasizes characteristics of the information-processing task performed 
during the interval to be estimated. Both high attentional demands resulting 
from the interval's elements and from attention to the passage of time during 
an empty interval are suggested to lengthen an estimate of an interval's 
duration. The informational hypothesis, sometimes referred to as the 
'processing effort model' (Poynter & Homa, 1983), also emphasizes the extent 
of processing, or processing time required during the interval to be estimated. 
For example, Vroon (1970) proposed that duration estimates directly relate to 
the amount of information transmitted during an interval. A number of 
studies have found processing effort effects (e.g., Block, 1974; Burnside, 1971; 
Hicks, et al., 1976; Vroon, 1970), but the relationship between estimated 
duration and processing activity has been shown to vary with the interval's 
actual duration. That is, with short durations (less than 10 seconds), the 
relationship is positive, while longer durations tend to produce the inverse 
relationship. 
Obviously, both the 'attentional' and 'processing effort' models focus on 
the information processing activities that occur during the experience of an 
interval or event. Therefore, they do not explicitly accord memory a role in 
duration estimation. That is, they do not consider the product of an interval, 
in terms of what one remembers of it, forms the basis of its estimated duration. 
The contextual-change and event-memory hypotheses, on the other hand, do 
focus on memory retrieval processes. These models are therefore perhaps 
more adequate as explanations of duration estimation, as such estimates are 
not only made immediately after the experience of an interval but also after 
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considerable delays. Obviously, to estimate the duration of an interval or 
event experienced 6 months ago one would, generally, have to remember the 
event, and it seems reasonable to assume one's memory of the event would 
not be of its attentional demands or the information processing effort involved 
at the time. 
The contextual-change hypothesis (Block & Reed, 1978) was first 
proposed by Fraisse (1963) who suggested duration estimation was mediated by 
"the number of changes observed" (p. 219) during an interval. Although this 
model emphasizes one's memory of an interval, it postulates that it is not the 
actual extent of the remembered interval's events that is important "but rather 
memory for the overall change in cognitive context during an interval" (Block 
& Reed, 1978, p. 664). This is based on the assumption that different tasks 
require somewhat different cognitive processes. Block and Reed (1978) found 
support for this model in experiments where intervals containing different 
kinds of 'levels of processing' tasks were estimated to be longer than equivalent 
intervals containing only one type of task, and where level-of-processing was 
found to affect event memory but not duration estimation. 
Of the event-memory hypotheses, Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' 
hypothesis is undoubtedly the most widely recognized (Fraisse, 1984). 
Furthermore, Fraisse considers that it is the most dominant in terms of 
retrospective duration estimation. Ornstein was, however, not the first to 
formalize the relationship between remembered event information and 
duration estimation. Frankenhaeuser (1959) conducted a series of experiments 
from which he concluded that the amount of 'mental content' from an 
interval positively influences one's estimate of its duration. Ornstein's model 
is, however, more complex than Frankenhaeuser's. Ornstein suggests that 
duration estimation is proportional to the size of the storage space of the 
"information remaining in storage" from the interval being estimated 
(Ornstein, 1969, p. 104). Thus, rather than an estimate being proportional to 
the information input during an interval, it is the information remaining in 
storage that is important. 
Ornstein's (1969) emphasis on the information remaining in storage 
allowed him to accommodate the duration estimation phenomena of 'time-
order error'. As already noted, such errors are found when the duration of 
two intervals of equal duration are estimated; the first typically being 
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underestimated relative to the second. Ornstein accounts for this by assuming 
that 
"When some period elapses before an interval is to be judged ... 
some items should drop out of storage and the experience of duration 
of that interval shortens." (p. 48) 
Thus the storage size of the first interval is smaller than the second at the time 
of estimation. Ornstein's model is also able to account for many other duration 
estimation findings, such as the 'filled duration illusion', and the typical 
finding that estimated duration is proportional to the number and complexity 
of elements within the interval to be estimated. 
Considering all the models of duration estimation, Ornstein's is the 
most applicable to the wide range of situations in which duration estimates are 
normally made. In contrast to the other models it accounts for how an event's 
duration can be estimated long after its occurrence. In line with these 
comments, Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' model of duration estimation is 
assessed in relation to public event duration estimation in Experiments 1 
through 4, and in relation to personal event duration estimation in 
Experiment 6, Part b. 
1.2 Memory: Temporal Components 
Ornstein's (1969) model suggests that the memory system plays an 
important part in duration estimation. Temporal characteristics, such as 
sequence and duration, are also important variables when recalling a past 
experience or event. The importance of temporal information within the 
memory system is primarily associated with autobiographical memory, that is, 
memories of events personally experienced by the subject (Brewer, 1986; 
Fitzgerald, 1986; McCormack, 1979; Neisser, 1986; Robinson, 1976; Schactel, 
1947) and where knowledge of events in the lives of others, such as 'public 
figures' or friends, obtained via the media or inter-personal communication 
are explicitly excluded (Loftus & Fathi, 1985; Whitten & Leonard, 1981). Such 
personal memories are explicitly required when people produce anamnestic 
data during psychological and medical treatment (Moss & Goldstein, 1979) and 
when witnesses testify about past events (Loftus, 1979). 
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Temporal components of memory have been explicitly incorporated in 
. some accounts of memory. Temporal information, for example, is at the basis 
of the episodic/semantic memory distinction proposed by Tulving (1972). 
Tulving suggested that episodic memory stores temporally dated episodes or 
events and the temporal-spatial relations among them. For example, "The car 
came out of the garage last Friday, having been repaired after breaking down 
on the preceding Wednesday". Obviously the temporal components of 
sequence and duration are important for the meaning of this memory. 
Semantic memory, on the other hand, stores the generalized knowledge a 
person has about the world; knowledge of objects, concepts, rules and 
meaning which are necessary for the use of language. Semantic memory then 
is not essentially associated with a particular point in time. A similar 
distinction to Tulving's episodic/semantic one, was made by Schactel (1947), 
who contrasted autobiographical and utilitarian memory. 
Tulving's (1972) attempt at classifying the phenomena and processes of 
memory sparked off considerable controversy (e.g., Anderson & Ross, 1980; 
McKoon, Ratcliff & Dell, 1986; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1986; Tulving, 1985, 1986; 
Warrington, 1986). The idea that there exists in fact two structurally and 
functionally different memory systems, as opposed, say, to the distinction 
having heuristic value, has been most vigorously questioned (Tulving, 1986). 
Accepting the episodic/semantic distinction implies the need for a dual-store 
model of long-term memory, whereas most currently favoured memory 
models postulate a 'single-store' (McKoon et al., 1986). The semantic/episodic 
debate focuses on the encoding and storage aspects of the memory system. In 
relation to the present discussion of the temporal characteristics of memory, 
there is general agreement that such information (i.e., when an event took 
place) is a necessary aspect of episodic memory recall. 
1.3 Dating Events 
As already noted, dating a past event can be carried out when answering 
a specific type of duration question (e.g., "How long is it since you left Mt. 
Cook?"). A large number of studies have been conducted on event dating, and 
can be divided into three categories on the basis of the methodology used; (a) 
traditional Ebbinghaus type experiments where subjects typically judge the 
serial position of words or the relative recency of pairs of words from 
sequentially presented lists, (b) the dating of significant public events, and (c) 
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the dating of autobiographical events. Research has also been conducted on 
the response bias inherent in survey data, and some of this research is relevant 
to a discussion of event dating. In the following sections, research on event 
dating is reviewed in order to elaborate current positions on the types of dating 
errors that are typically made, the factors that influence these errors, and 
finally, the models proposed to explain how events are dated. 
It should be noted at this point that a number of studies have required 
subjects to date recalled autobiographical memories, but have obtained no 
information on the accuracy of, or processes involved in, event dating. These 
studies have typically used single-word or phrase prompts to facilitate the recall 
of specific autobiographical experiences. The dates assigned to the recalled 
memories (which the experimenter has no way of verifying) have been used to 
examine the distribution of the recalled memories across the life-span (e.g., 
Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; Fitzgerald, 1981; Fitzgerald & Lawrence, 1984; 
Franklin & Holding, 1977; Holding, Noonan, Pfau & Holding, 1986; 
Pille mer, Goldsmith, Panter & White, 1988; Pillemer, Rhinehart & White, 
1986; Uhlenhuth, Haberman, Balter & Lipman, 1977), the organization and 
search processes involved in autobiographical memory (non-temporal 
components) (e.g., Reiser, Black & Abelson, 1985; Reiser et a1., 1986; Riegel, 
1973; Robinson, 1980), and the nature of autobiographical memory recall in 
special populations, such as amnesic, Korsakoff's and ECT patients (e.g., Sagar, 
Cohen, Corkin & Growdon, 1985; Zola-Morgan, Cohen & Squire, 1983). 
Further details on these studies and the methods involved are reported in 
Chapter 3. 
1.3.1 Date Responses: Accuracy and Error 
Perhaps the best place to begin an examination of event dating is to 
consider the nature of the responses that are typically made, and, in particular, 
the accuracy of event dating. Proposed models of event dating must be able to 
account for the systematic errors that occur, and it is, therefore, logical to 
consider them in light of the available data on date response characteristics. 
In order to examine the accuracy of event dating, it is first necessary to 
establish precisely when the events to be dated actually did occur. Usually this 
presents little problem when the events are public (e.g., the assassination of J. F. 
Kennedy); the precise dates of autobiographical events, on the other hand, are 
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rather more difficult to verify. Bruce and Van Pelt (1989), Linton (1975), 
Wagenaar (1986), and White (1982) achieved this by recording daily a sample of 
their activities and then later dating these events. Self-recording of daily 
activities and subsequent dating of the events was also employed by Barclay and 
Wellman (1986), Thompson (1982, 1985a, 1985b), and Thompson, 
Showronski and Lee (1988). However, rather than recording their own daily 
activities, the latter authors instructed a sample of subjects as to what to record 
and examined these subjects ability to subsequently date the recorded events. 
Essentially these experimental techniques fall within the category of 
longitudinal research. The delay inherent in this type of research is avoided in 
studies of event dating by using archival records to determine the subject's 
involvement in and the precise actual date of the events to be dated. A range 
of different types of events have been used, for example, a psychology course 
examination (Loftus & Fathi, 1985), attendance at an experimental psychology 
laboratory (Baddeley et al., 1978). A similar cross-sectional research approach 
has been employed in studies which have examined subjects' ability to date 
significant public events, such as 'Lord Mountbatten's assassination' (e.g., 
Brown, Rips & Shevell, 1985; Brown, Shevell & Rips, 1986; Ferguson & 
Martin, 1983; Friedman & Wilkins, 1985; Kemp, 1987, 1988; Lieury, Aiello, 
Lepreux & Mellet, 1980; Lieury, Caplain, Jacquet & Jolivet, 1979; Perlmutter, 
Metzger, Miller & Nezworski 1980; Underwood, 1977). In all of the above 
studies it was possible to compare the date a subject assigned to an event with 
its actual date of occurrence. 
The accuracy of the date assigned to an event by the subject is generally 
measured by its deviation from the event's actual date of occurrence. Two 
different measures of dating error are often used: signed error, in which the 
direction of the deviation is included, and absolute error, where the sign of the 
deviation is ignored. Signed errors measure whether an event was dated more 
recently or more remotely than it actually occurred. Such errors are often 
referred to as under- and over-estimation of actual event age, respectively (e.g., 
Baddeley et al., 1978; Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Lieury et aI., 1979; Livson & 
McNiell. 1962). They have also been referred to, respectively, as forward- and 
backward- telescoping (e.g., Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Thompson et al., 1988). 
However, the use of the latter terms to describe systematic dating errors 
originated in research on the error in responses to autobiographical questions 
which require activity frequency estimates (see Section 1.3.2). 
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Assigned and actual event dates are consistently reported to be positively 
correlated. Baddeley et al. (1978) obtained a correlation coefficient of .57, 
Brown et al. (1985) .88, Brown et al. (1986) .83, Bruce and Van Pelt (1989) .77, 
Ferguson & Martin. (1983) .66, Lieury et al. (1979) .72, Livson & McNiell. (1962) 
.75, Underwood (1977) .96 and White (1982) .26, .40, and .26 over three 
attempts to recall event date. These correlations suggest that the subjects were 
reasonably good at determining the ordinal temporal relations among events. 
However, the mean absolute dating error reported in some studies (e.g., 11 
months, Brown et al., 1985; 15 months, Underwood, 1977) suggests that this 
is not because the subjects knew the actual date of occurrence very often. 
Substantially smaller mean absolute dating errors, ranging from .93 to 2 days, 
were reported by Loftus & Marburger (1983). However, these means were 
obtained from the dating of only three or four events (e.g., examination dates), 
and dating errors greater than 7 days were counted as 7 days. 
The accuracy of event dating was also investigated by Rubin (1982), 
Experiment 5, using a rather ingenious procedure. A sample of diary keepers 
who agreed to participate in the research was obtained from an undergraduate 
psychology course. These subjects were requested to recall and date 100 
autobiographical events. Recall was without prompts. The subjects were then 
provided with their 100 event descriptions and asked to attempt to re-date 
them using their diary records. A total of 513 events were re-dated in this 
manner by the nine subjects who participated in the study. A between-subject 
median absolute dating error range of a to 37 days, and a group median of 3 
days was reported. Twenty-seven percent of the events had been exactly dated 
by the subjects, 34 percent were within one day, 59 percent within seven days, 
74 percent within a month, 93 percent within a year and 97 percent within two 
years. 
Investigations of the reliability of event dating, although few in number, 
also provide valuable data on the accuracy of event dating. Several studies of 
dating reliability have employed Galton's (1879) word-association technique 
which requires subjects to recall a specific autobiographical experience cued by a 
prompt word, such as 'street' or 'church' (e.g., McCormack, 1979; Robinson, 
1976, 1986). Subjects were required to date the recalled memories and then, 
after a delay, were again presented with their descriptions of the recall 
memories and asked to re-date them. The actual procedures varied slightly 
between the studies; for example, subjects in McCormack's study could date 
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recalled events by providing calendar year, the duration since the event or 
their age when the event occurred, while Robinson (1976, 1986) requested year 
and month as a minimum. Elapsed time between dating and re-dating also 
varied slightly between the studies; Robinson used an interval of two weeks in 
1986 and 1 week in 1976, the latter time being similar to that used by 
McCormack (1979). All three studies found reasonably high product-moment 
correlation coefficients between the two sets of assigned dates, .98 (McCormack, 
1979), .94, (Robinson, 1976), and .66 and .84 (Robinson, 1986). The 
correlations obtained by Robinson (1986) were obviously lower but this may be 
attributable to the introduction of a slightly different procedure in the re-dating 
phase of the experiment. The primary objective of Robinson's study was to 
examine strategies adopted when dating events. 
The above results suggest that the date assigned to an event may be quite 
reliable; that is, subjects are fairly consistent in their recall of when they think 
the event occurred. However, the obtained correlations are not perfect. 
Robinson (1976) reported that the majority of the difference between the two 
sets of dates was in the year component. That is, subjects changed their mind 
about the year an event had occurred in more frequently than for the month or 
day of the month. A similar result was reported by Rubin (1982) when 
assigned date was compared with the diary record of the event. 
Retention interval, the time between the occurrence of an event and an 
individual's assignment of a date to it, is perhaps the most important factor in 
determining the extent and nature of event dating error. Researchers have 
consistently reported that absolute dating error increases as retention interval 
increases (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; Barclay & Wellman, 1986; Friedman & 
Wilkins, 1985; Lieury et al., 1979; Linton, 1975; Perlmutter et al., 1980; 
Thompson, 1982, 1985a, 1985b; Thompson et al., 1988). However, no 
retention interval effect is generally found when subjects date very recent 
events. Thompson et al. (1988) found very accurate event dating within two 
weeks of an event's occurrence, as did Linton (1975). 
The extent of the retention interval effect on absolute dating error has 
been investigated in some studies. Barclay and Wellman (1986) reported that 
absolute dating error increased from 9 to 22 days as retention interval increased 
from one month to a maximum of 12 months, Baddeley et al. (1978), an 
increase of 19 days for every 100 days of retention interval, and Thompson 
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(1982, 1985a), one day for every week of retention interval, while Linton 
(1975) reported an average absolute error of 12 days over a 12 month retention 
interval. 
Retention interval also has an effect on the sign of the event dating 
error, that is, whether the error is an under- or over-estimation of an event's 
actual age. Brown et al. (1985) reported a product-moment correlation between 
signed error and actual date of -.74, and Baddeley et al. (1978) -.33. These 
correlations suggest a tendency toward underestimation of event age as 
retention interval increases, a result which is generally found when the dating 
error of a number of event of different ages is averaged (Kemp, 1988). 
Thompson et al. (1988) reported that this underestimation tendency was 
significant when the retention interval reached three months. While the 
general tendency is for event age underestimation to increase as retention 
interval increases there is some evidence that for recent events the age of the 
event is overestimated (e.g., Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Kemp, 1988; Lieury et 
al., 1979, 1980; Loftus & Marburger, 1983). Not all event dating studies have, 
however, found an overall dating bias, Wagenaar (1986), White (1982) and 
Rubin (1982) found dating error to be evenly distributed between under- and 
over-estima tion. 
Ferguson and Martin (1983) had subjects indicate on time-lines the date 
when they considered 12 significant public events (e.g., the visit of Pope John 
Paul II to the U.S.A) had occurred. Retention interval was defined as the 
interval between the occurrence of the event and the date of testing, and 
ranged from 3 to 55 months. The obtained data was found to be fitted by a 
straight line with a slope of .66 and an intercept of .45. Thus the age of the 
recent events were typically overestimated and those of the remote events 
underestimated. Ferguson and Martin interpreted retention interval as a 
duration and the assigned date as a duration estimate. Thus their results can 
be viewed as showing similar error tendencies to those typically found in 
duration estimation research where intervals of short and long actual duration 
are over- and under-estimated, respectively (refer Section 1.1.1). 
The effect of retention interval on dating error may, however, be 
different for the various components of a recalled date. A date can be divided 
into three components; year, month and day of the month. Friedman & 
Wilkins (1985) examined the relationship between retention interval and 
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absolute dating error for each of these components separately. Year and month 
analysis produced results consistent with those reported above. However, 
accuracy in determining the day of the month component was not related to 
retention interval. The hour of the day that the event occurred was also 
requested and recall was found to be independent of retention interval. A 
somewhat similar result was obtained by White (1982), who suggested that 
time of day might be reconstructed rather than recalled: "For instance, if given 
the description 'Lunch on terrace', 
somewhere around midday" (p. 179). 
it is not hard to guess it occurred 
Evidence of this type of reconstruction 
was found by Friedman & Wilkins, Experiment 2, where subjects indicated, in 
fictitious stories, event times (time of day) that were closer to actual event 
times than expected by chance. 
Overall, the results of studies on event dating accuracy are reasonably 
consistent. Some of the apparent between-study dating accuracy differences 
may be attributable to the use of slightly different dependent measures; for 
example, Brown et al. (1985), Brown et al. (1986) and Underwood (1977) 
required subjects to recall year and month of occurrence only, while Baddeley 
et al. (1978) also required subjects to indicate the day of the month by marking a 
point on a 10 cm line. In general, the preceding results suggest that: (a) 
individuals can assign a date to an event with some measure of accuracy, (b) 
that they are reasonably consistent in their determination of when events 
occurred, (c) that retention interval has a significant effect on dating accuracy, 
and (d) that retention interval also has an effect on the sign of dating error. 
1.3.2 Survey Data: Response Errors 
Retrospective surveys are frequently used as a basis for policy decisions 
(Potter, 1977), as well as providing much of society's knowledge about such 
issues as the prevalence of crime, sickness and diseases, and consumer 
expenditure. The accuracy of survey data is, therefore, of vital importance. 
Systematic dating errors have been observed in surveys which have required 
specific events to be recalled and dated (see Bradburn, Rips and Shevell (1987) 
for a recent review). The most extensive examination of dating error in 
relation to this type of survey question has been in the area of birth-history or 
fertility analysis (e.g., Blacker & Brass, 1979; Potter, 1977; Som, 1973). Where 
it has been possible to compare survey responses with official records (registrars 
of births), large errors have been found. 
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Blacker and Brass (1979) reported a study by Gibril (1976) in which survey 
responses were compared with Medical Research Council records. The sample 
population lived in four villages in Gambia, Africa; and births and deaths 
were closely monitored over a prolonged period. Of interest to the present 
discussion are the results of the comparison between assigned date of a child's 
birth and the actual date. The comparison revealed systematic dating errors 
with births that occurred in the preceding three years being dated further back 
in time and births that occurred 10 to 15 years before being dated more recently 
than their actual date. Thus both over- and under-estimation of event age 
were found. This is a particularly interesting finding, since normally one 
would expect a child's birth date to be recalled rather accurately because of the 
yearly celebration of the date, for example the birthday party. 
The age of event overestimation trend observed in Gibril's (1976) study is 
particularly worrying for investigators of fertility rates. Such errors could 
easily result in researchers overestimating the decline in birth rate or reporting 
a decline which is not actually occurring (Potter, 1977). Overestimation errors 
have also been observed in fertility surveys in El Salvador and Bangladesh 
(Potter, 1977); but in general, both under- and over-estimation errors are likely 
to occur. Som (1973) noted that such errors (border bias) were evident in 
demographic survey data obtained in Guinea and the Ivory Coast. He also 
noted that the combination of these errors was probably responsible for a 
general tendency in retrospective field surveys to over-estimate births and 
deaths within a specified reference period. 
Evidence of both under- and over-estimation errors was also reported by 
Douglas & Blomfield (1956). They asked mothers to recall the age of one of 
their children at the time the child had been hospitalized. Hospital admission 
records were used to check hospitalization dates. Comparing the mothers' 
responses and the hospital records indicated that when retention interval was 
less than two years there was a slight, but not significant, underestimation of 
the admission age. With longer retention intervals age at admission was 
found to be significantly overestimated. This result is interesting, as it 
indicates that recalling information other than a date can be subject to the same 
systematic errors mentioned above. 
Response errors similar to those mentioned above have also been found 
for survey questions which require activity frequency estimates such as; 
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"During the past 12 months, about how many visits did you make to a 
dentist?" (National Centre for Health Statistics, cited in Bradburn et al., 1987), 
and which are attributed to event dating errors. In the above question, the 
required quantitative response is presumably generated by recalling specific 
autobiographical events (visits to a dentist), dating these events, and then 
determining whether each particular recalled event occurred within the 
reference period (e.g., 'the past 12 months') defined in the question. 
Research on activity frequency estimates generally uses the terms 
forward- and backward-telescoping to describe specific types of error (e.g., 
Bradburn et al., 1987; Bushery, 1981; Gray, 1955; Neter & Waksberg, 1964; 
Penick & Owens, 1976; Quackenbush & Shaffer, 1960; Schneider & Sumi, 
1981; Sudman & Bradburn, 1973, 1974, 1982; Woltman, Bushery & 
Carstensen, 1975). The term forward-telescoping, also called 'end-period 
effect' (Kemsley, 1979), and 'telescopic effect' (Som, 1973), describes a tendency 
to overestimate activity frequency because events that occurred outside the 
reference (more than 12 months ago) are recalled as occurring within it. Thus 
the age of events is underestimated. Backward-telescoping, also called the 
'receding effect' (Som, 1973), occurs if the reference period defined in the 
question is not bound at one end by the interview. That is, if in the above 
example, the question was in the form "How many visits did you make last 
year to a dentist?" A backward-telescoping error results if an incorrect assigned 
date moves an event back into the question's reference period; the age of the 
event is overestimated. In the above examples, 'external' telescoping effects 
are described (Woltman et aL, 1975), with both types of telescoping errors 
producing event frequency overestimates. 
Telescoping errors can also remove events from the reference period, 
resulting in event frequency underestimation, or change the distribution of 
events within a reference period. The latter effect is sometimes referred to as 
'internal-telescoping' (Woltman et aL, 1975). Generally, however, research 
has focused on external telescoping effects and attributed event frequency 
underestimation to omissions or forgetting. Collectively, forward- and 
backward-telescoping errors are referred to as 'border bias' (Sudman & 
Bradburn, 1974) or 'boundary effects' (Som, 1973). 
Schneider and Sumi (1981) found mainly forward-telescoping errors in a 
survey of crime-victimization (also see Garofalo & Hindelang, 1977; Penick & 
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Owens, 1976), as did Neter and Waksberg (1964) in the reporting of household 
alterations and repairs. Forward-telescoping appears to be more frequent than 
backward (Schneider & Sumi, 1981; Sudman & Bradburn, 1974), and it poses a 
serious problem for survey researchers as it can not be controlled for as easily as 
backward-telescoping. The extent of the forward-telescoping error also appears 
to increase as the frequency of the event being investigated increases, possibly 
because the likelihood of confusion about dates increases (Sudman & 
Bradburn, 1974). The reference period defined in the question further 
influences the magnitude of the error. More actual forward-telescoping is 
likely as the reference period increases, but the actual size of the error increases 
as the size of the reference period decreases (Sudman & Bradburn, 1974). This 
is because the percentage of events erroneously included increases. Finally, 
the type of event or behaviour being investigated can influence the magnitude 
of the error. There are likely to be fewer omissions or event forgetting for 
salient events, and thus the compensating effect such omissions have on 
telescoping errors will be reduced (Neter & Waksberg, 1964). In general then 
the telescoping effect is a complex one and with forward-telescoping errors on 
the order of 20 percent not being uncommon - some studies have revealed 
errors as high as 60 percent (Schneider & Sumi, 1981) - it is a significant source 
of error in retrospective surveys. 
Several attempts have been made to develop an exponential model 
which adequately describes the nature of telescoping and omissions, and that 
can be used to adjust survey data accordingly (e.g., Potter, 1977; Neter & 
Waksberg, 1964; Sudman & Bradburn, 1974). However, the research results 
indicating the complex nature of telescoping effects have frustrated these 
attempts at model building. In relation to estimates of crime rates, Schneider 
and Sumi (1981) note that 
ft ••• the likelihood of developing a general model for correcting 
mnemonic biases is probably very low. This assessment follows 
from: (1) evidence indicating differential victimization survey recall 
across reported and unreported crime events; (2) the apparent 
dissimilarities of telescoping/forgetting patterns across samples and 
seasons, and (3) the lack of a stable comparison estimate of the 'true' 
distribution of incidents with which to calibrate a correction model. It 
(p. 409-410) 
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These factors are also likely to be just as applicable to other types of events, 
indicated by Potter's (1977) concluding remark in his paper, in which an 
attempt was made to construct such a model to adjust birth-history data; " ... 
the ultimate goal of arriving at a set of satisfactory 'correction factors' is, I 
think, out of reach" (p. 364). 
Research on response bias in survey data appears to have found results 
which are consistent with those reported in studies of event dating. The 
finding that forward-telescoping errors are more common that backward-
telescoping errors and that forward-telescoping errors increase as the retention 
interval increases can be accounted for by the tendency of subjects in event 
dating studies to generally underestimate the age of events and for this 
tendency to increase as retention interval increases. 
1.3.3 Factors Effecting Date Responses 
A number of studies have specifically investigated what factor or factors 
cause the systematic dating errors cited above. Brown et al. (1985) proposed an 
'accessibility hypothesis' which states that the more a subject recalls of an 
event, the more recently it will be determined to have occurred. This 
hypothesis is based on two assumptions. First, as the time since an event's 
occurrence increases, less information about the event will be remembered, 
that is, there is decay of memory strength over time. Secondly, that subjects, 
when dating events, take into account the amount of event related 
information they can retrieve as one indication of the event's age. 
In order to test their hypothesis, Brown et al. (1985) selected a sample of 
significant public events that had occurred during the life-time of the subjects. 
Subjects were presented with short descriptions of the events (e.g., United 
States signs the Panama Canal Treaty), and required to date each event, and to 
indicate on a 0 to 9 scale how much they remembered about each event. Date 
responses were in terms of year and month of the event's occurrence. 
Examination of the dates assigned to the high and low knowledge events 
indicated that the high-knowledge events were generally dated as having 
occurred more recently, a tendency towards underestimation of event age. 
Further support for the accessibility hypothesis was found when the date 
responses of subjects who rated their knowledge of an event before dating it 
were compared to those who dated the event first. Giving a knowledge rating 
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for an event was assumed to involve active memory searching for relevant 
information, thus making the event more accessible at the time of dating. As 
predicted, there was a general tendency for the group who rated before dating to 
assign more recent dates to events. 
Similar event knowledge/date assignment results were obtained when 
event knowledge was accessed objectively using recall protocols (e.g., Brown et 
aL, 1985, Experiment 3), and when the time taken to indicate if a specific event 
occurred before or after a presented date was examined (e.g., Brown et aL, 1985, 
Experiment 4). In the latter experiment, comparison times of highMknowledge 
events were faster when they were compared to early dates, and comparison 
times of low-knowledge events were faster for later dates. This result is 
consistent with the observed tendency for high-knowledge events to be dated 
more recently, thus resulting in a quicker determination of the relationship of 
the event to a presented date <e.g., before or after) when the presented date is 
an early date. 
Memory strength effects have also been found in studies of recency 
judgements of items such as words or nonsense syllables presented in list form 
under controlled laboratory conditions. One of two procedures is typically 
employed. In one procedure, each item is presented twice, separated by a 
specific number of intervening items, and subjects are required to state how far 
back in the series the first presentation occurred when the item is presented a 
second time (e.g., Hinrichs, 1970). Alternatively, subjects are presented with 
two items from a list presented earlier and must decide which item was 
presented more recently (e.g., Fozard, 1970; Morton, 1968; Wolff, 1966; 
Yntema & Trask, 1963). In the former paradigm, subjects make absolute 
recency judgements, in the latter they make relative judgements. The 
applicability of this type of research to the present discussion has been 
questioned by a number of authors (e.g., Brown et al., 1985; Loftus & 
Marburger, 1983) and detailed criticisms of this type of experimental procedure 
has been made in earlier sections of this thesis. Therefore, the applicability of 
the results of these studies should be not be taken for granted. 
The general finding of these laboratory experiments is that the memory 
strength of an item is positively related to recency judgements. That is, items 
with stronger memory traces are judged to have been presented more recently. 
Item memory strength is not accessed directly but rather assumed on the basis 
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that memory strength is a decreasing exponential function of time elapsed 
since item presentation or the number of items presented between the first and 
second presentation of an item (Tzeng & Cotton, 1980). A more direct 
assessment of item memory strength was employed by Brelsford, Freund and 
Rundus (1967) who found accuracy of a recalled item to be positively related to 
recency judgements. In general then this type of research has produced results 
similar to those obtained by Brown et al. (1985). 
Both studies using public events and those requiring recency judgements 
have reported memory strength effects on the determination of an event's date 
of occurrence. However, in both sets of studies the experimental procedures 
are atypical of the situations in which temporal information is routinely 
recalled. This is particularly true of recency judgement studies. Thompson et 
al. (1988) attempted to find a memory strength effect under more realistic 
conditions. Subjects were instructed to record in a diary one unique personally 
experienced event per day for three months. Recorded events were collected at 
the end of each week. One week after the completion of the recording phase, 
subjects were presented with their recorded event descriptions, and events 
determined not to be unique at this time were removed from the sample. The 
remaining events were then rated as to how well they were remembered on a 
7-point scale. Only those events that were remembered were then dated using 
a calendar. 
Examination of the dates assigned to these personally experienced events 
indicated that as retention interval increased, there was a tendency to date 
events more recently than their actual date of occurrence. However, no 
reliable difference in this tendency was found between well and poorly 
remembered events. Thus, no support for Brown et al.'s (1985) accessibility 
hypothesis was evident in the data. A similar result was also found by 
Thompson et al. (1988) when two other sets of data obtained using the same 
methods and procedures were examined. Thompson et al. also tested the 
accessibility hypothesis using a personally experienced/reported event dating 
comparison. Both types of events were obtained using the diary procedure 
outlined above. Personally experienced events, as used in the preceding 
experiment, were defined as "directly experienced or first-hand personal 
experiences", while reported events were defined as those "events that 
someone else has told you about" (Thompson et al., 1988, p.465). Although a 
reliable date underestimation tendency, which increased with retention 
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interval for both types of event, was found; no reliable effect of either type of 
event or vividness of memory, indicated by obtained knowledge ratings, was 
found. It is probably fair to assume that there would be a memory strength 
difference between experienced and reported events, although Thompson et al. 
did not note any difference in the obtained memory ratings. 
Kemp (1988) also investigated the effect of event knowledge, determined 
by ratings on a 9-point knowledge scale, on dating errors. One hundred public 
events were dated by the subjects, 50 being 'historical' events and 50 'recent' 
events. Both types of event were generally dated more recently than their 
actual date of occurrence. However, analysis of the dating errors of the poorly-
and well-known events indicated no significant tendency towards event age 
underestimation as event knowledge increased. Indeed, for the historical 
events the opposite was found with the poorly remembered events being dated 
more recently than the well-known events. Event knowledge was, however, 
found to be positively related to dating accuracy for both the recent and 
historical events. 
Some of Thompson's earlier work has also reported event memory 
effects on dating accuracy (e.g., Thompson, 1982; 1985a, 1985b). These studies 
employed the diary procedures described above. Dating accuracy was found to 
be positively related to memory ratings obtained at the time of dating and to 
perceived memorability noted at the time of event recording. Thompson 
(1982), however, noted that the event memory effect interacted with retention 
interval. That is, event memory only reliably affected dating accuracy for 
events occurring up to approximately 7 weeks before dating. Event memory 
effects were also used to explain the dating accuracy difference found between 
very pleasant and very unpleasant events (e.g., Thompson, 1985a). The 
former type of event was dated more accurately, but was also found to be 
rehearsed more frequently. Probably more frequently rehearsed events would 
be better remembered. 
Friedman and Wilkins (1985) also suggested an event memory effect on 
dating accuracy. Their study was conducted in England, and three of the public 
events dated, relating to the British Royal Family, were found to be dated 
more accurately than the other events. The authors proposed that this was 
because of the greater importance of these events for their subjects, and hence 
they might be more memorable. A similar result was also reported by White 
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(1982), with his rated memory of an event being positively related to the 
accuracy of the date assigned to it. 
It appears that event memory has an effect on dating accuracy, with this 
result being reported in studies which have used both personal and public 
events. The influence of memory of the event on the sign of dating errors is, 
however, unclear. While Kemp (1988) and Thompson et al. (1988) failed to 
find an effect, Brown et al. (1985) found memory strength effects consistent 
with those obtained in recency judgement studies. Wagenaar (1986) also found 
some evidence of memory strength effects on the sign of dating error. There is 
no doubt that systematic dating errors do occur, with a general tendency 
towards event age underestimation as retention interval increases. But 
whether this is due to memory strength effects or retention interval per se is 
unclear. 
Two new and somewhat related models of event dating bias suggest that 
such errors are due to boundary effects (e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges & Prohaska, 
1988; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989). The boundary in an event dating experiment is 
the time wi thin which the events must have occurred; for example, in 
Thompson et a1., (1988) the boundary is created by the diary-keeping procedure. 
The subjects in this study would know that the events they were dating 
occurred within the time of their involvement in the study; the remotest and 
most recent boundary markers being the date when they started and stopped 
recording events respectively. The boundary model assumes that events will 
not be assigned dates outside these boundaries. Therefore, unless the subject is 
willing to provide a date which is outside a boundary, dating errors for the 
remotest and most recent events can only move the assigned date towards the 
mean date of the events being dated. Thus, the remotest and most recent 
events, if dated inaccurately are assigned dates that are too recent and too 
remote respectively. 
Furthermore, the boundary model suggests that the overall tendency for 
events to be dated too recently can be explained by the effect of retention 
interval on absolute dating error. As retention interval increases, dating 
accuracy diminishes, therefore more remote, than recent, events are likely to 
be dated inaccurately. The signed error of remote events is positive because 
they are not assigned a date outside the remote boundary. Thus signed error, 
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when averaged over all the events, will be positive because the majority of the 
signed errors are positive. 
1.3.4 Models of Event Dating 
Models of how people answer 'when' questions vary not only in terms 
of the postulated processes involved, but also in the research that has been 
employed in their development. Broadly speaking, the models can be 
categorized as 'direct-access' or 'reconstructive'. The former postulate that date 
information is actually stored in memory, the later suggesting it is 
reconstructed at the time of recall. Friedman and Wilkins (1985) summarize 
five proposed models; 
"(1) that events are organized in memory in a time-ordered format, (2) 
that explicit time tags are laid down at the time of encoding, (3) that 
decay of trace strength provides time information, (4) that events are 
inter-related by order codes, and (5) that idiosyncratic contextual 
information associated with a trace is used to deduce the time of events." 
(p.168) 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 fall into the direct-access category; date information being 
associated with an event's memory trace. Model 5, on the other hand, suggests 
that date information is reconstructed using the information stored in memory 
about the event. 
The direct-access models were developed on the basis of serial position 
and recency experiments, the nature of whiCh has already been described in 
Section 1.3.3. The relevance of this type of research to the answering of 
questions such as "When did you break your leg?", has, as already noted, been 
questioned (e.g., Friedman & Wilkins, 1985; Thompson et al., 1988). The 
rejection of this type of research and the related temporal models is, however, 
not simply based on methodological considerations. Rather, it is the results of 
what might be termed more ecologically valid studies which have not 
generally found evidence of direct-access to date information, which has led to 
the abandonment of these models in favour of model 5, or date reconstruction. 
Extensive discussion of model (3) has already been presented (in Section 1.3.3), 
and it is evident that trace strength may play some part in event dating. There 
is, therefore, not a total rejection of the processes proposed by traditional 
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laboratory research to account for the retrieval of date information. It will also 
become evident in the following discussion that model (2) is also at least 
partially correct. 
Studies which have required subjects to date autobiographical and public 
events have consistently found evidence that dates are generally reconstructed, 
rather than directly recalled (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; Brown et al. 1986; 
Bruce & Van Pelt, 1989; Friedman & Wilkins, 1985; Linton, 1975; Loftus & 
Marburger, 1983; Robinson, 1986; Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1988; 
Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982). However, there is general agreement that 
date reconstruction requires some direct access to date information, that is the 
actual date of some events, often termed 'landmark events' ( Brown et al., 
1986; Lieury et al., 1980; Linton, 1975; Loftus & Marburger, 1983), can be 
directly recalled. Specifically, the reconstructive model of event dating has 
been developed on the basis of studies which have required subjects to 
verbalize or record the sequence of deductions made during an attempt to date 
an event (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; Brown et al., 1986; Friedman & Wilkins, 
1985; Linton, 1975; Thompson, 1982), by providing subjects with 'landmark' 
events and examining the date responses made (e.g., Loftus & Marburger, 
1983; Robinson, 1986; Thompson et al., 1988), and on the basis of 
experimenters' introspective conclusions (e.g., Lindsay & Norman, 1972; 
Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982). 
The general nature of the reconstruction of an event's date is illustrated 
by the following example. Two friends meet; one remarks that the last time 
they saw each other was at Jeff's party, the other replies "When was that?". 
The actual date of 'Jeff's party' may be remembered, in which case the 
reconstructive approach would define this event as a 'land-mark event'. 
Alternatively, there may be no direct access to the event's date, in which case 
the individual would try to determine it using another landmark event and 
information recalled about the event. He may remember that Jeff's party 
occurred some time after his brother's wedding for which he can remember the 
date. Furthermore, he may remember that at Jeff's party everyone was 
swimming, and it was therefore probably in the summer. Now he knows the 
wedding was in October (spring) and that Jeff's party was sometime after it in 
the summer. On the basis of these deductions he might place Jeff's party in the 
month of November or December in the year of the wedding. Thus, date 
reconstruction relies on the individual's ability to recall the actual date of an 
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event that occurred before or after the event to be dated, the use of a landmark 
event, and knowledge of routines and normal behaviour patterns. 
Considerable attention has been focused on the nature of, and use of, 
landmark events. Wagenaar (1986) in a study of the efficiency of different 
event aspects (e.g., what, where, who and when) as cues to autobiographical 
event memory retrieval found that 'when' an event occurred was a sufficient 
cue for memory retrieval, although not very often. Reynolds and Takooshian 
(1988) also found evidence that some subjects could recall experiences on the 
bases of date information only. These results support the proposition that date 
information is stored in the memory representation of some events. 
Landmark events are, however, not exclusively personal or idiosyncratic, 
other events such as public holidays (e.g., New Year's Day, Waitangi Day, 
Christmas Day), annual celebrations (e.g., Valentine's Day, Mother's Day) and 
significant public events (e.g., political incidents) can also be used. Research 
has, however, found that subjects generally prefer to use personal landmark 
events when dating events (e.g., Brown et a1., 1986; Friedman & Wilkins, 
1985; Lieury et a1., 1980). Although Brown et al. (1986) did find in relation to 
the dating of political events that more public facts (e.g., political terms, 
political incidents) were used to deduce the dates than autobiographical events. 
It has also been found that subjects with more landmark events available 
date events more accurately (e.g., Thompson, 1982) and dating accuracy is 
increased if the available landmark events are personal or autobiographical 
(e.g., Baddeley et a1., 1978). The type of personal landmark event used to 
deduce a date may also affect dating accuracy: White (1982) noted that dates 
assigned to events which occurred within a holiday were particularly accurate. 
Providing subjects with landmark events has also been reported to increase 
dating accuracy (e.g., Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Robinson, 1986), a finding 
which supports the suggestion made by researchers interested in survey 
response errors (e.g., telescoping effects) that providing a landmark event to 
define one end of a reference period, for example sending out a letter, rather 
than using a statement like 'in the last 12 months'; may reduce response errors 
(e.g., Cartwright, 1963; Gray, 1955; Kemsley, 1979). 
Finally, Robinson (1986) uses the term temporal reference system to 
define the cognitive representation of landmark events, and suggested that 
landmark events may not be evenly distributed across any particular year or 
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month. In other words, such events may be available for the dating of some 
events but not others. 
In conclusion, duration estimates and the assignment of dates to events 
appear to show similar errors: there is the tendency for duration to be under-
and over-estimated for long and short intervals respectively, and for the age of 
events to be under- and over-estimated for remote and recent events 
respectively. However, in other respects, particularly the models proposed to 
account for the processes (duration estimation and event dating), there appears 
to be little similarity. It is true that event dating can be used to produce a 
duration estimate, but it may be that these types of estimates are not produced 
in the same way as other types of duration estimates. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RETROSPECTIVE DURATION ESTIMATION OF PUBLIC EVENTS 
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 contains four experiments on the estimation of public event 
duration. Experiment 1 examines the validity of subjective knowledge ratings. 
Experiment 2 obtains estimates of the durations of public events, and examines 
Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' model of duration estimation. The knowledge 
rating scale assessed in Experiment 1 is used in this experiment to measure 
event knowledge. Although some support for Ornstein's model of duration 
estimation was found in Experiment 2, other results of this experiment 
prompted the formulation of a reconstructive model of duration estimation. 
Experiment 3 obtains frequency of occurrence estimates of public events in 
order to investigate the reconstruction of public event duration. Experiment 4 
obtains duration estimates of both specific public events and general types of 
public events, and examines predictions made on the basis of the 
reconstructive model of duration estimation. 
2.1 Experiment 1: Validation of Subjective Knowledge Ratings 
This experiment investigates subjects' ability to use a seven point rating 
scale to give knowledge ratings of public events. Subjects' demographic 
characteristics were also examined to determine if they affected knowledge 
ratings. In order to test Ornstein's 'storage size' hypothesis it is essential that 
knowledge ratings validly reflect event knowledge. A knowledge rating scale 
could produce unreliable ratings if, for example, the subjects deliberately 
distorted their ratings to impress the experimenter, used the scale in an 
idiosyncratic way, or simply rated the event description on whether or not they 
considered that event should have been remembered regardless of whether or 
not they actually remembered it (Thompson, 1982). Furthermore, because it 
was proposed to use mean knowledge ratings when analysing the results (that 
is, averaged over subjects for each event), it was essential that the effect on 
knowledge ratings of subjects' demographic characteristics be determined. If, 
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for example, knowledge ratings varied systematically with age, the calculated 
mean would not reliably reflect subjects' event knowledge. 
Collecting recall protocols and counting the number of atomic 
propositions is one method of objectively validating knowledge ratings (e.g., 
Brown, Rips & Shevell, 1985). This technique, however, requires 
considerable time to analyse the protocols, and classifying each proposition as 
true or false is susceptible to error. Instead, subjects in Experiment 1 were 
presented with propositions relating to specific events and were required to 
classify each as true or false, that is, a true/false recognition task. A positive 
relationship between the subjects' ability to correctly classify propositions for 
each event and their knowledge ratings for the events would suggest that the 
knowledge rating scale is a valid instrument for measuring event memory. 
Scale validity would also be implied if there was a systematic change in 
knowledge ratings with event rehearsal and time since the event's occurrence. 
2.1.1 Method 
Questionnaire 
Chronological sources (e.g., Grun, 1975; Hodson, 1984; Reed, 1979; 
Trager, 1979) and editions of 'The Press' (a Christchurch daily newspaper) were 
systematically searched for suitable public events. An event was selected if it 
satisfied two criteria. First, each event had to have a definite duration marked 
by a distinct beginning and end. Second, the event had to be unique in at least 
one aspect, thus ensuring the event would not be confused with a similar-
event that had occurred earlier or later. Thirty-six public events occurring 
between 1978 and 1986 were obtained. An 'event description' was formulated 
for each event, actual examples include: "Mr Aldo More, former Prime 
Minister of Italy, was kidnapped by the Red Brigade urban-guerilla group. 
Sometime later his body was found in the boot of a car in central Rome", and " 
Pope John Paul II went to Poland to visit his homeland. It was the first visit by 
a Pope to a communist country". Each of the 36 event descriptions was 
assigned randomly to a position in the questionnaire. The 36 complete event 
descriptions are listed in Appendix A; for the purposes of discussion, event 
description abbreviations are used, these are also shown in Appendix A. Each 
event description was followed by a knowledge rating scale and two scales 
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relating to event rehearsal. A true/false recognition task was also included for 
eleven of the events. 
Response choices on the seven point knowledge rating scale were 
defined as follows: (1) I can not remember this event, (2) I can just barely 
remember it, (3) I remember it but not so well, (4) I remember it fairly well, 
(5) I remember it very well, (6) I remember it almost perfectly, and (7) I 
remember it perfectly. This scale is similar to that developed by Herrmann 
and Neisser (1978) and those used by Brown et a1., (1985) and Thompson (1982, 
1985a, 1985b). The two event rehearsal scales also had seven points. Only the 
end points of each scale were defined. The first scale was of frequency of event 
rehearsal with response choices ranging from (1) Once, to (7) Very frequently; 
and the second, of the recency of event rehearsal, with response choices ranging 
from (1) In the week following the event, to (7) In the last week. Space was 
also provided for the subject to indicate if no instance of event rehearsal could 
be recalled. 
The true/false recognition task, included for eleven of the events, 
consisted of five true and five false propositions. The true propositions were 
taken directly from media reports. False propositions were generated by the 
experimenter to appear plausible in relation to the event. Care was taken to 
ensure that no proposition could be rated on the basis of general knowledge 
(see Appendix B for the eleven events and associated true/false propositions). 
The task was scored out of ten, one being given for each correct answer. 
Questions relating to sex, age, education and newspaper reading habits 
were located on the cover page, as were the subject instructions. The subjects' 
newspaper reading habits were assessed in relation to one newspaper, 'The 
Press' (a Christchurch daily). A three point scale was used with response 
choices being defined as follows: (1) I never read this newspaper, (2) I 
occasionally read it, and (3) I read it every day. 
Subjects 
Fifty-six females with an age range of 17 to 71 years and forty-two males 
with ages ranging from 17 to 75 years completed the questionnaire. A 
'haphazard' sampling technique was used, i.e. available individuals. 
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Procedure 
The questionnaire was distributed in December 1986. A stamped, 
addressed envelope was supplied so that respondents could return the 
questionnaire by post. Ninety-eight of the one-hundred-and-thirty 
questionnaires distributed were returned by the 1st of Apri11987. 
Respondents were instructed to read each event description carefully, to 
use the knowledge rating scale to indicate how much they remembered of the 
event, to indicate, if appropriate, both the recency and frequency of event 
rehearsal on the scales provided and finally, where appropriate, to read each 
true/false proposition and indicate if it was true or false by placing a T(true) or 
F(false) alongside. 
2.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Subjects' knowledge ratings and scores on the true/false recognition task 
were correlated for each of the eleven events. Table 2.1 lists the obtained 
correlation coefficients; knowledge ratings were generally positively correlated 
with performance on the recognition task, with all five significant correlations 
being positive. 
The correlations between the true/false recognition task scores and 
knowledge ratings might have been expected to be slightly higher. However, 
without knowing most of the details associated with an event it would be 
difficult to score highly on the recognition task, although the recallable event 
related information may have been such that the subject gave relatively high 
knowledge ratings. 
A number of analyses were conducted with the data averaged over 
subjects and using the 36 events as the random variable. Mean knowledge 
ratings were positively correlated with both frequency (r = .86, P < .01) and 
recency (r = .69, P < .01) of event rehearsal. Furthermore, a significant 
negative correlation was obtained (r = -.34, P < .05) between the mean 
knowledge ratings and the age of the events. 
Brief Event Description 
Soviet submarine detained by Sweden 
Suspected foot & mouth. outbreak N. Z. 
Rebels seize Great Mosque 
Maori protest march 
Pacific Charger runs aground 
London, police besiege Libyan Bureau 
Nation-wide search for psychiatric patient 
Nicholas Daniloff arrested 
Paul McCartney arrested 
Royals visit New Zealand 
Climbers trapped on Mount Cook 
Note - Significance levels are for two-tailed tests. 
* P<.05, ** P<.01, *** P<.001 
Event 
Description 
Abbreviation 
SS 
TPF 
GMM 
H 
PC 
YF 
BDC 
NC 
PMC 
R 
MC 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.12 
.23* 
-.31 
-.11 
.25 
.43 *** 
.22 
.30** 
.23 ** 
.07 
.31 ** 
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Table 2.1. Product-moment correlation coefficients obtained between event knowledge 
ratings and true/false recognition task scores. 
For 16 of the events (SAH, PIT, CD, A, SB, OUE, GMM, TJC, TPF, PC, 
ST, F, MC, AB, BDC, JK) a 'media coverage' variable was obtained. This 
involved counting the number of articles about each event published in 'The 
Press' (a Christchurch daily newspaper) during the time of the event's 
occurrence. A significant positive correlation (r = .64, P < .01) was obtained 
between the mean knowledge ratings and media coverage for the 16 events. 
The results obtained with the recognition task suggest that the 
knowledge rating scale gives an approximate indication of how much 
individuals knew about particular events. This argument is strengthened by 
the correlation of the knowledge ratings with the rehearsal ratings and the 
finding that more distant events were less well-known. The media coverage 
analysis also suggests that the knowledge ratings are valid, as they appear to be 
sensitive to initial between-event information differences. Overall the results 
of the knowledge rating scale analyses are consistent with the findings of other 
studies which have examined the validity of similar scales using objective 
measures (e.g., Brown et a1., 1985; Thompson, 1982). 
Further analyses were performed in order to determine if subject 
characteristics affected knowledge ratings. The age and education of the subject 
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were correlated with their average knowledge rating, averaged over the 36 
events. Knowledge of the events as a whole increased with age (r = .39, P < 
0.01), but not significantly with years of education (r = .05, n.s.). A number of 
studies have reported that media use increases significantly with age (e.g., 
McCombs & Poindexter, 1983; Schramm & White, 1949), and particularly 
during the early teenage years (Peterson, Jensen & Rivers, 1965; Schramm & 
White, 1949). Moreover, age is positively related to objective measures of 
public event knowledge (Atkin & Gantz, 1978; Chaffee, Ward & Tipton, 1970; 
Conway, Stevens & Smith, 1975). Therefore, the obtained relationship 
between event knowledge and age may have resulted because older subjects 
obtained more information about the events at the time of their occurrence. 
However, there was no significant relationship found here between the 
subjects' media use, as measured by ratings on the newspaper reading scale, 
and age (r = .09, n.s). 
It is possible that the obtained relationship between event knowledge 
and age was found because some of the younger subjects were not actively 
using the media as a source of public event information at the time some of the 
earlier events occurred. The acquisition of public event information after an 
event's occurrence has been investigated by asking individuals about events 
that they were too young to have experienced at the time of the event's 
occurrence (e.g., Squire, 1974; Squire, Chace & Slater, 1975; Warrington & 
Sanders, 1971). Generally, the stimulus events occurred before the 
individuals were 12 years of age, and the consistent finding is that these 
individuals perform poorly on the questions. Twenty-four of the subjects in 
this study were under the age of 12 when 12 of the events occurred. 
The data was also examined for sex differences. No significant difference 
was found between the sexes for newspaper reading, X2 (3, N = 98) = 0.972, n.s., 
or knowledge of the events as a whole F (1, 97) = 0.012, n.S. 
Overall, the results suggest that the knowledge rating scale provides an 
adequate measure of subjects' public event knowledge in order to test 
Ornstein's 'storage size' hypothesis. The sample of public events used also 
appears adequate as they were sufficiently distributed across time for the 
knowledge ratings to systematically vary. 
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The systematic variation in knowledge ratings in relation to the events 
may reflect differences in the 'degree of original learning' about the events and 
event rehearsal, and not 'forgetting' or time effects. The results, however, 
argue against this, particularly the obtained systematic decrease in knowledge 
ratings as the time since the events' occurrence increased, and the relationship 
between event knowledge and age. Furthermore, regardless of whether 
knowledge ratings reflect differences in original learning, rehearsal or 
forgetting effects, they should still reflect the amount of information the 
subject can recall when making a duration estimate. According to Ornstein's 
(1969) 'storage size' hypothesis there should be a relationship between the 
knowledge ratings and duration estimates, regardless of what factors influence 
the knowledge ratings. Whether a subject learnt relatively little about an 
event at the time of its occurrence or forgot information associated with it 
because it occurred long ago, there will be less information held in memory on 
which to base a duration estimate. 
2.2 Experiment 2: Retrospective Estimates of Public Event Duration 
Experiment 1 established that subjects' age was an important factor in 
determining public event knowledge. In order to help ensure that all subjects 
had experienced the events, via the media, at the time of their occurrence, age 
was held constant in Experiment 2. Only twenty year old subjects were used, 
thus ensuring that all subjects were at least 11 years old when the first event 
occurred. A slightly older age group might have been preferred; however, it 
would have been difficult to obtain a reasonable number of older subjects from 
the under-graduate psychology course at Canterbury University, and the use of 
a more broadly based sample would have led to variation in education level. 
Subjects in this experiment were given brief descriptions of public 
events, and then asked to rate how much they remembered of each event and 
to estimate its duration. Estimates were in terms of days, weeks or months. 
The experimental hypothesis, following Ornstein (1969), was that subjects' 
duration estimates would be positively related to event knowledge, with better 
known events being estimated to have lasted for longer. A related hypothesis 
concerns retention interval, the time between an event's occurrence and its 
recall. Its is well-substantiated that less information can be retrieved after 
longer retention intervals. Hence, the duration of older events should be 
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estimated as shorter than that of more recent ones of comparable actual 
duration. 
2.2.1 Method 
Questionnaire 
A duration question was formulated for each of the 36 event descriptions 
used in Experiment 1. For example, for the event, "Pope John Paul II went to 
Poland to visit his homeland. It was the first visit by a Pope to a communist 
country", the duration question was "How long was Pope John Paul II in 
Poland for?" (See Appendix A for the complete set of duration questions). 
Actual event duration was determined from the media reports associated with 
the events, the day the event began on and ended on were both counted as a 
complete day. Actual durations ranged from 2 to 448 days. The actual 
duration and date that each of the 36 events began on are shown in Table 2.2. 
The 36 event descriptions and associated duration questions were 
assigned randomly to their positions in the questionnaire. Ten different 
random sequences were used. A knowledge rating scale, identical to that used 
in Experiment 1, was included after each event description. A question 
relating to the respondents sex, along with instructions, was located on the 
cover page. 
Subjects 
Twenty-three male and 30 female under-graduate psychology students of 
the University of Canterbury completed the questionnaire. All were 20 years 
old at the time of the experiment. 
Procedure 
Subjects completed the questionnaire individually. They were 
instructed to read each event description, rate how much they remembered of 
the event on the knowledge rating scale, and then to answer the duration 
question. It was emphasized that subjects should give a duration estimate 
even if they could not remember the event itself. Three example questions 
(not included in the questionnaire) were then displayed on an overhead 
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projector. These were worked through in order to illustrate the task and help 
reduce the chances of a systematic improvement in subjects' responses as they 
completed the questionnaire. 
Subjects required approximately 20 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. The experiment was carried out in October 1987. 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Median duration estimates were computed for each of the 36 events. 
Medians were used, instead of means, because the subjects occasionally made 
unusually large estimation errors. Table 2.2 shows the median duration 
estimate, actual duration, date the event began on, mean knowledge rating 
and median signed error for each of the 36 events (signed error was calculated 
by subtracting actual event duration from estimated duration). Inspection of 
the table suggests that, on average, the longer the actual event duration the 
longer the estimated duration. This result was confirmed by obtaining a 
significant (p < .05) correlation of .66 between the two variables. 
The logarithm of the median duration estimates was regressed on the 
logarithm of the actual durations in order to determine whether the estimation 
of duration in this study followed Stevens' psychological power law. A slope 
of 0.50, indicating a power function between the two variables with an 
exponent of 0.50, and a correlation of 0.69 were obtained. The obtained 
exponent indicates a tendency for the short duration events to be over-
estimated and the long duration events to be under-estimated, but is smaller 
than the exponent value of 0.90 typically found in traditional duration 
estimation research (Eisler, 1976). The fact that the actual durations used in 
this study were substantially longer than those traditionally used may be 
responsible for this difference. Alternatively, the low correlation between the 
two variables (logarithm of estimated and actual duration) may have restricted 
the size of the obtained exponent. 
A significant (p < .05) negative correlation of -.34 was obtained between 
the age of the events, determined by the date that the events began on, and the 
mean knowledge ratings. This result is consistent with the result obtained in 
Experiment I, as is the correlation of.58 (p < .05) obtained between the 
knowledge ratings and media coverage variable for the 16 events that the later 
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Brief Event Description and Date Event Actual Median Median Mean 
Abbreviation Began on Duration Duration Signed Knowledge 
Estimate Error Rating 
AIdo Moro kidnapping AM 16 Mar 78 55 14.0 -41 1.7 
Cook Island's election scandal SAH 1 Apr 78 117 14.0 -103 1.8 
Pope John Paul I's reign PPI 27 Aug 78 33 90.0 57 2.8 
Pope John Paul II visits Poland PPII 2Jun 79 9 7l) -2 3.1 
Carless days in New Zealand CD 30Jul 79 319 240.0 -79 3.9 
Abbotsford emergency A 6 Aug 79 36 13.0 -23 3.4 
Soviet Airliner held in New York SB 26 Aug 79 3 2.0 -1 1.4 
U.S. Embassy occupation OUE 4 Nov 79 442 28.0 -414 2.4 
Great Mosque seized GM 20 Nov 79 14 6.0 -8 1.5 
Paul McCartney arrested PMC 14 Jan 80 12 4.0 -8 2.4 
Hostages Iranian Embassy London IEL 30 Apr 80 7 4.0 -3 2.2 
Mangere College play MP 3May 80 3 7.0 4 1.1 
Clark murder trial TJC 6 Jan 81 123 36.5 -86 2.7 
Walesa visits Rome LW 13 Jan 81 7 7.0 0 1.6 
Suspected foot and mouth outbreak TPF 11 Feb 81 11 7l) -4 3.2 
Pacific Charger runs aground PC 21May 81 15 6.0 -9 2.1 
Springbok tour ST 19Jul 81 55 21.0 -34 4.5 
Rexin Industrial sit-in RCF lSep 81 96 5.0 -91 1.3 
Sweden detains Soviet submarlane SS 27 Oct 81 11 14.0 3 2.1 
Falkland's war F 2 Apr 82 73 35.0 -38 4.5 
aimbers !raped on Mount Cook MC 15Nov 82 14 6.0 -8 3.8 
Dozier kidnapping JD 17 Dec 82 42 21.0 -21 1.4 
Australian bushfire AB 16 Feb 83 2 12.5 10.5 3.2 
Royals visit New Zealand R 17 Apr 83 13 7l) -6 3.5 
Discovery of Hitler Diaries S 22Apr 83 17 21.0 4 3.4 
Mario protest march H 28 Jan 84 10 5.0 -5 2.2 
Search for psychiatric patient BDC 22 Feb 84 9 9.5 0.5 2.0 
Police besiege Libyan Bureau London YF 17 Apr 84 10 3.0 -7 2.6 
Gloria Kong kidnapping GK 29Jun 84 3 4.0 1 3.2 
John Kirk extradited from U.S.A. JK 7Jul 84 448 134.0 -314 3.5 
Wizard temporarily resigns W 3Sep 84 30 21.0 -9 3.1 
Baby Fae heart transplant BF 26 Oct 84 22 14.0 -8 2.6 
Riots in New Caledonia NC 12 Jan 85 2 10.5 8.5 2.1 
Achillo Lauro hijacked AL 7 Oct 85 3 5.5 2.5 2.3 
Daniloff arrested ND 29Aug 86 13 26.0 13 2.8 
Stars & Strips beats KZ7 KZ7 5 Oct 86 12 28.0 16 4.8 
Overall (means) 58.08 24.6 -33.3 2.6 
Table 2.2. Beginning date, actual duration, median duration estimate, median signed 
error, and mean knowledge rating for each event used in Experiment 2. 
variable was obtained for. Thus, as Ornstein (1969) predicted, event 
knowledge did decrease as the age of the event increased. However, there was 
no significant correlation between actual event date and median estimated 
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duration (r = -.10), which is not consistent with Ornstein's (1969) suggestion 
that 
"when some period elapses before an interval is to be judged .. some 
items should drop out of storage and the experience of duration of that 
interval shortens." (p. 48) 
Nor was there a significant correlation between the actual date that the event 
began on and the event's actual duration (r = -.15), which rules out the 
possibility that this result was obtained because the older events were actually 
of long duration and recent events of short duration. 
As no significant relationship was found between event knowledge 
(mean knowledge ratings) and actual event duration (r = .15) it was possible to 
directly examine Ornstein's predicted relationship between event knowledge 
and estimated duration. 
Correlating median duration estimates and mean knowledge ratings 
produced a moderate, yet significant (p < .05) correlation (r = .35); thus, the 
better known events were on average estimated to have lasted longer. This 
result provides some support for Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' hypothesis. 
However, inspection of the median signed error scores shown in Table 2.2 
indicates that for 24 of the events the subjects generally underestimated the 
events' duration. The overall median signed error (-6.5 days) is further 
evidence of this general tendency. Therefore, the observed positive 
relationship between event knowledge and duration estimation might be 
alternatively explained as a tendency for estimated duration to increase in 
accuracy, that is, move toward actual event duration as event knowledge 
increases. 
Further analyses used subjects as the random factor. Knowledge ratings 
were correlated with duration estimates for each of the 36 events: only two 
significant (p < .05) positive correlations were obtained; of the remaining 34 
correlations, 12 were negative. Furthermore, when subjects' event 
knowledge ratings were added to produce a knowledge rating sum for each 
subject, and duration estimates treated similarly, the correlation of the two 
sums was very low (r = -.04). Mean knowledge ratings and median absolute 
error (absolute error was calculated by subtracting the actual event duration 
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from the estimated event duration and ignoring the sign) were also correlated 
for each event separately. Four significant (p < .05), and 14 non-significant 
negative correlations were obtained, the remaining correlations were positive 
but extremely low. Subjects' event knowledge rating sum was also correlated 
with their absolute error sum. The obtained negative correlation (r = -.19), 
although not significant, does, when considered with the above results, 
support the suggestion that event knowledge is positively related to estimation 
accuracy rather than directly related to the size of the duration estimate as 
suggested by Ornstein (1969). 
In order to examine the effect of event knowledge on duration 
estimation more closely, further analyses were performed. First, the 
knowledge ratings for each subject and event were dichotomized. Knowledge 
ratings of 1 ("I can not remember the event") were taken to be indicative of 
forgotten events or events that the subject had not heard of. Events given a 
knowledge rating from 2 to 7 were taken to be remembered events. Then, for 
each event, the median duration estimate of those subjects who could not 
remember the event was calculated and, similarly, the median duration 
estimate of subjects who remembered the particular event. The number of 
subjects who did or did not remember the event varied with the event and 
there were three events (CD, ST, and F) which were remembered by all the 
subjects. 
Table 2.3 shows the median duration estimate for each of the events 
given by each group, that is subjects who remembered, and those who did not 
remember the event. The number of cases each median is based on and actual 
event duration are also shown. Inspection of the median duration estimates 
shown in Table 2.3 indicates they are generally quite similar between the 
groups, even were the number of subjects in each group varied markedly. 
Indeed, for six of the events the median duration estimates are identical for the 
two groups. 
When the two groups of estimates were compared (over the 33 events 
for which both remembered and not remembered estimates were available) no 
significant difference was found (t (32) = -.82, n.s). This result indicates that 
the two groups of estimates were similar. Further evidence of this was found 
when the median signed error of the estimates (t (32) = 0.82, n.s) and the 
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Event Actual Median Duration Median Duration N= Subjects Not N=Subjects 
Description Duration Estimate (Days) Estimate (Days) Remembering Remembering 
Abbreviation Not-Remembered Remembered Event Event 
AM 55 10 20.5 31 22 
SAH 117 14 14 28 25 
PPI 33 330 73.5 10 43 
PPII 9 12 7 4 49 
CD 319 240 0 53 
A 36 7 14 6 47 
SB 3 2 2 40 13 
OUE 442 6 63 18 35 
GMM 14 6 4 36 17 
PMC 12 3 5 17 36 
IEL 7 3 4 21 32 
MP 3 7 9 50 3 
1}C 123 90 29.5 11 42 
LW 7 7 5 31 22 
TPF 11 6 7 7 46 
PC 15 6 7 24 29 
ST 55 21 0 53 
RCF 96 4 8 43 10 
SS 11 14 14 24 29 
F 73 35 0 53 
MC 14 5 65 3 50 
JD 42 21 38.5 45 8 
AB 2 9 13 2 51 
R 13 14 7 4 49 
S 17 43 21 6 47 
H 10 3 6 16 37 
BDC 9 10 7 24 29 
YF 10 3 3 18 35 
GK 3 4 4 8 45 
JK 448 135 104 2 51 
W 30 8 23 9 44 
BF 22 14 14 9 44 
NC 2 5 17 19 34 
AL 3 7 5 25 28 
ND 13 21 28 12 41 
KZ7 12 8 28 1 52 
Table 2.3. Median duration estimate for each event for subjects that did and did not 
remember the event, and the number of subjects in each group. 
median absolute error of the estimates (t (32) = 0.96, n.s) of each group was 
compared. Correlating actual and estimated duration, however, produced a 
significant (p < .01) correlation (r = .79) for the remembered event group but 
not for the forgotten event group (r = .34), which is consistent with the 
suggestion that event knowledge increases estimation accuracy. 
S2 
The overall effect of these analyses is to call the meaning of the 
correlation between median duration estimates and mean knowledge ratings 
into question. Although the existence of this correlation provides some 
support for Ornstein's (1969) hypothesis, the finding that estimates were 
generally underestimations and that increased event knowledge decreased the 
size of the underestimation argues for an 'estimation accuracy' explanation of 
the event knowledge effect. However, the degree to which an event is 
remembered has only a small effect on estimated duration. Indeed, not 
remembering the events at all did not significantly increase estimation error or 
change the nature of the estimates made when compared with estimates given 
by subjects who remembered the event. 
These results can be interpreted in two ways; either the duration 
estimates obtained in this study were simply guesses, or they were generated by 
some kind of inferential or reconstructive process. The similarity seen in the 
estimates provided by subjects that did and did not remember the events 
suggests that both groups of subjects used a similar duration estimation process. 
Several findings argue against the estimates being simply guessed: firstly, there 
is the event knowledge effect, secondly, the obtained correlation between 
actual and estimated event duration, and, finally, the fact that the estimates 
were, in general, reasonably accurate. Therefore, the use of a reconstructive 
duration estimation process by the subjects seems the most plausible 
explanation of the results, particularly, considering it can account for the slight 
effect of event knowledge on estimation accuracy. Such a model of duration 
estimation is also supported by other research which has demonstrated that 
recall is often a reconstructive process (e.g., Baddeley, Lewis & Nimmo-Smith, 
1978; Barclay, 1986; Bartlett, 1932; Brown, Shevell & Rips, 1986; Friedman & 
Wilkins, 1985; Linton, 1975; Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Robinson, 1986; 
Thompson, 1982, Thompson, Showronski & Lee, 1988; Wagenaar, 1986; 
White, 1982). 
Reconstructing event duration may involve the use of: (a) general event 
knowledge already stored in memory, and (b) information provided in the 
event description. Individuals are constantly exposed to information on 
public events. Over time many similar, although distinguishable, events 
occur. Similar events can be categorized into types (e.g., natural disasters, 
wars, an official visit to a country). As more instances of a specific type of 
event are encountered an individual may develop a body of general knowledge 
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relating to that type of event. Time information, such as event duration, 
may be part of this general event knowledge. The extent of this general event 
knowledge, for any specific type of event, might be assumed to vary in relation 
to the number of category members that have been encountered. 
Providing individuals with a specific event description, as was done in 
this experiment, might allow them to access a specific memory of that event, 
or to categorize the described event as a particular type and access their general 
event knowledge for that type of event, or both. The recalled information 
would, in this case, be used to provide the duration estimate. When both 
specific and general event knowledge can be recalled, the specific event 
knowledge may help reduce a reconstructed duration estimate's error if the 
specific event is not a representative member, in terms of actual duration, of 
its event category. That is, where the event appears typical of an event 
category but its duration is atypical for some reason, specific event knowledge 
could reduce estimation error. 
This reasoning provides two testable hypotheses. If the duration of a 
specific event is estimated by reconstruction from general knowledge of that 
type of event, then the estimated duration of a specific event should be similar 
to the estimated duration of the same event described in general terms. 
Furthermore, if general event knowledge becomes more elaborate as the 
number of similar events encountered increases, reconstructed duration 
estimates of frequently occurring events should be more accurate, and show 
less between-subject variance, than reconstructed duration estimates of less 
frequently occurring events. Each of these hypotheses is tested in Experiment 
4. However, in order to test the latter hypothesis and to access the validity of 
the assumption it is based on, Experiment 3 was conducted, in which the 
estimated frequency of public event occurrence is examined. 
2.3 Experiment 3: Frequency of Occurrence Estimates of Public Events 
The aim of this experiment was to discover how frequently the types of 
public events used in Experiments 1 and 2 were estimated to have occurred in 
the previous 10 years. Thirty-three of the event descriptions used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were re-worded to form 'general' event descriptions. 
Subjects were asked to estimate how many times in the previous ten years each 
type of event had occurred world-wide. The frequency estimates were used to 
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select ten high and ten low frequency events to be used as the stimuli in 
Experiment 4. 
2.3.1 Method 
Questionnaire 
Thirty-three of the 36 public event descriptions used in Experiments 1 
and 2 were reworded to provide 'general'l event descriptions. Generally, this 
re-wording simply involved replacing place names and individual's names 
used in the original event descriptions with descriptive terms. For example, 
the 'Aldo Moro' and the 'Pope John Paul II' events from Experiments 1 and 2 
became respectively: "A prominent politician is kidnapped by an urban-
guerrilla group. Some time later his body is found.", and "A prominent 
religious leader made an official visit to a foreign country" (see Appendix C for 
the 33 general event descriptions). 
The 33 general event descriptions were randomly assigned a position in 
the questionnaire. Each description was followed by the series of numbers 0 to 
10, and an open bracket with "more than 10 times" beside it. Questions 
relating to the respondents' sex and age, along with instructions, were located 
on the cover page. 
Subjects 
Twenty-five male and 56 female under-graduate psychology students of 
the University of Canterbury, with an age range of 17 to 60 years, who had not 
previously participated in my experiments, completed the questionnaire. 
1 Event KZ7 was not used as it appeared impossible to reword the event description into a 
description of a type of event, nor were events CD and P, which were found in Experiment 2 to be 
remembered by most subjects. 
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Procedure 
Subjects completed the questionnaire individually. They were 
instructed to read the general event description and to indicate (by circling the 
appropriate number or ticking the brackets) how many times they considered 
that type of event had occurred world-wide in the last 10 years. It was 
emphasized that their responses did not have to necessarily correspond with 
the number of specific occurrences remembered. 
Subjects completed the questionnaire in March 1988, requiring 
approximately 10 minutes to do so. 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 2.4 shows the median, and upper and lower quartile frequency of 
occurrence estimates for the 33 general events (response category "more than 10 
times" was coded as 11). Both the medians and the inter-quartile deviations 
were used to select 10 high and 10 low frequency events for Experiment 4. That 
is, the selected low frequency events have the smallest medians and the 
smallest inter-quartile deviations, while the selected high frequency events are 
those with largest medians and smallest inter-quartile deviations. The 10 
selected low frequency events are indicated by an 'V in Table 2.4 and the 10 
high frequency events by an 'H'. 
The data was examined for sex differences. A comparison of the 
between-sex frequency estimates for each of the 33 general events only 
produced one significant result, event PPII (t (79) = 2.20, P < .05). Subjects' 
frequency estimates were also added to produce an event frequency sum. No 
significant difference was found when a comparison between the sexes was 
made on this measure (t (76) = 0.83, n.s). Despite the single significant result 
obtained, it seems reasonable to conclude that sex has little effect on estimated 
event frequency. Subject age also appears not to have an effect on estimated 
event frequency, indicated by the non-significant correlation obtained when 
subjects' age was correlated with their event frequency estimate sum (r = -0.06, 
n.s). 
Overall, the frequency of occurrence estimates support the suggestion, 
made in Experiment 2, that general event knowledge may vary between 
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specific types of events because the number of category members encountered 
varies. Furthermore, the frequency estimates were sufficiently varied to allow 
two distinct groups of events (e.g., 10 low and 10 high frequency) to be selected. 
Event Event Frequency Estimates High (H) and Low 
Description (L) Frequency 
Abbreviation Events 
Lower~quartile Median Upper~quartile 
AM 2 4 5 
SAH 2 3 5 L 
PPI 1 2 3 L 
PPll 6 11 11 H 
A 10 11 11 H 
SB 1 3 6 
OUE 2 4 7 
GMl\1 2 4 7 
PMC 2 4 7 
IEL 2 4 9 
MP 2 5 8 
TJC 2 3 5 L 
LW 2 3 6 L 
TPF 2 3 4 L 
PC 4 7 11 H 
ST 2 4 6 
RCF 4 8 11 H 
SS 1 3 4 L 
MC 8 11 11 H 
JD 2 4 8 
AB 5 7 11 H 
R 11 11 11 H 
S 2 4 8 
H 11 11 11 H 
BDC 1 1 4 L 
YF 1 3 6 
GK 4 7 11 
JK 1 2 4 L 
W 1 3 6 L 
BF 4 7 11 H 
NC 8 11 11 H 
AL 1 2 4 L 
ND 2 5 8 
Table 2.4. Upper and lower quartile, and median frequency of occurrence estimates for 
each event. and the selected low and high frequency events. 
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2.4 Experiment 4: Reconstruction In Retrospective Estimates Of 
Public Event Duration 
The 10 low and 10 high frequency public events selected in Experiment 3 
formed the stimuli for this experiment. Two parallel questionnaires were 
constructed, one containing the 20 specific event descriptions as used in 
Experiment 2, the other the corresponding general event descriptions 
developed in Experiment 3. Subjects completed either the general or specific 
event questionnaire. Two experimental hypotheses are tested: firstly, that 
duration estimates given by subjects who can not remember or never originally 
heard of a specific event will be similar to estimates made by subjects given a 
general description of the same event; secondly, that the duration estimates of 
the high frequency events will be more accurate and show less between-subject 
variance than those of the low frequency events. 
2.4.1 Method 
Questionnaire 
A duration question was formulated for each of the 10 high and 10 low 
frequency events selected in Experiment 3. For example, the duration 
question for the general event description formulated from the Pope John Paul 
II event ( a high frequency event) was "How long did the visit last for?" Five 
of the duration questions were identical to those used with the specific events 
in Experiment 2. The remaining 15 had names of people and place names 
removed or replaced with descriptive terms ( these are listed in Appendix C). 
The 20 general event descriptions and their duration questions were randomly 
assigned a position in the questionnaire. 
A parallel questionnaire was composed by taking the corresponding 20 
specific event descriptions and duration questions (as used in Experiment 2) 
and assigning them to matched positions. A question asking if the subject 
remembered the event was included after each event description. 
Questions relating to the subjects' age and sex, along with instructions 
were located on the cover page. The two questionnaires are termed 
respectively, 'the general event questionnaire' and 'the specific event 
questionnaire' . 
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Subjects 
Subjects completed either the 'general' or the 'specific' event 
questionnaire. Twenty-one males and 27 females, with an age range of 17 to 
41 years, from the Introductory Psychology course at the University of 
Canterbury, completed the general event questionnaire. Thirty-five male and 
64 female subjects from the same groups, with ages in the range of 17 to 45 
years, completed the specific event questionnaire. 
Procedure 
Both groups of subjects were instructed to carefully read each event 
description and answer the associated duration question. The subjects who 
completed the specific event questionnaire were also instructed to indicate 
whether they remembered the event in the space provided. 
All subjects completed the questionnaire during laboratory class time, in 
April 1988, and took approximately 15 minutes to do so. 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion 
The estimates obtained with the specific event questionnaire were 
divided into two groups on the basis of whether or not the subject indicated he 
or she remembered the event. The median duration estimate was then 
calculated for each event for these two groups and for the general event 
questionnaire estimates. Table 2.5 shows the 20 median duration estimates for 
each of these groups, actual event duration is also shown. Inspection of the 
median duration estimates shown in Table 2.5 suggests they are similar across 
the groups. 
This was confirmed when the three sets of median duration estimates 
were correlated with each other and actual duration, and paired-sample t -tests 
performed (the results of these analyses are also shown in Table 2.5). Significant 
(p < 0.01) positive correlations were obtained between all three groups of 
estimates. Furthermore, no significant differences were found between the 
three groups of estimates, or between the estimates and actual event durations. 
The three groups of estimates not only appear to vary similarly with actual 
event duration, as indicated by the high between-group estimate correlations, 
Event Actual 
Description Duration 
Abbreviation 
High 
Frequency 
Events 
Low 
Frequency 
Events 
Actual Duration 
PPII 
A 
PC 
RCF 
MC 
AB 
R 
H 
BF 
NC 
SAH 
PPI 
TJC 
LW 
TPF 
SS 
BDC 
JK 
W 
AL 
General Questionnaire 
Specific Questionnaire: 
Not-remembered 
9 
36 
15 
96 
14 
2 
13 
10 
22 
2 
117 
33 
123 
7 
11 
11 
9 
448 
30 
3 
r 
t 
r 
t 
r 
t 
Median Duration Estimates (Days) 
General Event 
Questionnaire 
7.5 
10 
10 
4 
4.5 
5.5 
9 
1 
27 
4 
23 
360 
105 
14 
7 
26.5 
5 
148 
21 
4 
.35 
t(19)=0.47, n.s. 
Specific Event 
Questionnaire: 
Not-remembered 
8.5 
7 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 
7 
14 
21 
255 
60 
7 
5 
14.5 
8 
60 
21 
5 
.12 
t(19)=0.72, n.S. 
.96** 
t(19)=1.75, n.S. 
Note- Significance levels are for two-tailed tests * P<.05, ** P<.01 
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Specific Event 
Questionnaire: 
Remembered 
7 
13 
8.5 
9 
7 
7 
7 
3 
12 
14 
23.5 
90 
90 
4 
10.5 
14 
6 
120 
28 
5 
.68** 
t(t9)=1.40, n.s. 
.88** 
t(19)=1.18, n.s. 
.74** 
t(19)==0.45, n.S. 
Table 2.5. Median duration estimates obtained with the general events and the specific 
events from subjects who did and did not remember the events. Between group correlation 
coefficients (r) and paired·sample Hest results are also shown. 
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but also show the same extent of estimation error, indicated by the t -test 
results. 
The specific event questionnaire results are consistent with those 
obtained in Experiment 2 in that estimates given by subjects who did and did 
not remember the events were very similar. Furthermore, the results support 
the first experimental hypothesis in that the estimates given by the subjects that 
did not remember the specific events were highly correlated with those given 
by subjects presented with a general event description only. 
The two groups of median duration estimates obtained in Experiment 2 
(Le., estimates given by subjects that did and did not remember the events) 
were also correlated with the three groups of estimates obtained in this 
experiment. Table 2.6. shows the obtained correlations. All six correlations 
Experiment 2 
Remembered 
Event Median 
Estimates 
Not-remembered 
Event Median 
Estimates 
General Event 
Questionnaire 
.79** 
.99** 
Experiment 4 
Specific 
Questionnaire: 
Remembered 
.92** 
.87** 
Note- Significance levels are for two-tailed tests * P<.OS, **P<.Ol 
Specific 
Questionnaire: 
Not-remembered 
.64** 
.96** 
Table 2.6. Correlations between the median duration estimates obtained in Experiment 2 
and Experiment 4. 
are significant (p < .01), and also appear to vary systematically. The 
correlation between the two groups of subjects that did not remember the 
events is very high, as is the correlation between the two groups that did 
remember the events. Furthermore, the general event questionnaire 
estimates show a stronger relationship to the not-remembered estimates from 
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Experiment 2; a similar result to that obtained in this experiment and shown 
in Table 2.5. 
The correlations between actual and estimated event duration obtained 
in this experiment and shown in Table 2.5, for the remembered and forgotten 
event estimates, also show similar between-group variation to those observed 
in Experiment 2 (e.g., r = .79, P < .01 and r = .34, n.s., respectively). Again, 
the only significant correlation (p < 0.01) is between the remembered event 
median estimates and actual event duration, suggesting that the relationship 
between event knowledge and duration estimation observed in Experiment 2 is 
reasonably reliable. 
In order to assess further the proposition that the estimates given by 
subjects that did not remember the events and those based on general event 
descriptions were not simply guesses, between-group estimation accuracy was 
Specific Event Specific Event 
Questionnaire: Questionnaire: 
Not-remembered Remembered 
r .98** .82** 
General Event Absolute Error 
t t(19)=1.46, n.s. t(19)=O.90, n.s. 
Questionnaire 
r .98** .86** 
Signed Error 
t t(19)=1.75, n.s. t(19)=1.18, n.s. 
r .88** 
Absolute Error 
Specific Event t t(19)=1.50, n.s. 
Questionnaire: 
Not-remembered 
r .91** 
Signed Error 
t t(19)=O.45, n.s. 
Note- Significance levels are for two-tailed tests * P<.05, ** P<.01 
Table 2.7. Between groups absolute and signed error score correlation coefficients (r) 
and Hest results. 
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examined. Absolute and signed error scores were calculated for each of the 
three groups of estimates obtained in this experiment (the procedures involved 
for calculating error scores were identical to those used in Experiment 2). The 
error scores for each of the three groups of estimates were correlated and 
compared for significant differences. The obtained correlations and paired-
sample t -test results are shown in Table 2.7. All of the between-group absolute 
and signed error score correlations were significant (p < 0.01) and none of the 
paired-sample t -test comparisons produced a significant difference. In general 
all of the correlations are reasonably high, and, when considered with the t -test 
results, suggest that the subjects who did not remember the events and those 
given only general event descriptions made very similar estimation errors to 
those subjects who actually remembered the events. These results provide 
further evidence that event knowledge has only a slight effect on duration 
estimation accuracy. Furthermore, the similarity in errors between the three 
groups strengthens the argument for a duration estimation process which goes 
beyond simple guessing. Overall the results support the alternative 
explanation that event duration was reconstructed. 
The second experimental hypothesis, that 'duration estimates of the high 
frequency events will be more accurate and show less between-subject variation 
than those of the low frequency events', focuses on the effect of 'past 
experience' in the reconstructive duration estimation process. In order to test 
this hypothesis the duration estimates of the 10 high and 10 low frequency 
events were compared in terms of median absolute error and standard 
deviation for each of the three groups. Because the actual durations of the 
high and low frequency events were different, comparisons were performed 
using analysis of covariance with actual event duration as the covariate. 
Table 2.8 shows for each group of estimates the median absolute error 
and standard deviation for each of the high and low frequency events. Overall 
means are also shown in the table, as are the adjusted means (adjusted for the 
effect of the covariate, actual event duration). Although the adjusted means, 
for both absolute error and standard deviation, all vary in the predicted 
direction between the high and low frequency events none were found to be 
significantly different. However, when the standard deviations of the general 
event 
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Event General Event Specific Event Specific Event 
Description Questionnaire Questionnaire: Questionnaire: 
Abbreviation Not-remembered Remembered 
Median Standard Median Standard Median Standard 
Absolute Deviation Absolute Deviation Absolute Deviation 
Error Error Error 
PPII 5.0 14.33 5.0 10.69 4.0 20.09 
A 26.0 12.31 31.0 22.55 26.0 35.57 
PC 10.5 80.25 12.0 15.08 10.0 22.67 
RCF 92.0 64.77 91.0 10.34 87.0 9.21 
High MC 10.0 5.06 10.0 6.86 8.0 5.23 
Frequency AB 3.5 5.93 3.0 3.75 5.0 10.95 
Events R 6.5 12.88 8.0 4.91 6.0 6.29 
H 9.0 2.13 8.0 16.62 7.0 5.43 
BF 13.0 37.46 15.5 16.81 13.0 11.58 
NC 2.0 52.32 12.0 27.81 12.0 58.45 
Mean 17.75 28.74 19.55 13.54 17.90 18.55 
Mean (adjusted) 35.52 36.21 42.84 22.22 38.87 25.81 
SAH 96.0 116.10 96.0 29.81 96.0 117.0 
PPI 327.0 375.70 222.0 211.16 57.0 174.42 
lIC 87.5 190.15 63.0 57.68 81.0 151.42 
LW 7.0 12.92 4.0 7.49 4.0 6.21 
Low TPF 8.5 13.29 6.0 17.58 4.0 25.78 
Frequency SS 15.5 147.32 8.0 81.45 8.0 37.08 
Events BDC 6.0 26.68 5.0 10.72 5.0 7.72 
JK 309.0 190.06 388.0 202.77 328.0 139.09 
W 23.0 174.71 16.0 135.99 23.0 63.44 
AL 1.5 4.60 2.0 6.18 2.0 5.94 
Mean 88.10 124.75 81.0 76.08 60.80 72.81 
Mean (adjusted) 70.34 117.29 57.72 67.40 39.83 65.55 
Table 2.8. Median absolute error and standard deviation for each of the high and low 
frequency events for each group. 
questionnaire and the specific event questionnaire not~remembered estimates 
were averaged, the difference between the high and low frequency events 
standard deviation was found to be significant (F (1,17) = 4.436, P < .05), with 
the high frequency events' adjusted mean standard deviation (29.20) being 
smaller than the low frequency events' (92.56). No other significant 
differences were found for either standard deviation or absolute error when 
averaged across different groups of estimates. 
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Overall these results suggest that the duration estimates of all the groups 
probably were largely reconstructed. The consistency of the direction of the 
adjusted mean differences for both absolute error and standard deviation across 
the three groups further strengthens this argument. 
2.5 General Discussion 
In line with Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' hypothesis, at least part of the 
variance in public event duration estimates appears to be accounted for by the 
subjects' event knowledge, with an increase in event knowledge producing an 
increase in the size of the estimated duration. However, because the actual 
duration of the events was generally underestimated and event knowledge 
decreased the size of the underestimation, event knowledge can be interpreted 
as increasing estimation accuracy. This interpretation of the part event 
knowledge plays in duration estimation is markedly different from Ornstein's 
which suggests a direct relationship between event knowledge and estimated 
duration. Indeed, ample evidence was found that knowledge of an event was 
not at all necessary for a reasonably accurate estimate of its duration to be given. 
Clearly the estimation of public event duration is not based solely on the 
amount of stored event information. 
Two alternative explanations of public event duration estimation were 
suggested in Experiment 2; that the estimates were simply guesses, or they 
were reconstructed on the basis of general and specific event knowledge. The 
general accuracy of the estimates and their consistency, both across the 
experiments and the different experimental groups, together with the actual 
duration and event knowledge effects, argue against the guess explanation. 
Furthermore, the predictions made on the basis of the proposed reconstructive 
model of duration estimation were largely confirmed in Experiment 4. A 
general event description was sufficient to produce estimates similar to those 
given on the basis of a specific event description by both subjects who did and 
did not remember the specific events. Thus, the event description supplied 
probably was used by all the subjects to categorize the event and access their 
general knowledge of that type of event. The finding that the accuracy and 
variance of the high and low frequency events varied in the predicted 
direction, although not significantly so for accuracy, supports the suggestion 
that the extent of general event knowledge of any specific type of event is likely 
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to vary in relation to the number of specific events of that type encountered in 
the past. 
The reconstructive model of public event duration estimation also 
adequately accounts for the moderate effect of event knowledge. Specific event 
knowledge probably allowed the subjects to adjust a reconstructed estimate 
when the particular event that a duration estimate was required for was not 
typical in terms of duration of its category. It is also probably true that the 
duration of a type of event is less stable than other factors that determine 
category membership. That is, all events, such as kidnappings, are 
characterized by some aspects - someone is taken, money or something is 
demanded - which are probably rather consistent across different kidnappings. 
The duration, however, probably varies rather more. Therefore, knowledge of 
a specific example of a kidnapping may not only help refine a reconstructed 
estimate when the duration of the event is definitely atypical but even when it 
is typical. 
General time knowledge is probably not stored in memory as a separate 
body of knowledge. Rather, as suggested in the reconstructive model of 
duration estimation, it is associated with specific types of activities and events. 
That is, temporal information, including duration where appropriate, is a 
part of what Schank and Abelson (1977) call a script or a standardized 
generalized memory representation of an event which is developed on the 
basis of encounters with many similar events. As similarities between events 
are noted they are formed into that type of event's script structure. Schank and 
Abelson also suggest that the particulars of a specific event for which one 
already has a script are only stored in memory if they are significantly different 
from those already contained in the standardized script. This reasoning is in 
line with the explanation of the event knowledge effect on duration estimation 
observed in this study. 
The formulation of a reconstructive model of duration estimation to 
explain the results of this study is not surprising. Firstly, as noted in Chapter 
I, duration estimation research has typically required the estimation of rather 
meaningless intervals of time which deny subjects the opportunity to use a 
reconstructive strategy. It is, therefore not surprising that Ornstein's model 
could not adequately explain the present results, as his model was developed 
on the basis of traditional duration estimation research. Secondly, as note in 
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section 2.2.2, there is ample evidence that responses are often reconstructed 
rather than recalled (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Corbonell & Collins, 1973; Collins, 
1978; Collins, Warnock, Aiello & Miller, 1975; Genter & Collins, 1981). In 
relation to temporal information, specifically the recall of when an event 
occurred, the dominant explanation is a reconstructive one (e.g., Baddeley, 
Lewis & Nimmo-Smith, 1978; Brown, Shevell & Ripps, 1986; Linton, 1975; 
Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Robinson, 1986; Thompson, 1982, Thompson et 
aL,1988; Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982), which incorporates the use of general 
time knowledge about natural temporal patterns, activity routines, and 
autobiographical and social information (Friedman & Wilkins, 1985). The 
results of this study suggest that event duration is similarly reconstructed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UNDIRECTED-DIARY METHOD 
3.0 Introduction 
Obtaining diaries compiled by individuals (diarists) who have no prior 
knowledge of their use in research and examining the diarist's recall of the 
autobiographical events detailed therein is a method that has not previously 
been employed by memory researchers. This method, termed the 'undirected-
diary method', is used in Experiment 6. It is proposed that this method 
overcomes a number of the problems associated with some of the methods 
currently used in autobiographical memory research. In this chapter, the 
undirected-diary method is compared with other methods of studying 
autobiographical memory. 
The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first, methods that 
have been used to study autobiographical memory are described. Sections two 
and three focus on diary-keeping. Section two briefly outlines the history of 
diary-keeping and the various ways in which diaries have been used in 
research. The characteristics of diarists, diary-keeping as a behaviour, and 
diary records are examined in Section three, where the results of a 
questionnaire survey of diarists (Experiment 5) are given. Section four 
compares the undirected-diary method to other methods that have been used 
to study autobiographical memory. The general focus of the chapter is to 
determine the research potential of the undirected-diary method in the study of 
autobiographical memory. 
3.1 Autobiographical Memory Research Methodology 
In this section methods that have been used to investigate 
autobiographical memory are described. In line with the definition of 
autobiographical memory given in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, only methods 
which have been used to study people's memory of real-life incidents which 
they have personally experienced are examined. Table 3.1 describes five 
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methods that have been used to investigated various aspects of 
autobiographical memory, and lists studies which have used each method. 
Although the objectives of the various studies listed in Table 3.1 are not 
particularly relevant to the present discussion, this information is presented in 
the table. 
Table 3.1. Methods that have been used to ·investigateautobiographical memory and studies 
that have used each method. 
Section 1: The Diary Method 
Subjects are instructed to record in a diary specified details of 
particular events at the time of the events occurrence. Subject's records are 
collected and compared with their subsequent recall of the recorded 
material. Details of a record can also be used as a prompt for recall or the 
complete record presented in a recognition procedure. The method has 
also been used with the experimenter participating as the subject ( e.g., 
Linton, 1975; White, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986). See Abel (1947), and Reason 
and Lucas (1984) for a discussion of the method. 
Study 
Barclay & Wellman (1986) 
Bruce & Van Pelt (1989) 
General Focus of Study 
Event dating, organization of 
autobiographical memory 
Frequency, spatial and temporal 
(date) aspects of autobiographical 
event memory 
Crovitz, Cordoni, Daniel & Perlman Forgetting everyday experiences 
(1984) 
Linton (1975), also see Linton (1978, Event dating strategies and accuracy 
1979, 1982) 
Thompson (1982) 
Thompson (1985a) 
Thompson (1985b) 
Thompson, Showronski & Lee 
(1988) 
Wagenaar (1986) 
Event dating strategies, effects of 
event memory, rehearsal, 
actor / observer differences 
Event dating, relationship of 'affect' 
to recall and dating accuracy 
Event dating, effect of event 
memory and involvement in event 
Event dating, organization of 
autobiographical memory 
Event dating accuracy, retrieval of 
autobiographical memories, 
organization of autobiographical 
memory 
White (1982), also see White (1989) Event dating accuracy, retrieval of 
autobiographical memories 
Section 2: Prompted Free-Association Recall of Autobiographical Memories 
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Originally developed by Galton (1879), this method involves presenting a 
subject with a word (e.g., "boat", Cermack & O'Connor, 1983) which they use in 
a free-association manner as a prompt to recall a specific autobiographical 
memory. Crovitz and Schiffman (1974) are generally credited with the revival 
of Galton's word association technique (Rubin, 1986), and it is currently the 
most popular method of studying autobiographical memory (Brewer, 1986). 
Sometimes activity descriptions (e.g., "visiting a doctor", Reiser, Black & 
Kalamarides, 1986) are used as prompts rather than single words. 
Study 
Cermak & O'Connor (1983) 
Experiment 2 
Crovitz & Quina-Holland (1976) 
Crovitz & Schiffman (1974) 
Fitzgerald (1981) 
Fitzgerald (1980) 
Fitzgerald & Lawrence (1984) 
Franklin & Holding (1977) 
General Focus of Study 
Memory impairment from amnesia 
due to encephalitis 
Proportion of autobiographical 
memories recalled from early 
childhood as a function of age of 
memory 
Frequency of autobiographical 
memories recalled as a function of 
age of memory 
Frequency of autobiographical 
memories recalled as a function of 
age of memory 
Sampling of autobiographical 
memory 
Autobiographical memory across 
the life-span 
Memory retrieval speed, age 
distribution of recalled memories 
Galton (1879) Contents of memory 
Holding, Noonan, Pfau & Holding Memory retrieval speed, age 
(1986) distribution of recalled memories 
McCormack (1979) Frequency of autobiographical 
memories recalled as a function of 
age of memory 
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Reiser, Black & Abelson (1985) Organization and retrieval of 
autobiographical memory 
Reiser, Black & Kalamarides (1986) Autobiographical memory search 
processes 
Robinson (1986) 
Robinson (1980) 
Robinson (1976) 
Rubin (1982) 
Sagar, Cohen, Corkin & Growdon 
(1985) 
Uhlenhuth, Haberman, Balter & 
Lipman (1977) 
Warren, Chatlin, Thompson & 
Tomsky (1983) 
Warren, Hughes & Tobias (1985) 
Event dating reliability 
Affect and the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories 
Event dating reliability, sampling 
autobiographical memory, effect of 
cue word type, age of memory and 
type of experience 
Event dating reliability, 
autobiographical memory recall as a 
function of time since event 
Recall of autobiographical memory, 
effect of Alzheimer's, Parkinson's 
and long-standing focal brain 
trauma 
Recall and age distribution of 
various types of autobiographical 
events 
Effect of autobiographical 
elaboration on noun recall 
Effect of autobiographical 
elaboration on memory for 
adjectives 
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Williams & Broadbent (1986) Bias in autobiographical memory 
retrieval in suicide attempters 
Zola-Morgan, Cohen & Squire (1983) Recall of autobiographical memories 
by amnesic, Korsakoff's and ECT 
patients 
Section 3: Un-prompted Recall of Autobiographical Memories 
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Subjects are simply asked to recall and describe autobiographical events. 
No prompts or cues to recall are provided, although sometimes limits are 
placed on recall, such as "please describe a memory that you have of your 
freshman year in college" ( Pillemer, Rhinehart & White, 1988, p. 711). 
Study 
Bond & Brockett (1987) 
Fuhrman & Wyer (1988) 
Harvey, Flanary & Morgan (1986) 
King & Pontious (1969) 
Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter & 
White (1988) 
General Focus of Study 
Memory for acquaintances 
Temporal-order of autobiographical 
memories 
Flashbulb memories, vividness of 
associa ted memories 
Retrieval-order effects in 
autobiographical memory 
Memories of first year of college, 
distribution of memories within 
this year 
Pillemer, Koff, Rhinehart & Rierdan Recount memories of menarche -
(1987) flashbulb memories 
Pillemer, Rhinehart & White (1986) Autobiographical memories and 
periods of life transition 
Reynolds & Takooshian (1988) 
Riegel (1973) 
Efficiency of date information as a 
prompt to recall 
Lifespan development 
Rubin & Kozin (1984) Experiment I, Flashbulb memories 
Part a 
Smith (1952) 
Waldfogel (1948) 
Whitten & Leonard (1981) 
Section 4: Use of Archival Records 
Accuracy of autobiographical 
memory recall 
Proportion of autobiographical 
memories recalled from early 
childhood as a function of age of 
memory 
Retrieval-order effects in 
autobiographical memory 
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The experimenter obtains information on events an individual has 
experienced. The recording of the information is sometimes a phase of the 
experiment, although generally it is routinely performed as part of the event 
(e.g., an individual's attendance at an exam). Sometimes information on the 
circumstances surrounding the experience of an event is used (e.g., recall is of 
the features of the environment in which the event occurred). Generally the 
obtained event information is used in a similar way to that obtained with the 
diary method. 
Study and Type of Archival Record General Focus of Study 
Baddeley & Hitch (1977). Effect of recency on recall 
Rugby club records 
Baddeley, Lewis & Nimmo-Smith 
(1978). 
Event dating, recall strategies and 
ability to recall autobiographical 
Attendance at an applied psychology event information 
laboratory 
Bahrick (1979). City knowledge, recall and 
Names and location of streets in the recognition 
city subject attended university 
Bahrick, Bahrick & Wittlinger 
(1975). 
N ames and photographs taken from 
high school year book 
Beatty & Spangenberger (1988). 
Geographical features of the region 
in which the subject was born 
Douglas & Blomfield (1956). 
Records from a study of maternity 
services and the cost of child-bearing 
Field (1981). 
Records from a longitudinal study 
of development 
Gold & Neisser (1980) 
Kindergarten records 
Janis (1950). 
Records from an interview 
Recall and recognition of names and 
faces - effects of retention interval 
Persistence of geographical memory 
Reliability of retrospective recall 
Reliability of retrospective 
reports/autobiographical memory 
Early memories - recollections of 
kindergarten 
Autobiographical memory 
impairment after ECT treatment 
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Jojce, Caple, Maron, Reynolds & 
Mathews (1969). 
Doctors records of consultation 
Levin, High, Meyers, Von Laufen, 
Hayden & Eiskenberg (1985) 
Experiment 2. 
Information obtained from a 
relative 
Ley, Bradshaw, Eaves & Walter 
(1973). 
Doctors records of consultation 
Ley & Spelman (1965). 
Doctors records of consultation 
Ley, Whitworth, Skilbeck, 
Woodwarward, Pinsent, Pike, 
Clarkson & Clark (1976). 
Doctors records of consultation 
Loftus & Fathi (1985). 
Psychology course examination 
records 
Mednick & Shaffer (1963). 
Medical records 
Neisser (1981). 
Conversation transcripts 
Pyles, Stolz & MacFarlane (1935). 
Medical records 
Speakman (1954). 
British postage stamps 
Effect of retention interval on recall 
of doctor /patient consultation 
Autobiographical memory 
impairment after closed head injury 
Methods of increasing the recall of 
doctors advice 
Recall of doctor /patient 
communication 
Improving patient memory for 
medical advice 
Effects of retrieval order - backward 
and forward search - on 
autobiographical memory recall 
Reliability of retrospective recall 
Accuracy of autobiographical 
memory 
Reliability of retrospective recall 
Recall of stamp value - age/memory 
rela tionshi p 
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Yarrow, Campbell & Burton (1970). Reliability of retrospective recall 
Records from longitudinal study 
Zola-Morgan & Oberg (1980). 
Records from a field trip 
Section 5: Public Events 
Autobiographical memory 
impairment in an alcoholic 
Korsakoff patient 
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Significant public events ( e.g., the explosion of the space shuttle 
Challenger; Bohannon, 1988) have been used in a variety of ways in memory 
research: subjects have been required to recall or recognize information 
associated with the event itself ( e.g., Albert, Butters & Levin, 1979; Botwinick 
& Storandt, 1974; Cermak & O'Connor, 1983; Johnson & Klinger, 1976; 
Perlmutter, 1978; Sanders & Warrington, 1971; Seltzer & Benson, 1974; 
Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Squire, 1974; Storandt, Grant & Gordon, 1978; 
Warrington & Sanders, 1971; Warrington & Silberstein, 1970), to recall the date 
on which the event occurred ( see Chapter I, Section 1.3 to 1.3.4), and to recall 
information relating to the circumstances of hearing about the event. 
However, only in the latter case where memory for the personal event of 
hearing about the public event is investigated, is the research focusing on 
autobiographical memory. The term 'flashbulb memories' (Brown & Kulik, 
1977) is generally used to specifically define the aspect of autobiographical 
memory being studied. In accordance with the above discussion, and the focus 
of this chapter, only studies which have used public events to investigate 
autobiographical memory are listed in this section. 
Study and Public Event Used 
Bohannon (1988). 
Explosion of the space shuttle 
Challenger 
General Focus of Study 
Variables effecting flashbulb 
memories - emotion, rehearsal, 
retention interval 
Brown & Kulik (1977). 
Assassination of J. K. Kennedy 
Flashbulb memories 
Christianson, Carlsson, Fredriksson, Reliability of flashbulb memories 
Nilsson & Viktorsson (1988). 
Assassination of 01£ Palme 
Colegrove (1899). Recall of autobiographical events 
Assassination of President Lincoln associated with a public event 
Pillemer (1984). Variables effecting flashbulb 
Assassination attempt on President memories - rehearsal, emotion 
Reagan 
Rubin & Kozin (1984). Variables effecting flashbulb 
Experiment 1, Part b. memories - surprise, importance 
Used a number of events e.g., The 
night President Nixon resigned 
Winograd & Killinger (1983). 
Assassination of J. F. Kennedy 
Yarmey & Bull (1978). 
Assassination of President J. F. 
Kennedy 
3.2 Diaries and Their History 
Development of flashbulb 
memories 
Nature of flashbulb memories 
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It is not easy to define the term 'diary', The definition given in The 
Pocket Oxford Dictionary; "Daily record kept of events or thoughts" (Fowler & 
Fowler 1975, p. 229) is too precise. Many individuals who keep a diary do so 
only intermittently. Furthermore, 'events or thoughts' falls short of an 
adequate description of the material entered in diaries. A description of the 
frequency and nature of diary entries must be very general if it is to account for 
the enormous individual differences between diarists. Perhaps the only 
precise statement that can be used to describe a 'diary' is that it is written in the 
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first person, and contains a more or less continuous series of "responses to the 
writer's present situation and recent experience" (Fothergill, 1974, p. 48). 
However, diaries as a form of personal document vary so much that perhaps 
the only definition which applies to them all is " ... a diary is what a person 
writes when he (or she) says, 'I am writing my diary" (Fothergill, 1974, p.3). 
Diary keeping as a separate literary activity developed from a number of 
pre-diary habits. Four literary forms are identified by Fothergill (1974) as the 
ancestors of diary-keeping: journals of travel, conscience, personal 
memoranda, and 'public' journals. Although each type of journal is classed as 
a separate literary form, and each serves a distinct function, all four contain, to 
some extent, descriptions of an individual's and others' actions, experiences 
and beliefs. 
Travel journals were kept by gentlemen when 'abroad'. Francis Bacon, 
In his essay, 'Of Travel' (1906) details the use of such a journal on a 
gentleman's travels. This literary form has to some extent survived intact, 
travel diaries are available from stationists and 'travel' is still sufficient to 
prompt some individuals to keep a record of their experiences (see the 
discussion of motives behind diary-keeping in Section 3.3.1.5). 
Religious belief was largely responsible for journals of conscience. These 
journals contain largely expressions of thoughts, feelings, and opinions, and 
were used for self-development. Quakers often used such journals for 
religious disciplinary purposes (Ponsonby, 1974). The type of material one 
should record in a 'journal of conscience' and the spiritual benefits which 
might result from such a habit are described in John Beadle's The Journal or 
Diary of a Thankful Christian, published in 1656. 
Fothergill's other two classes of journal, 'journals of personal 
memoranda' and 'public journals' were both used to intermittently record the 
'events of the day', but in contrast to the 'journal of travel' were not prompted 
by the nature of one's activities. The former often consisted of a number of 
notes or jottings relating events in the life of the author or those around him. 
Public journals, on the other hand, were kept in a more formal manner and 
contained such things as transactions of public bodies and details of military 
campaigns. 
79 
From Fothergill's four literary forms, or types of journals, developed 
the habit of diary-keeping. Beginning in the sixteenth century, a few well-
educated people began to keep daily records of the events in their lives and 
those around them, and their thoughts, feelings and opinions. The practise 
was predominantly undertaken by well-educated men (Ponsonby, 1974). 
Education was undoubtedly a prerequisite for keeping a diary, ensuring literacy 
and allowing the diarist to express himself well in writing. At this time in 
history the well educated were normally wealthy, thus possessing the means to 
buy the necessary materials for diary-keeping. 
It is interesting that, in the past, diarists seem to have been mainly male 
(Aitken, 1944; Dunaway & Evans, 1957; Fothergill, 1974; Forbes, 1923; 
O'Brien, 1944; Ponsonby, 1923, 1927; Ponsonby, 1974). It is possible, 
however, that the records we now have, which are mainly published diaries 
and those held by museums, are not a representative sample and that many 
females kept diaries during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, diary keeping had become quite 
fashionable among ladies (Ponsonby, 1974), while surveys of diary-keeping 
conducted this century have consistently .found more female than male 
diarists. (These surveys are discussed in detail in Section 3.3). Perhaps, then, 
the single most significant development in the history of diary-keeping is that a 
once predominantly male behaviour is now practised predominantly by 
women. 
Diary keeping is also no longer confined to the wealthy and educated, 
although a certain level of literacy is required. The materials required for diary 
keeping, pencil and paper, are now generally available. Indeed, this is also an 
important aspect in the history of diary keeping. Not only are the necessary 
materials now readily available, but the 'diary' has been developed as a 
'retail able' item, commonly available in stationary shops. 
It would be inappropriate to discuss the history of diary keeping in more 
detail in this thesis. The interested reader is referred to Fothergill (1974) and 
Ponsonby (1974). However, as a human behaviour diary keeping is 
particularly intriguing. As to what motivated many individuals to begin 
recording daily experiences, thoughts and feelings during the nineteenth 
century, there is no obvious answer. 
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3.2.1 The History of Diaries in Scientific Research 
Personal documents, including diaries, have been used by psychologists, 
psychiatrists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians and autobiographers. 
Anthropologists, historians and autobiographers use personal documents as a 
source of fact and opinion. The documents are used in an objective way, as a 
. source of information. The advantages and disadvantages of using this 
material in historical and anthropological research have been discussed by a 
number of authors (e.g., Freidel, 1955; Gottschalk, Kluckhohn & Angell, 
1945; Ponsonby, 1923). Psychologists, psychiatrists and sociologists, on the 
other hand, have tended to 'reason' from the contents of personal documents 
in relation to the phenomenon being investigated. The use of personal 
documents in this kind of inductive research has also been extensively 
discussed (e.g., Allport, 1942; Angell & Freedman, 1953; Gottschalk et al., 
1945; Madge, 1965; Plummer, 1983). 
Psychologists, psychiatrists and sociologists began to use personal 
documents as research 'tools' towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Diaries, in particular, were used extensively, being considered "the personal 
document par excellence." (Allport, 1942, p. 95). Researchers generally 
worked with a single 'diary' or subject, two or three at most. The diary 
material was either solicited from students or obtained from an established 
collection, for example 'The Vienna Collection' (Allport, 1942) (The details of 
a number of extensive collections of diary material can be found in Iovetz-
Tereschenko (1936». Researchers simply performed a type of qualitative 
analysis on the material. Excerpts from the diaries were published together 
with interpretations and discussions of their meaning in relation to the 
phenomenon being investigated. These often formed the bases of hypotheses 
and theories. 
This method of inductive reasoning from diary records has been 
employed to study religious experience (e.g., Clark, 1929; James, 1901-2; 
Kupky, 1928; Starbuck, 1899), adolescent love and relationships (e.g., Hall, 
1904; Iovetz-Tereschenko, 1936; Runner, 1937), family disorganization 
(Mowrer, 1927), the social meaning of suicide (Cavan, 1928; Douglas, 1967), 
the experience of aging (Berman, 1986; Drakeford, 1984) and language 
development (Fuchs, 1927). Around the turn of the century then, the use of 
diaries in research was reasonably wide-spread. However, early in the 
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twentieth century the number of studies employing such documents declined 
rapidly, particularly in psychology (Allport, 1942). The use of personal 
documents in sociological research, although also declining about this time, 
continued to be reasonably popular. 
Psychology as a science radically changed during the early part of the 
twentieth century, and some authors (e.g., Allport, 1942; Madge, 1965) have 
attributed the decline in the use of personal documents in psychological 
research to this change in psychology as a whole. Traditionally psychology was 
based on the introspective conclusions of individual philosopher-
psychologists. During the early part of the twentieth century the value of a 
science based on dogmatic phenomenology began to be questioned. The 
inadequacies of introspection were pointed out by the behaviourist school of 
psychology, overt behaviour became the subject matter of psychology, and 
many laboratories were established. Per,sonal documents were seen as 
'subjective material' (Allport, 1942), and the way they were used in research as 
out of line with the prevailing scientific temper. This demand for objectivity 
in psychology probably reduced the use of personal documents in research. 
However, analysis of personal documents as a method never completely 
disappeared, perhaps it continued as " ... a protest against the laboratory 
emphasis and against the aridity of behaviourism" (Allport, 1942, p. 127), and 
not because of the value of the method. 
Personal documents probably were rejected as useful 'tools' for scientific 
research primarily because of the way in which they had been used. 
Psychology was striving to become a more 'objective' science and still is in 
many areas. There has, however, recently been a trend within psychology 
towards the reacceptance of phenomenal data in experimental psychology (see 
Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Hilgard, 1980, and Natsoulas, 1970 for discussions of 
this issue). Furthermore, Taylor, Robinson and McCormick (1986) have 
argued that the examination of personal documents should be restored as a 
technique in the study of personality, as long as the documents are submitted 
to sensitive, reflective and expert analysis. It is perhaps ironic that diaries are 
used in this thesis in order to increase the objectivity and validity of 
autobiographical memory research. 
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3.3 Diarists, Diary Keeping and Diary Material 
Who are diarists? This is a critical question in relation to the validity of 
generalizations that a researcher using diaries might make. Are diarists 
representative of the population about which a researcher might enquire? 
Research using diaries has been criticized on this point; 
" ... no one seems to have ascertained what proportion of 
adolescents in various countries and in various socio-economic 
groups keep diaries. Diaries which are used to support a number of 
generalizations regarding adolescence seem to us to be worth but little 
unless there is some way of telling to what extent the adolescents who 
keep diaries are representative of those who do not - the latter must 
surely be the vast majority". (Murphy, Murphy & Newcomb, 1937, 
p.841) 
Some authors have, however, suggested diarists possess no special or 
definable attributes. For example, 
" ... there is nothing in age, sex, character, profession, religion or 
circumstances which can be taken as a safe indication of whether a man 
or woman is a diarist or not" (Ponsonby, 1974, p.l0). 
Ponsonby's statement is, at best, a gross over-simplification, and is not based 
on any empirical evidence. Moreover, in the past, as we have seen, sex, 
religion, and circumstances (e.g., education) have been influential in 
determining who became a diarist. 
There have been remarkably few studies conducted on the characteristics 
of diarists, especially contemporary diarists, and, unfortunately, very few 
details have been obtained from those studies which have been conducted. 
Ponsonby (1923) found that 41 percent of the males and 61 percent of the 
females of a random sample of educated people over 30 years of age had been or 
were diarists. A Russian study by Uher (1935, cited in Allport, 1942) found one 
third of the adolescent males and two thirds of the adolescent females sampled 
kept diaries. A study of 3500 Japanese students with an age range of 13 to 21 
years was conducted by Yoda in 1938. Half of the college students and a smaller 
percentage of middle-graders were found to be diarists (cited in Allport, 1942). 
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Finally, Allport (1942) reported that an unpublished study conducted in North 
America found 71 percent of the female students sampled had kept a diary, 
with 36 percent still doing so. The above studies were conducted some time 
ago; some more up-to-date information is given by Rubin (1982, Experiment 
5). As part of an experiment on the reliability of event dating Rubin asked 394 
introductory psychology students if they kept a diary, and if so, over what 
period. Two hundred and thirteen subjects responded positively. No data on 
the length of records of the majority of this group was reported, however, the 
9 subjects (diary keepers) chosen as research participants had kept an average of 
6 years of records with a range of 3 to 10 years. No other data were reported. 
It is difficult, and perhaps unwise, to draw anything other than 
tentative conclusions from these studies. It appears that more females than 
males keep diaries and that diary keeping is not confined to English speaking 
cultures. Finally, the proportion of individuals in each study that had been or 
were diarists is quite large. This may, however, be an artifact of the age range 
sampled; Iovetz-Tereschenko (1936) has suggested that the keeping of diaries is 
particularly prominent during adolescence. 
The following questionnaire survey (Experiment 5) was motivated by 
both the wish to obtain more recent data on diary keeping and as part of 
research into autobiographical event memory. 
3.3.1 Experiment 5: A Questionnaire Survey Of Diarists 
3.3.1.1 Method 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained three sections: a general information 
section containing questions on the subjects' sex, age, ethnic group and 
marital status (a question on education was also included in the questionnaire 
completed by the community sample); a diary-keeping section with eleven 
questions specific to diary-keeping (shown in Figure 3.1); and a section 
requesting research participants for Experiment 6. Subject instructions were 
printed on the cover page. The questionnaire was entitled 'The Diary-Keeping 
Prevalence Study'. 
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Figure 3.1. Questions on diary-keeping from the diary-keeping prevalence study 
questionnaire. 
Diary-Keeping Section 
(6) Do you keep or have you ever kept a diary? 
No ( 
Yes ( 
) If no do not continue 
) If yes please continue 
(7) At what age or between what ages have you kept a diary? 
Age.......... or From .......... to ......... . 
(8) Please indicate which category(ies) below best describes the 
nature of your diary entries (Tick as many categories as 
necessary) 
(9) 
(10) 
Salient life events 
Everyday life events 
Personal thoughts and feelings 
World events 
Events that have occurred in other peoples lives 
Other (please specify) 
Please indicate at what time of the day you generally 
write/wrote in your diary 
In the morning ( ) 
Midday ( ) 
In the afternoon ( ) 
In the evening ( ) 
Do/did you write in your diary every day? 
Yes ( ) 
No ( ) 
Almost every day ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
(11) If you forgot or can/could not write in your diary for some 
reason on a particular day do/did you: 
Leave that page blank? ( ) 
Make an entry at some later date? () 
(12) Have you ever fabricated events in your diary so as to avoid 
the true nature of your activities being discovered e.g., by your 
parents? 
Never .......... I .......... I .......... I .......... I ..... ·····I··········I··········Frequently 
12 3456 7 
(13) Do/did you use codes in your diary? That is, do/did you record 
things using symbols or letter sequences etc that only you 
know the meaning of. 
Never .......... 1 .......... 1 ...... ····1········ ··1········· ·1········· ·1····· ..... Frequently 
12 3456 7 
(14) Have you retained your diaries? 
Yes (all of them) 
Yes (some of them) 
The diary I am writing in currently is 
my first diary but I intend to retain it 
No 
(15) Do/did you read back over your diary entries? 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
Never .......... I .......... I .......... I .......... I ..... ·····I··········I···········Frequently 
12 3456 7 
(16) In your own words please describe why you keep or 
once kept a diary ........................................................... . 
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Subjects 
One hundred and seventy-one males with an age range from 16 to 36 
(mean 19.6 years) and 307 females with an age range of 17 to 59 (mean 20.7 
years) from the Stage 1 psychology course at the University of Canterbury 
completed the questionnaire. 
Two hundred and twenty-three questionnaires were also distributed to 
Stage 2 psychology students at the University of Canterbury. These students 
were required to interview a member of the community as part of a 'life-
history' assignment, and administered the diary-keeping questionnaire at the 
same time. Thirty-one of these questionnaires were returned, of these 20 had 
been completed by males ranging in age from 26 to 88 and 11 by females with an 
age range of 43 to 91 years. 
Procedure 
The student sample completed the questionnaire in groups during 
March 1987. Instructions printed on the cover page of the questionnaire were 
read out. Completion of the questionnaire required approximately ten 
minutes. 
The community sample completed the questionnaire during the course 
of their 'life history' interview in August 1987. They were instructed to read 
the instructions printed on the cover page carefully before beginning. 
The student and community samples were not combined for analysis 
purposes. Generally only the student sample's data are discussed; however, 
where appropriate, data from the community sample are presented. 
3.3.1.2 Results and Discussion 
3.3.1.3 Prevalence and Demographic Factors 
Of the 478 student respondents that completed the questionnaire, 36 
males and 158 females had once kept a diary, and 19 males and 65 females were 
keeping one at the time of the study. Thus 55 or 32 percent of the males and 
223 or 72 percent of females sampled had been or were diarists. These results 
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are consistent with the studies reported earlier in terms of the sex difference, 
with more females than males being diarists. Diary keeping also appears to be 
quite common, with over 58 percent of the sample defined as diarists. 
Plummer's (1983) statement that" ... the diary as a form of writing seems to be 
going out of fashion" (p. 18) appears to be incorrect, at least for this sample. 
Furthermore, the apparent prevalence of diary-keeping is not consistent with 
the statement made by Murphy et al. (1937) quoted earlier. It is also possible 
that diary-keeping is even more prevalent than the above results indicate. 
Diary-keeping is a rather private and sometimes secret behaviour and because 
of this " ... anyone making enquiries about diary-keeping may quite well be 
met with a denial from a habitual diarist" (Ponsonby, 1923, p.3). 
The sex difference in diary-keeping is not a problem for researchers 
contemplating using diaries. A reasonable number of men do keep diaries. A 
researcher should, therefore, be able to obtain a suitable sample of both males 
and females without too much effort (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1 for the results 
of the administration of the 'research participant request form'). Furthermore, 
the finding that the majority of the sample could be categorized as 'diarists' 
suggests that diarists are not a small special subgroup of individuals. 
It is possible, however, that the prevalence figures obtained from this 
survey do not apply to the general population. The sample, university 
students, can be described as 'reasonably well educated'. Furthermore, when 
the effect of education on diary-keeping was examined in the 'community' 
sample a significant result was obtained (F (1, 30) = 8.158, p <. 0.05). The 
mean number of years of secondary and tertiary education of the diary-keepers 
in the sample (N=17) was 6.9, while that of the non-diary-keepers (N=14) was 
3.5. Therefore, diary-keeping may well remain chiefly the domain of the 
educated. 
The size of specific ethnic groups within the student sample ( New 
Zealand Maoris, Asians or Pacific Islanders) was unfortunately very small. 
However, all of the females (N=8) and 36 percent of the males (N=14) in these 
three ethnic groups were diarists. These results suggest that diary-keeping may 
be prevalent in different ethnic groups and that it may be possible to conduct 
cross-cultural studies in autobiographical memory using diaries. 
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Interpretation of the marital status results is rather difficult because of 
the nature of the student sample: only seven percent of the sample were 
married. Fifty-five percent of the married respondents were, however, 
keeping a diary at the time of the survey. Diary-keeping is, therefore, not 
solely a behaviour of single individuals. 
The 'age' data must also be interpreted with caution. The youngest age 
at which both a male and female respondent indicated he or she had kept a 
diary was seven, while data from the community sample indicated that some 
individuals (N=3) were doing so when over 70 years old. The majority of the 
student sample male diarists indulged in the behaviour between 17 and 18 
years of age, while for the females the peak was slightly earlier, between 15 and 
16 years of age. The latter results perhaps reflect the age distribution of the 
sample. However, the 'peaks' in diary-keeping for each sex are slightly earlier 
than the mean sample ages. There is, therefore, some support for Iovetz-
Tereschenko's (1936) suggestion that diary-keeping is particularly prominent 
during adolescence. 
3.3.1.4 Diary Keeping Characteristics: Duration 
At the time of the survey the male diarists had kept diary records for a 
mean of 2.6 years and the female diarists for a mean of 3.8 years. It is, 
however, possible that the mean difference reflects the overall age difference 
between the males and females sampled: the females on average were 
approximately one year older than the males. It should also be noted that 
there is no guarantee that, for example, a respondent who indicated she or he 
kept a diary at age 17 kept it for the whole year. On the other hand, it is 
important to remember that a considerable number of the diarists may go on to 
compile many more years of records. Seven diarists from the community 
sample had kept a diary for over 30 years, with 67 years being the maximum 
duration indicated. 
The 278 student diarists surveyed had in total recorded approximately 
990 years of diary records. Presumably entries were not made on all of the 
361,350 days. Nevertheless, the amount of material recorded is quite 
staggering. The potential this material has for research, however, can only be 
realized if diarists retain it. Eighty percent of the female and 62 percent of the 
male diarists indicated they had, or planned to, retain some or all of their 
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diary records. Thus, while some diary records are lost or destroyed, the 
amount of potentially usable material is enormous. 
3.3.1.5 Motives 
That some diary material is either lost or destroyed may indicate that for 
some individuals, their completed diaries have little or no value. This raises 
the question: ,Why do individuals keep diaries at all? The student samples 
brief descriptions of why they had kept or were keeping a diary were divided 
into 11 reasons by the experimenter. Table 3.2 shows the 11 reasons, (ranked 
according to the frequency of use) and the percentage of male and female 
diarists giving each reason. Nineteen males and 84 females gave more than 
one reason for keeping a diary which is why the percentages shown in Table 3.2 
do not add to 100. 
Inspection of Table 3.2 indicates that most diarists, both male and 
female, kept a diary as an aid to the future recall of past events (e.g., reason 1). 
Ponsonby (1923) noted that this was one motive for diary-keeping, and the 
value of diary records as a memory 'trigger' was mentioned by Peeples (1957). 
The table also shows diaries are used as a day-to-day memory aid (e.g., reason 
6). Harris (1978), in a study of 'memory aids', reported 93 percent of the 30 
students questioned used a diary as a prospective memory aid. Generally, the 
between-sexes tests for proportional differences did not produce any 
meaningful results. However, there may be a sex difference in using a diary as 
a 'confidant' (e.g., reason 8) as only female subjects gave this reason. 
Furthermore, when the proportion of diarists that kept a diary as a confidant, 
emotional outlet, and a place to sort things out (e.g., reasons 2, 4 and 8) were 
combined and compared between the sexes a significant (p < 0.05) difference 
was obtained Z= 2.510 (critical Z = 1.960). Overall a significantly greater 
proportion of the female diarists kept a diary for these 'subjective' reasons. 
Some diarists obviously see their diary records as having some value in 
the future (e.g., reason 1), and one might expect these individuals to retain 
their diaries. On the other hand, the diarists that used a diary as a confidant, 
emotional outlet or a place to sort things out (e.g., reasons 2, 4 and 8), rather 
than keeping a diary for its value in the future, see it as fulfilling its function at 
the time that entries are made, and one might expect these individuals would 
be less concerned with the future whereabouts of their diary records. These 
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diarists may even destroy their diaries,. as their motive for keeping them 
suggests they may contain sensitive, potentially damaging material. However, 
the proportion of diarists (18.5 percent) that had kept a diary as a confidant, 
emotional outlet, and a place to sort things out (e.g., reasons 2, 4 and 8) and no 
longer had their diary records was essentially the same as the proportion (18.1 
percent) that kept a diary for its value in the future (e.g., reason 1) and that had 
indicated they no longer had their diary records. 
Reason For Keeping A Diary Percentage Percentage Test of 
of Males of Females Proportional 
Difference 
(1) The records would help the individual to 38.1 39.0 Z=0.12 
remember life events at some later date. 
They would provide a source of cues for 
reminiscence 
(2). A place to record thoughts and feelings 21.8 29.1 Z=1.09 
towards life events, an emotional outlet 
(3) Simply wished to record their life events 12.7 19.2 Z=1.1S0 
(4) A place to clarify thoughts and ideas, sort 7.2 14.7 Z=1.S1 
out problems 
(S) Record travel experiences 12.7 9.4 Z= 0.73 
(6) To plan for the future, work schedules, 10.9 8.0 Z=0.71 
appointments, birthdays and other important 
dates 
(7) The diary was given as a present and they 16.3 6.2 Z=2.47 .. 
felt obliged to use it 
(8) The diary was I is a confidant, a friend to 0 9.4 
discuss ones life with 
(9) Because others I friends kept a diary. 3.6 4.9 Z=0.44 
(10) To improve writing ability 0 .8 
(11) So as to provide a record of their life for 0 .4 
their family when they die 
Note - Two tailed test of proportional differences .. = O.OS 
<Critical Z=1.960), .... = 0.01 (critical Z = 2.S76) 
Table 3.2. Reasons given for keeping a diary and the percentage of male and female 
respondents that gave each reason. 
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Terms which have been used to describe diarists, such as egotistical, 
vain, self-absorbed and self-conscious (Ponsonby, 1923), although 
unsubstantiated, are likely to apply, if at all, to those diarists that kept diary 
records for more subjective reasons. However, in the final analysis, the large 
proportion of the sample defined as diarists, itself indicates diary-keeping to be 
a normal activity, not one restricted to an egotistical subgroup. For further 
discussion of the motives behind diary-keeping see Allport (1942) and 
Fothergill (1974). 
3.3.1.6 Memory Effects 
Perhaps the most important question in relation to the use of diaries in 
autobiographical memory research is whether the act of recording an event in a 
diary makes it more memorable. Describing an event in a diary is essentially 
the rehearsal of the individual's memory of the event. The results of the 
present study do not supply any information which can be used to answer this 
question directly. This question has, however, been investigated in studies 
where the experimenter has recorded his own autobiographical events 
(Wagenaar, 1986) or instructed others to do so (Thompson, 1982). In neither 
study was a significant effect of event recording on memorability found. In 
these studies the recorder also knew that he or she would be required to recall 
the events, which was not the case for the diarists that participated in 
Experiment 6 of this study. On the basis of these results one might expect that 
describing an event in a diary does not significantly affect its memorability. 
Recording an event also makes it available for rehearsal; it can be 
rehearsed at any time by simply reading the entry. Figure 3.2 shows the 
percentage of male and female respondents in the student sample who gave 
each rating for how frequently they read back over their diary entries. A very 
large proportion, 98.9 percent of the diarists sampled, did read back over their 
diary entries at some time, some more frequently than others. However, the 
wording of the question may have biased these results. Respondents may 
have interpreted it as meaning do they read back over their diary entries 
immediately after making them. Few individuals write something down and 
do not read over it. It is impossible from these results to determine how long 
after an entry was made that it was read. 
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Figure 3.2. The percentage of male and female respondents giving each rating for how 
frequently they read back over their diary entries. 
The male and female respondents' frequency ratings, shown in Figure 
3.2, were found to be significantly different (F (1, 277) = 7.203, P < 0.01); with 
the female diarists giving a higher mean rating (4.15) than the male diarists 
(3.50). This result perhaps reflects the sex difference in relation to the 
'subjective' use of diaries; more females kept a diary for subjective reasons and 
subjective entries might be more prone to review. 
3.3.1.7 Diary Entries 
The characte~ of diary entries has implications for the type of research 
which diaries can be used for, and the generalizations that can be made. Are 
the activities, thoughts and feelings described in diaries representative? 
Experiment 6 used diary entries to investigate subjects' memory of 
autobiographical events. Only those diary entries that were objective, factual 
accounts of events were used in the experiment, and then only when all the 
required information was recorded. Subjective entries, that is descriptions of 
feeling, opinions and motives, were not used in this research but might be 
useful for other research dealing with such aspects of biographical memory. 
The characteristics of diary entries have been described by Allport (1942), 
Fothergill (1974) and Ponsonby (1923), based on extensive reading of published 
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diaries and those held in museums. Although the diaries read by Allport, 
Fothergill and Ponsonby were generally compiled many years ago by 'famous' 
individuals, some of the statements they make regarding the character of diary 
entries are still relevant today. Indeed I found very similar types of entries in 
my readings of contemporary diaries of relatively unknown individuals. 
Diary entries vary both in terms of the material recorded and the style 
used. Some diarists simply note the day's occurrences in an objective way, 
while others used complete, crafted sentences to detail their thoughts and 
feelings, as well as the day's events (Fothergill, 1974; Ponsonby, 1923). 
Although the nature of the material recorded and the style of recording varies 
greatly between diarists, within a single diary such factors usually remain fairly 
constant (Fothergill, 1974). One thing that can be said about most, and 
probably all diary entries, is that they only relate a sample of the day's activities, 
thoughts and feelings. Diarists do not generally record the day's events in 
'script' form noting everything about their day from 'rising' to 'retiring'. 
To try and systematically describe exactly what a diarist might record 
would be absurd: entries are as varied as the activities which humans indulge 
in. Respondents were, however, asked which of five categories (plus an 
'other' category) best described their diary entries. Respondents could specify 
more than one category (which is responsible for why the percentages shown in 
Table 3.3 do not add to 100). Table 3.3 shows the percentage of male and female 
diarists in the student sample that specified each category. The percentage of 
males and females that indicated they made more than one type of entry (e.g., 
they made entries about both 'salient life events' and 'personal thoughts and 
feelings') are also shown in Table 3.3 for the four category combinations 
primarily used by the respondents. It appears that diary entries are either 
predominantly 'objective', detailing the activities of the diarist during the day, 
or subjective, dwelling on the individual's thoughts and feelings during the 
day. Tests of proportional differences within the entry categories indicate that 
the female diarists made significantly more 'subjective' entries than the males. 
These results are consistent with those reported earlier on the motives for diary 
keeping: diaries being primarily kept as either an aid to the future recall of past 
events or as a confident, emotional outlet and a place to sort things out, with 
the sex difference between motives being similar to that found for the types of 
diary entries made. The data on diary entries also calls into question the 
validity of Murphy et al.'s (1937) statement that; 
"There are, to be sure, a few diaries of matter-of-fact youngsters who 
simply tell what they had to eat and whether they went to the movies 
or went roller skating but they are few." (p.841) 
Type of Diary Entry Percentage Percentage Test of 
of Males of Females Proportional 
Difference 
Everyday life events 65.4 73.9 Z=1.25 
Personal thoughts and feelings 52.7 74.8 Z=3.20 ** 
Salient life events 43.6 30.0 Z=1.93 
Events that have occurred in others lives 20.0 24.2 Z=0.66 
W orId events 9.0 9.4 Z=0.09 
Other - Entries specified "poetry' & 'ideas" 0 .8 
Category Combinations 
Everyday life events and personal thoughts 29.0 51.1 Z=2.94 ** 
and feelings 
Salient life events and personal thoughts and 23.6 24.2 Z=0.09 
feelings 
Salient and everyday life events 20.0 18.8 Z=0.20 
Salient and everyday life events and 10.9 14.7 Z=O.72 
personal thoughts and feelings 
Note - Two tailed test of proportional difference * = 0.05 
(critical Z=1.960), ** 0.01 (critical Z=2.576) 
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Table 3.3. Types of material recorded in diaries and the percentage of male and female 
respondents that recorded each type of material. 
As already mentioned, not only does the type of entry made vary 
between diarists but also the level of description given: some diaries contain 
more detail than others. Diarists 
" ... are liable to take much for granted often failing to describe 
persons or situations whose existence and character the diarist merely 
assumes." (Allport, 1942, p.98) 
This is unsurprising as the diarist is not describing the day's occurrences for the 
information of others. The omission of details relating to events has 
implications for the research potential of such material. Where complete 
event information is required, for example, the 'what', 'where', 'who' and 
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'when' of an event, a considerable amount of diary material may need to be 
read for a suitable sample of events to be obtained. 
If the researcher requires information on a specific type of event, the task 
of locating it could be even more difficult if some diary entries are made in 
'code' form. Ponsonby (1923) discussed the use of 'codes' in diary entries, 
noting 
"Various devices are used by diarists to ensure secrecy. Many seem to 
fear the accidental discovery of their volume. Cypher is by no means 
uncommon for special entries." (p. 25) 
Codes were encountered in a number of the diaries examined in Experiment 6. 
One can only speculate as to the nature of activities entered in code form. It is 
most probable that they are sexual activities, although uncoded descriptions of 
sexual activities are not uncommon. 
Almost half of the student diarists surveyed, 46.7 percent, indicated they 
had at some time made a 'coded' entry in their diary; of these, 16.1 percent 
Figure 3.3. Percentage of male and female respondents that gave each rating on the 
frequency of coded diary entry scale. 
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were males and 83.8 percent were females. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of 
male and female respondents that gave each rating on the frequency of coded 
diary entry rating scale. Male and female ratings were compared and no 
significant difference found (F(1, 277) = 5.275, n.s.). Therefore, although more 
female than male diarists made coded diary entries, the female diarists did not 
do so any more frequently than the male diarists. The use of codes in diaries 
indicates that information on some activities may simply not be obtainable. 
3.3.1.8 Authenticity 
The authenticity of diary entries is critical to the validity of Experiment 6. 
A diary used to obtain autobiographical events for memory experiments that is 
no more than an "orchestrated litany of lies" will produce completely 
misleading results. Nor can the consideration of authenticity be confined to 
deliberate literary dishonesty; unconscious 'tricks' of memory could just as 
easily lead to incorrect entries. On the other hand, the idea of a diary compiled 
of deliberate hoaxes hardly makes sense. As Anais Nin (1968) noted about her 
own diary-keeping, "The secrecy of the diary was a great incentive to honesty" 
(p. 143). A similar argument has been used by other authors (e.g., Allport, 
1942; Fothergill, 1974) in defending the validity of diary entries. 
Figure 3.4. The percentage of male and female respondents that gave each rating on the 
frequency of fabricated diary entry scale. 
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It does, however, appear that not all diary entries may be factual. Forty-
four percent of the student diarists questioned indicated that they had at some 
time made a fictitious diary entry, of these 20 percent were males and 80 
percent were females. Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of male and female 
respondents that gave each rating on the frequency of 'fabricated diary entry' 
scale. When the male and female ratings were compared no significant 
difference was found (F(1, 277) = 2.641, n.s.). The fabrication of diary entries 
appears to be similar to that of coded entries with more females than males 
having made fictitious entries and no significant difference in the frequency of 
the activity between the sexes. 
One can only speculate on the reasons behind the fabrication of diary 
entries. A possible explanation was given in the questionnaire, "so as to avoid 
the true nature of your activities being discovered (e.g., by your parents)" (see 
Figure 3.1, question 12). This is in line with Ponsonby's (1923) explanation of 
the use of codes quoted above and seems the most plausible explanation. The 
significant negative correlation (r = -.13, P < 0.05) between age in years and the 
frequency with which entries were fabricated, for the female respondents, 
supports this explanation. No significant correlation was found for the male 
respondents. The fear that their activities and feelings might be discovered is 
likely to be stronger in younger diarists, perhaps still living at home with their 
parents. Significant positive correlations (r = .58, P < .001 for male and r = .20, 
P < .01 for female respondents) obtained between the use of 'codes' and the 
'fabrication' of diary entry frequency ratings, suggest that diarists tend to use 
both strategies to ensure the secrecy of their activities. 
As noted, incorrect diary entries could also result if the diarist failed to 
recall the facts of the day correctly. However, if diary entries are made daily 
under the immediate influence of experience, they are unlikely to be much 
affected by errors of memory. But when are diary entries made? Ninety-six 
percent of the female and 85 percent of male student respondents indicated 
they made entries in the evening. Diary entries made in the evening, perhaps 
just before going to bed, probably relate the events of the day, but it is possible 
that entries made in the evening are far removed from experience. The diarist 
may always make entries at this time but not daily, instead periodically making 
multiple entries to bring the diary up-to-date. 
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Only 21 percent of the male and 15 percent of the female student diarists 
sampled indicated they made diary entries every day. Of the student 
respondents that did not indicate they made entries every day, 55.8 percent of 
the males and 70.3 percent of the females indicated they would make an entry 
sometime after the date. The remainder indicated they would leave the page 
or date blank. 
Thus diary entries are not always made under the immediate influence 
of experience. Although no data exists on how long after events belated 
entries are made, it would seem reasonable to assume that it would be no 
more than a few days. As studies in autobiographical memory have 
consistently found that the recall of autobiographical information is very good 
(e.g., Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982), it would seem unlikely 
that a diarist would fail to recall correctly his or her own actions in but a few 
days. Events that the diarist totally failed to recall would simply not be 
entered. Therefore, making belated diary entries may only reduce the quantity 
of material recorded, not its quality or authenticity. 
Overall then there is some evidence to suggest that not all diary entries 
are correct. Furthermore the data on the fabrication of diary entries is 
inconsistent with Allport's (1942) statement that" ... as in everyday life the 
general honesty and creditability of the report can be relied upon" (p. 128). On 
the other hand, in relation to the use of diaries to obtain autobiographical 
events for memory experiments, it is probable that diarists who regularly 
fabricated diary entries would not volunteer to lend their diaries to a 
researcher. 
3.4 The Undirected-Diary Method Compared to Other Research 
Methods 
The use of diaries in psychological research probably declined during the 
early part of the 20th century because the way in which they were used did not 
satisfy contemporary scientific standards of sampling, objectivity and validity 
(Allport, 1942). This criticism of the use of diaries is also applicable to some of 
the methods currently employed to investigate autobiographical memory. In 
this section the undirected-diary method is contrasted with other methods 
currently employed to investigate autobiographical memory. 
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Much contemporary memory research explicitly tries to avoid the 
problems of ecological validity associated with traditional research. However, 
investigating memory as it occurs in everyday life has generally required some 
sacrifice of control over critical variables (Bahrick & Karis, 1982), and this may 
be partly responsible for the relative lack of research into autobiographical 
memory (Brewer, 1986; Robinson,· 1976). There are undoubtedly 
methodological problems associated with some of the techniques currently 
used to investigate autobiographical memory. Followers of the Ebbinghaus 
tradition cite these problems as a justification for their methods, suggesting 
that "attempts to increase ecological validity may actually decrease predictive 
validity by virtue of a decrease in reliability" (Wilkins, 1986, p. 109). There is, 
of course, little to be gained by substituting one methodological problem for 
another. 
3.4.1 Verification 
A fundamental requirement of memory research is that the subjects 
have been exposed to some event or stimulus which they can recall. That is, 
" ... in order to count as memories events, though past, must be 
stored and hence be potentially available - by being taken out of store-
at dates later than the time of original occurrence." (Gruneberg & 
Morris, 1978, p.3) 
If the researcher has no control over the subjects' acquisition of the 
information to be recalled, which is generally the case when studying 
autobiographical memory, an attempt must be made to verify that the subject 
experienced specific events at specific times. Generally, then, both the time 
when the information (event) to be recalled was acquired (experienced) and the 
nature of the information or event should be verified. The issue of 
verification has been discussed at length by a number of authors (e.g., Bahrick 
& Karis, 1982; Barclay, 1986; Loftus & Fathi, 1985; Reynolds & Takooshian, 
1988; Robinson, 1976; Sanders, 1972; Strube, Knopf & Weinert, 1983), who 
generally agree that it is desirable, although often difficult. But, as noted by 
Strube et al., "Veridicality is too important an issue as to be dismissed because 
of time-consuming effort" (p. 10). On the other hand, there are also some 
authors (e.g., Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Pillemer & Goldsmith, 1988; 
Rubin, 1986) that consider the accuracy of memory as only one component 
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worthy of study, implying that verification is not always essential. As noted 
by Edwards and Middleton (1987): 
"Precise measures of input-output discrepancies do not reflect what, 
in many cases, people are trying to achieve in recalling or recounting 
things. Remembering often serves functions which place a low 
premium on accuracy." (p. 85) 
However, the study of some memory processes such as 'schematization' and 
'reconstruction' (Barclay, 1986), the effect of retention interval on recall and 
the recall of temporal information requires verification. 
The degree to which verification can be achieved depends on the 
particular method adopted by the researcher. The diary method (see Table 3.1, 
Section 1) allows the researcher to determine the nature of experienced events, 
and when they were experienced, that is, verification, as do the archival 
records method (see Table 3.1, Section 4) and the undirected-diary method. In 
contrast, studies of autobiographical memory which have employed Galton's 
word association method (see Table 3.1, Section 2), unprompted free recall (see 
Table 3.1, Section 3), and public events (see Table 3.1, Section 5) do not generally 
incorporate any 'verification'. An exception is Rubin's (1982) Experiment 5 
which had subjects use their diaries to verify the accuracy of dates assigned to 
events recalled using the unprompted free recall method. 
3.4.2 Representativeness 
The second methodological issue to be discussed is that of the 
'representativeness' of the autobiographical events used in research, and thus 
the generalizations that can be made. Verification is also important here, as it 
allows the researcher to objectively define what type of autobiographical 
information the subjects are attempting to recall. Furthermore, using a 
research method which does not allow verification (e.g., Galton's word 
association method, unprompted free recall and the public event method) 
means the researcher can not determine if recalled events are actually 
representative of those originally experienced. 
Although both the diary method and the archival records method allow 
verification, and permit the nature of autobiographical events subjects are 
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attempting to recall to be defined, the representativeness of these events may 
be affected by the method itself. In relation to the diary method, Quackenbush 
and Shaffer (1960) noted that there is no assurance that subjects are not 
selective in what they record. The archival records method is obviously 
limited to events for which such records are available. The undirected-diary 
method, on the other hand, perhaps avoids this particular problem; diarists are 
not aware at the time diary entries are made that they will be questioned on 
them (the recorded events) at a later date and thus the autobiographical events 
described in diaries may be more representative of the autobiographical events 
they have experienced. The problem of representativeness for the diary 
method has also be partly overcome by Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski (1982). 
In a study self-awareness and voluntariness to the quality of experience they 
used an electronic device which emitted signals at random intervals as an 
indicator of when a subject should record his or her activities (also see 
Csikszentmihalyi, Larson & Prescott, (1977), Freeman, Csikszentmihalyi & 
Larson (1986), and Larson & Csikszentmihalyi (1983) ). 
Quackenbush and Shaffer's (1960) suggestion noted above may be a 
particularly important consideration if a researcher wished to study a specific 
aspect of autobiographical memory, such as emotion. Individuals may be 
particularly selective 
autobiographical event. 
in recording the emotional content of an 
The undirected-diary method, on the other hand, 
appears to be well suited to such investigations, since the results of the diary-
keeping prevalence study indicate that some diaries are specifically kept in 
order to record emotional experiences. Furthermore, the respondents indicated 
that diary entries relating to 'personal thoughts and feelings' were frequently 
made. 
Although the autobiographical events and associated information 
contained within individual diaries may be more representative than that 
which could be obtained with another method, representativeness may be 
restricted by two factors. Firstly, the use of codes in diaries suggests 
information about some types of autobiographical events may be difficult to 
obtain from this source. Secondly, diary-keeping appears to be particularly 
prevalent during adolescence, suggesting that obtaining information on 
autobiographical events from diaries which are representative of other periods 
of life (e.g., old age) may be difficult. However, the results of the community 
sample indicated that diary-keeping is not an exclusively adolescent behaviour. 
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When event dating or the recall of temporal information is being 
studied, the autobiographical events used in the research should also be 
representative on this dimension. Studies using the diary method which have 
examined subjects' ability to recall the year in which the recorded events 
occurred but only had subjects record events for 3 or 4 months (e.g., Barclay & 
Wellman, 1986; Thompson, 1982, 1985a; Thompson et a1., 1988) may have 
over-estimated the subjects' ability to recall year of occurrence information 
simply because the events were not representative in terms of this temporal 
component. A similar criticism can be made of some studies which have used 
the archival records method to study the recall of temporal information (e.g., 
Baddeley et a1., 1978; Loftus & Fathi, 1985). The diary method can of course 
sample longer time periods, as demonstrated by Linton (1975) and Wagenaar 
(1986), but considerable delay is involved. Such delay can be avoided and 
representativeness on temporal dimensions achieved by using the undirected-
diary method with an adequate sample of diary records (e.g., diary entries 
covering a number of years). 
So far I have focused on the representativeness of the autobiographical 
events used in research. The representativeness of research results may also be 
affected by the method used. In relation to the diary method, there is the 
question of whether recording an event in a diary affects recall, an issue 
discussed in Section 3.3.1.6. Furthermore, where the diary method is used 
with a single subject (e.g., Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982) there 
is the question of whether the memory of this single subject is representative. 
Replication of the above single subject studies will help answer this question, 
replication could, of course, be performed across a number of subjects by using 
the undirected-diary method. 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
The undirected-diary method appears to overcome a number of the 
problems inherent in some of the methods used to study autobiographical 
memory. Verification that a subject experienced a specific event at a specific 
time is achievable, although the finding that some diary entries are 
fabrications must be borne in mind. The representativeness of the stimulus 
material, both in terms of temporal dimensions and the nature of the events, 
is also probably superior to that achieved with other methods if an adequate 
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sample of diary records is used. Furthermore, the 'single-subject' problem can 
be avoided if an adequate sample of diarists is obtained. 
The study of autobiographical memory has often resulted in the sacrifice 
of control over critical variables, however, researchers should not forfeit the 
opportunity to increase the reliability and validity of their research. The 
undirected-diary method may provide this opportunity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES FOR EXPERIMENT SIX 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter details the procedures employed in Experiment 6 and is 
divided into three sections. The first section describes recruitment of subjects 
for the experiment. Section two details the diary material obtained from the 
subjects and the examination of this material. The defining characteristics of 
the events selected from the diary material are also described. In the final 
section the formulation and administration of the autobiographical interview 
schedules are described. 
4.1 Obtaining Diarists As Research Participants 
The generally held scientific standards of sampling are difficult to 
observe when conducting research with diarists. The experimenter cannot 
randomly select subjects and, although the subjects' diary material had to meet 
certain criteria for participation in the study, the method used to obtain 
subjects is best described as 'haphazard sampling' (Weisburg & Bowen, 1977): 
available individuals were used. However, even though no formal sampling 
procedure was employed, the procedure for recruiting subjects was formalized. 
Originally, acquaintances of the experimenter were approached and 
asked if they had ever kept or were keeping a diary. It was explained that 
diarists were needed to participate in an autobiographical memory experiment. 
Four individuals who had diary records expressed an interest in participating 
and agreed to deliver their diary-records to the experimenter. They were told 
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not to read through these diary records before bringing them in.1 Four sets of 
diary records were delivered to the experimenter early in 1986. 
Two of these subjects were subsequently rejected because their diaries 
provided insufficient material. The other two subjects participated as subjects 1 
and 2. Because of recording style, the information required, and omissions 
(days when no entry was made), the amount of usable dairy information was a 
relatively small proportion of the submitted material. It was therefore decided 
that at least one reasonably complete year of records would have to be available 
for a subject to participate. Because the 'acquaintance' approach to obtaining 
subjects did not provide enough participants, a more formal strategy was also 
used. 
4.1.1 The Formal Approach to Obtaining Research Participants 
The 55 male and 223 female diarists from the student sample in 
Experiment 5 were given a brief, simple statement about the research, and 
asked to participate in it. The statement - 'Research Participant Request Form' 
- was administered with the 'diary-keeping prevalence questionnaire' (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.1), and is shown in Figure 4.1. Eight males and 19 
females responded positively, and gave their name, address and phone 
number. A further 10 males and 29 females removed the detachable section 
from the request form (This section is not shown in Figure 4.1). Three males 
subsequently returned this section, two indicating they would like to 
participate. No attempt was made to contact the other 36 subjects. 
The diary-keeping prevalence questionnaire for each of the 29 subjects 
who expressed an interest in participating in the research was examined. 
Three males and five females had less than one year of diary records. They 
were sent a letter of thanks. Appointments were made with the remaining 14 
females and 7 males to discuss their participation in the research. These 
'briefing' sessions were conducted between the 6th and 16th April 1987, and 
each lasted approximately 25 minutes. During the briefing session the 
1 There is no guarantee that these subjects or the others who participated did not read over 
these diaries before delivering them. However, considering the many hours I required to read 
the records, 56 in the case of subject 13, for example, it seems unlikely. 
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Figure 4.1. 'Research Participant Request Form' given to diarists in order to obtain 
research subjects. 
Part of my Ph.D. research involves the study of autobiographical 
memory using 'personalized autobiographical questionnaires' 
administered in an interview situation. In order to formulate a 
questionnaire for an individual require some verifiable 
autobiographical information about that individuals past. Individual's 
diaries are the most comprehensive source of this information. 
Diaries have, however, not previously been used in this manner to 
investigate autobiographical memory. The methodology that I am 
using is therefore new and the results so far look very promising. 
In order that these results can be extended and tile methodology 
developed further I require more subjects. Individuals who have 
participated so far have found the experience enjoyable, it being a 
unique opportunity to find out about their own memory, engage in 
some reminiscences, and contribute to the development of a new area 
of memory research. 
Two important points need to be mentioned: (a) All diary 
material is treated as STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. It is kept under lock 
and key and I am the only person with access to it. Each questionnaire 
is hand written to ensure confidentiality. (b) Because the interview 
administration of the questionnaire can take some time I treat each 
subject to a meal at the end of the sessions. 
Would you, as a diary-keeper, like to participate in this research? 
method of diary analysis and autobiographical interview schedule construction 
and administration were covered (These procedures are described in detail later 
in this chapter). An indication was given as to the time it would take to 
prepare their autobiographical interview schedule, and how long it would take 
them to complete it. The confidential treatment of the diaries and the results 
was noted. It was stressed that the subjects should not look at their diary 
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material before submitting it. Any questions were answered and the subject 
asked if he or she wished to participate further. 
Fourteen subjects subsequently delivered their diaries and were sent a 
letter of receipt, which also noted they could withdraw from the research at 
any time. One female subject withdrew at a later date because she was leaving 
the University of Canterbury and one male subject was rejected when the 
examination of his diary records revealed insufficient material. 
4.2 Diary Material Submitted By Subjects 
Approximately 17,520 pages of diary records were submitted by the 14 
subjects that participated in the study. The year or years each subjects' diary 
records covered, and their interview date(s) are shown in Table 4.1 (see Table 
4.5 for the interview dates). 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
Subject 7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1960 
EJ Year of First Diary 
• Year of Last Diary 
Interview/s Date 
o One Diary Only 
I!I • 
I!I 
I!I • . 
• 
0 
Ill--
Ill--
I!I---. 
I!I • 
0 
l!I • 
0 
Ill--
Ill----
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Time (Years) 
Table 4.1. The year or years of subjects diary records, and interview date(s). 
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4.3 Examination of the Diary Material and Event Selection 
Each subject's diary records were examined systematically for suitable 
events by the experimenter. Two types of events were searched for in the 
diaries: 'spontaneous events' and 'duration events'. Selection of the events, 
both spontaneous and duration, was dependent on the availability of the 
necessary information, and not random. The defining characteristics of each 
type of event were carefully considered before the examination of the diaries 
began. 
4.3.1 Spontaneous Events: Definition and Selection 
Spontaneous events were defined as events which occurred on a 
particular day or date. To be considered for selection, four aspects, the what, 
where, who and when of the event, had to be specified by the diary entry. 
'What' 
The 'what' aspect is the simplest description of the event, such as "saw 
the movie "BeetleJuice". 'What' information had to be reasonably detailed for 
an event to be selected. For example, if the diary record stated that the subject 
went with John X to the Avon cinema and saw 'a double feature', the event 
was not selected because 'double feature' was not held to be detailed enough. 
Care was also taken to ensure that the 'what' aspect did not contain 'where' 
information. For example, the 'what' aspect for a swimming event would be 
'went for a swim' as opposed to 'went for a swim at New Brighton Beach', 
'Where' 
The exact location of the event had to be specified, general terms such as 
cinema and restaurant were not sufficient. Generally the required information 
was obtained directly from the diary-entry. However, with certain types of 
events, such as attending movies, plays and exhibitions, it was occasionally 
possible to obtain the 'where' aspect from an alternative source. For example, 
a subject may have recorded on the 10th May 1977 that she saw "Jaws II" but not 
noted where. If she lived in Christchurch at the time (easily determined from 
the diary), the cinema could be obtained from a back copy of the relevant 
newspaper. This method of obtaining 'where' information helped increase 
the number of usable events. 
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'Who' 
For an event to be selected the diarist had to have been personally 
involved. Thus 'you' was always part of, and sometimes the whole of the 
'who' aspect. When other individuals were involved in the event with the 
diarist, their names were also given. Generally only the first name of each 
individual involved is recorded in a diary, the exception being where the 
individual was not well known to the diarist. Those named in the who aspect 
were those individuals actually named in the diary by the subject rather than 
all those present. For example, if the subject went to a party the 'who' aspect 
would name all the individuals the diarist named, if any, and not all the 
people at the party. In some entries the diarist provided a 'group label' such as 
'Christchurch Girls High School pupils' which described all those involved in 
the event. In such cases this group label was used with 'you' as the 'who' 
aspect. 
'When' 
The 'when' aspect was relatively easy to determine, as it was generally 
either recorded at the beginning of the entry or printed on the top of the page. 
An event was selected if the day, month and year could all be determined. The 
day of the week on which the event occurred was also required, and was either 
obtained directly from the diary records or from a calendar. No more than one 
spontaneous event was used from a particular day's entry. 
4.3.2 Duration Events: Definition and Selection 
The defining characteristic of a duration event is that it lasted for more 
than one day. Two types of duration events were obtained and termed 'filled' 
and 'empty' duration events. Empty duration events consisted of two 
associated events separated by some period of time. For example, the 
individual may have recorded that he sent away an order for a rare stamp and 
on a subsequent date recorded that he received the stamp. The interval 
between the two events is assumed to be relatively uncontaminated with 
associated events, or empty. 
Filled duration events consisted of a sequence of spontaneous events 
that were generally associated because they occurred within a definable interval 
of time, such as a holiday in Australia. No spontaneous events which 
occurred within a filled duration were included in the subject's interview 
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schedule. However, spontaneous events which occurred within empty 
duration events were included, since these were not associated with the 
duration event. The actual duration of duration events was obtained from the 
diary, the day the event began and ended on being both counted as a whole day. 
More precise timing was usually not possible as diarists rarely recorded time 
information. 
Table 4.2 shows the number of spontaneous and duration events 
obtained from each subject's diary records, and subject sex and age at the time of 
the interview schedule administration. It was possible to obtain one 
spontaneous event from each day that an entry had been made. However, the 
diarist had to have recorded the necessary information, and 
Table 4.2. Subject sex, age and number of spontaneous and duration events obtained from 
their diaries. 
Subject Sex Age Number of Number of 
Spontaneous Duration Events 
Events 
1 F 21 80 17 
2 F 34 23 11 
3 M 19 72 16 
4 F 36 77 20 
5 F 18 40 6 
6 F 21 28 5 
7 F 19 17 7 
8 M 20 22 5 
9 F 18 20 7 
10 F 23 19 5 
11 M 19 22 4 
12 F 18 16 9 
13 F 18 188 49 
14 F 18 63 26 
Overall 687 187 
generally sufficient information to define a spontaneous event was 
encountered only infrequently, most entries simply described a routine day. 
This is not to say that the selected events were all significant life events, merely 
that they were important enough for the diarist to record in detail. Duration 
events, on the other hand, simply appear to be rather rare. 
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The diarists' recording or entry style also determined the number of 
events obtained from the diary material. Some individuals regularly used 
complete literary sentences and included considerable detail. Others, however, 
omitted details and simply noted the event's occurrence. These factors, along 
with the selection of filled duration event explain why the number of 
spontaneous events obtained was sometimes rather small even though a 
considerable amount of material was submitted. 
The examination of the diary material indicated to the experimenter the 
enormous research potential of such material. However, an experimenter 
must be prepared to invest considerable effort to obtain the necessary research 
material: the time required to read through a subject's diary material was, 
however, related to the legibility of the subject's hand-writing. Fothergill sums 
up what an experimenter might expect in an examination of diary material: 
"Their chief characteristic is that they go on and on, filled with non-
entities and non-events, an endless in-gathering of loose ends. Even the 
richest and most varied diaries, it must be admitted, are pretty heavy 
going at times." (Fothergill, 1974, p.8) 
4.4 Categorization of the Autobiographical Events 
An essential part of all studies of memory is defining the material to be 
remembered. In this study a simple phrase such as 'autobiographical events' 
could be used, however, this is not very informative. It was, therefore, 
decided to categorize both the spontaneous and duration events obtained from 
the subjects' diaries into types of events. Knowing the specific types of events 
and their frequency used in the study was also useful when attempting to 
generalize about autobiographical memory, and for specific parts of the data 
analysis. 
Categorization was inhibited somewhat by the confidential nature of the 
autobiographical information: all categorization was performed solely by the 
experimenter. Furthermore, 87 of the spontaneous events were not easily 
categorized and would have each required a complete description. Rather than 
do this and threaten subject confidentiality these 87 events have been 
categorized only as to whether they involved the subject only or the subject and 
other individuals. 
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Table 4.3 shows the result of the spontaneous event categorization: sixty-
four different event types are listed under seven general event categories, 
along with the number of each type of event obtained from the subjects' 
diaries. 
Table 4.3. Spontaneous event categorization labels, and the number of each type of event 
obtained from the subjects' diaries. 
Event Categorization Label 
Social Events: A 
Attending a movie at a cinema 
Watching a movie (video) at a private residence 
Attending an exhibition 
Attending a play or musical 
Seeing a band or orchestra play 
Seeing a 'dance troop' perform 
Visited a tourist attraction 
Attending a sporting event 
Attending a cabaret 
Attending a fair/AMP show 
Sub-total 
Social Events: B 
Meal at a restaurant 
Meal at a private residence (invited to diner) 
Attending a party 
Attending a dance or ball 
'Drinks' at a hotel 
Attending a picnic 
Attending a barbecue 
Attending an auction 
Practical joke/prank 
Meeting, unexpected - by chance 
Sub-total 
Advanced Knowledge Events 
Meeting planed 
Went on a school field trip 
Heard speaker at school 
Attended conference 
Sat exam or test 
Posed for official photograph 
Babysitting 
Odd-job, single days work 
Public performance (e.g., delivered speech) 
Number of 
Events 
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16 
7 
40 
19 
10 
8 
9 
2 
8 
233 
59 
4 
33 
5 
9 
6 
6 
1 
6 
6 
135 
4 
9 
2 
3 
2 
2 
6 
8 
4 
Visited doctor or dentist 
Sub-total 
Object Association Events 
Retail purchase 
Received a present 
Made something (creative) 
Picked something up 
Found something 
Received an award or prize 
Lost something 
Discovered theft 
Dropped something off 
Car broke down 
Accident (non-injury) 
Accident (injury) 
Sub-total 
Mishaps 
Sub-total 
Recreating - Involved in a Sporting Event 
Skiing 
Canoeing 
Swimming 
Squash 
Roller-skating 
Fishing 
Flying 
Horseriding 
Iceskating 
Cards 
Tennis 
Golf 
Video games 
Gymnastics 
Shooting 
Scrabble 
Tramp/walk 
Soccer 
Softball 
Sub-total 
Unclassified Events 
Miscellaneous events involving subject only 
Miscellaneous events involving a number of people 
Sub-total 
Total 
3 
43 
65 
14 
11 
13 
3 
9 
2 
2 
4 
123 
7 
9 
8 
24 
5 
3 
10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
42 
21 
66 
87 
687 
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Table 4.4 shows the 23 categories used to describe the 187 duration events 
and the frequency of each type of event obtained from the subjects' diaries. 
Categorization of the duration events was within the filled and empty duration 
event categories. In contrast to the spontaneous events, all the duration 
events were categorized. 
Event Categorization Label 
Filled Duration Events 
Friendls come to stay 
Employed in a job (holiday job) 
Holiday 
Official trip (e.g., school trip) 
Take a course (e.g., Ball-room dancing) 
Hospitalized 
Construct something 
Have a pet animal 
Medical treatment daily 
Personal relationship 
Act in a play 
Empty Duration Events 
Sub-total 
Brought or sold something - pick it up or deliver it 
Received invitation - attend 
Photograph taken - see it 
Close friend or relative gos away - returns 
See movie or play - see it again 
Order something - it arrives 
Loose something - recover it 
Sit test - get results 
Have something done - have it redone 
Apply for position - hear result 
Finish course - start new related course 
Buy concert ticket - attend concert 
Sub-total 
Total 
Number of 
Events 
8 
8 
49 
16 
10 
5 
6 
5 
4 
1 
2 
114 
15 
13 
3 
7 
2 
3 
8 
3 
3 
12 
1 
3 
73 
187 
Table 4.4. Duration event categorization labels, and the number of each type of event 
obtained from the subjects diaries. 
Examination of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicates that the events cover a wide 
range of human activities, activities that most individuals engage in at some 
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time. It is my opinion, based partly on my knowledge of the unclassified 
events, that the results of this study are applicable to most New Zealanders. 
4.5 Autobiographical Interview Schedule Formulation and 
Administration 
4.5.1 Spontaneous Events 
The event aspects 'what', 'where' and 'who' were used both as cues to 
prompt recall and as the aspects to be recalled. The 6 sequences in which the 
event aspects 'what', 'where' and 'who' were presented to the subjects as 
retrieval cues were randomly assigned to the spontaneous events, each 
sequence of event aspect cue presentation being assigned to an approximately 
equal number of events. Each spontaneous event was randomly assigned a 
position in the interview schedule. 
Figure 4.2 shows the format of a spontaneous event question. (Note: the 
event described in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.7 are typical, but fictitious.). The 
details in parentheses were not included in the interview schedule, but 
describe aspects of the interview schedule format. 
Procedure 
For each spontaneous event, the subject was first presented one event 
aspect, either 'what', 'where' or 'who'. In the example shown in Figure 4.2 the 
What aspect - Saw the movie Jaws II - is the first cue presented. The subject was 
then required to recall the remaining two event aspects; in the Figure 4.2 
example they would be required to state where the event occurred and who was 
present. Alternatively, they could make a pass response. Such a response 
category was necessary as the subjects could not respond in a meaningful way 
to, for example, a 'who' aspect that was simply 'you'. If a pass response was 
made, the subject had to indicate which of the categories, la or Ib, on the 
Generative Mechanism Card shown in Figure 4.3 best described why it was 
made. This card was placed on a table in front of the subject. 
If the subject made a correct response to either of the two remaining 
aspects (where and who in the above example), he or she was required to 
indicate how the response/ s was generated using categories 2 to 4 on the 
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Generative Mechanism Card. Correct responses were defined for each event 
aspect as: Who - the person/s or group involved in the event in at least as 
much detail as was recorded in the diary; What - the meaning of the subject's 
response had to coincide with that recorded in the diary; Where - the specific 
location recorded in the diary. 
21 (Event number) 
5 (Order event aspect cues were presented in) 
What: .... $.~~ ... I:.4. .... ~.~~i.e .... 1..fI::'!'!.r.:Jl... .... (First cue presented) 
Where:..... (Space to record response and response 
reason, or pass reason) 
Who:..... (Space to record response and response 
reason, or pass reason) 
where: .... fI..f ... &... .. fk~I.1. .... (a/I.'?t'!?~ ........... (Second cue presented if 
pass or incorrect response made above) 
Who:..... (Space to record response and response 
reason, or pass reason) 
Who: .... 'I.~.~." .. :rC!':P.&.: .... ~~ .... 1.!/( ........... (Third cue presented if 
Rem: ..... 
pass or incorrect responses made above) 
(Space to record if event was remembered 
if all cues had to be presented) 
When:..... (Space for date responsel reason for date 
response for each date component) 
Date. ::r.6."N:~ ... ..!l~.I!ky . ..! "fl.!.:...... (Actual date of event) 
Day: ..... 
Freq: .... . 
Rec: .... . 
(Space for day of the week response and 
reason for response) 
(Space for frequency rehearsal rating) 
(Space for recency rehearsal rating) 
Figure 4.2. An example of the interview schedule format for a spontaneous event. 
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Incorrect or pass responses after one cue had been presented resulted in 
the next aspect in the sequence being presented and the same procedure used. 
In the Figure 4.2 example the second aspect presented is Where - At the Avon 
cinema. 
Figure 4.3. Card used by subjects to indicate the strategy they adopted when recalling 
information about autobiographical events. 
Generative Mechanism Card 
(1) Pass: Because (a) the cue or cues are not sufficient for recall, 
or (b) there are too many possible answers. 
(2) Wild guess. 
(3) Guessed on the basis of logical inference. 
(4) Remembered the answer. 
Correct recall of one event aspect on the basis of the first cue, pass 
responses after the presentation of the first and second cues, or an incorrect 
response after the presentation of the second cue, resulted in the remaining or 
third event aspect being presented: Who - You, Jack and Jill - in the Figure 4.2 
example. The subject was then asked if they recognized or remembered the 
Not-Remembered Event Card 
(1) Because the combination of cues does not bring any particular 
event to mind, but rather a lot of similar ones. 
(2) Because the combination of cues does not make any sense at all. 
Figure 4.4. Card used by subjects to indicate why they could not recall/recognise specific 
autobiographical events. 
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event. If they could not remember the event they were asked to indicate which 
category on the 'Not-remembered Event Card'best described why. The 'Not-
remembered Event Card', which was also placed on the table in front of the 
subject, is shown in Figure 4.4. 
Regardless of whether or not the subject remembered or recognized the 
event, he or she was required to date it and indicate what day of the week it 
had occurred on. The date response required three specific components: the 
year, month and day of the month. The subject used the categories or a 
combination of categories on the 'Generative Mechanism for Dating Card' to 
indicate how they had determined each of the date components. The 
Generative Mechanism for Dating Card is shown in Figure 4.5, and was on the 
table in front of the subject. 
Generative Mechanism for Dating Card 
(1) Remembered the answer. 
(2) Wild guess. 
(3) Inferred the answer using one or more of the following 
strategies: 
(a) Using events that you know occurred before the target event 
that you know the date of. 
(b) Using events that you know occurred after the target event 
that you know the date of. 
(c) Specific information provided by the cues lead you to infer 
the date. For example, the event obviously occurred in the 
summer, winter, May holidays etc. 
Figure 4.5. Card used by subjects to indicate the strategy they adopted when 'dating' 
autobiographical events. 
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Subjects used categories 2 to 4 on the Generative Mechanism Card (Figure 4.3) 
to indicate. how· they determined the day of the week the event occurred on. 
No feedback as to the accuracy of the date or day of week responses was given to 
the subject. 
Finally, events that were remembered, indicated by one or more event 
aspects being correctly recalled or by subjects stating they recognized the event 
after all the event aspects were presented, were rated on two rehearsal scales, 
recency and frequency. Figure 4.6 shows the two rehearsal scales. 
Rehearsal Rating Card 
RECENCY FREQUENCY 
(1 ) In the first week following the event. (1) Once. 
(2) (2) 
(3) (3) 
(4) (4) 
(5) (5) 
(6) (6) 
(7) In the last week. (7) Very frequently. 
Figure 4.6. Rating scales used by subjects to rate the frequency and recency of 
autobiographical event rehearsal. 
4.5.2 Duration Events 
For duration questions the subjects rated their· knowledge of the event 
and estimated its duration; the order in which these responses were obtained 
was randomly assigned to an approximately equal number of events. Each 
duration event was randomly assigned a position in the interview schedule. 
The details of a duration event obtained from the subjects' diaries were 
formulated into an event description. Figure 4.7 shows an example of the 
interview schedule format of an empty duration event. The event description 
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in this example describes the two associated marker events. The event 
description for a filled duration event required only a single statement, such as 
"You and Paul went on a holiday to Australia". A duration question relating to 
the event description was also formulated. In the above filled duration event 
example it would be "How long were you and Paul in Australia?". 
2 (Event number) 
RID (Order subject gave knowledge rating and duration estimate) 
KR:..... (Space for knowledge rating) 
Fre:..... (Space for frequency rehearsal rating) 
Rec: ..... (Space for recency rehearsal rating) 
Est ..... (Space for duration estimate) 
Act.f.!.. .. c{~i.f.~.§.~§.:.~I!!.~~ .... ~ ... t!!.~.~ .. ~~~.~/r(P.: (Actual duration) 
..... ~~ ..... f?,d.:~~ .... f.p..~ .... ~'!-!.~J~ .... ~.~(gr. ... 4.~ ... ~!~().I .............. . 
····J.q~··~·~·····-(~~·i··~:ic~i·~i~~·V.~········· .. ·· .. ···· ........................... .. 
Figure 4.7. An example of the interview schedule format for a duration event. 
Procedure 
For the duration event questions, the event description was first read to 
the subject. The subject then either first answered the duration question or 
rated the event on the knowledge rating scale. Both responses were thus 
obtained in a random order for each event. The knowledge rating scale is 
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shown in Figure 4.8. Duration estimates were in terms of days, weeks, or 
months, or some combination of these. Subjects were instructed to count both 
the day the event began and ended on as a complete day. Events that the 
subject remembered, indicated by their response on the knowledge rating scale, 
were rated on the two rehearsal scales, shown in Figure 4.6 
Event Knowledge Rating Card 
(1 ) I can not remember it. 
(2) I can just barely remember it. 
(3) I remember it but not so well. 
(4) I remember it fairly well. 
(5) I remember it very well. 
(6) remember it almost perfectly. 
(7) remember it perfectly. 
Figure 4.8. Scale used by subjects to rate event knowledge. 
In order to ensure confidentiality, the interview schedule for each of the 
14 subjects was hand-written by the experimenter. The formulation of 
interview schedules and administration procedure for subjects 1 and 2 was 
somewhat different to that described above as the procedure was modified on 
the basis of their results. Originally, space was provided on the interview 
schedule format of both spontaneous and duration events for subject ratings on 
pleasantness, salience and emotional involvement scales. These scales were 
dropped from the procedure because: (a) subject 1 and 2 expressed difficulty in 
using them retrospectively, (b) the original procedure was very time 
consuming, and (c) examination of the use of these scales by subjects 1 and 2 
suggested that the ratings did not provide a basis for meaningful analysis. 
The interview procedure was explained to the subject at the beginning of 
the first interview and reiterated at subsequent interviews if required. The 
characteristics of the two types of questions, . spontaneous and duration event 
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questions, were covered separately. It was noted that the questions would be 
presented in a random (non-temporal) sequence and that there was no time 
limit for answering questions. 
The subjects' responses were recorded in their interview schedule by the 
experimenter. Interviews were conducted at the University of Canterbury. No 
single interview lasted for more than two hours, but some subjects participated 
in more than one interview. Table 4.5 shows the date or dates subjects were 
interviewed on. 
Subject 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Date of Interview 
14 Oct 1986,28 Oct 1986, 26 Nov 1986 
12 Nov 1986, 12 Dec 1986 
25 Nov 1987, 27 Nov 1987, 18 Dec 1987 
23 Mar 1988, 13 Apr 1988, 20 Apr 1988, 29 Apr 1988 
12 Apr 1988, 20 Apr 1988 
17 March 1988 
30 Apr 1988 
9 Apr 1988 
30Sep1987 
2 Oct 1987 
28 Sep1987 
28 Sep1987 
31 Jul1987, 7 Aug 1987,18 Sep 1987,25 Sep 1987, 20 Nov 1987,23 Nov 1987 
7 Aug 1987, 29 Sep 1987 
Table 4.5. Subject interview dates. 
On completion of the interview schedule the subject was reminded that 
he or she was entitled to a meal at a restaurant. Two subjects declined this 
offer, one stating 'the experience was rewarding enough in itself". All subjects 
were given the opportunity to look back over their responses, and questions 
they had about the research were answered. 
Diary material was then returned to the subject, along with the 'Subject 
Participation Questionnaire', which related to their participation in this 
research and to this type of research in general. Subjects were asked to 
complete the questionnaire and return it by mail. A stamped, addressed 
envelope was supplied. Subjects 1 and 2 were not given this questionnaire. 
CHAPTERS 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EVENT MEMORY: EXPERIMENT SIX -
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.0 Introduction 
123 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on 
the undirected-diary method, and deals with the results of the 'subject 
participation questionnaire'. Sections two and three contain the results of 
Experiment 6: section two the spontaneous event results (Experiment 6, Part a), 
and section three the duration event results (Experiment 6, Part b). 
The predominant approach taken in experimental design and data 
analysis within psychology is undoubtedly nomothetic. Data is gathered from 
a reasonable sample of subjects and the subjects form the random variable in 
the analysis. This approach enhances the reliability of generalizations 
suggested in the obtained results. In line with this trend the data obtained 
from the 14 subjects are generally combined for analysis, however, rather than 
subjects forming the random variable, events are used. Furthermore, because 
the sample size is relatively small, the reliability of between-subject results is 
explicitly investigated using within-subject analyses. It was, however, not 
possible to assess reliability in this manner at all points during the data 
analysis, primarily because dividing the data up, for example, into filled and 
empty duration events, drastically reduced the within-subject cell sizes. 
5.1 Subject Participation Questionnaire: Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.1 shows the questions relating to research participation in the 
subject participation questionnaire. Of the twelve questionnaires distributed 10 
were returned, 7 completed by female subjects and 3 by male subjects. 
The subjects enjoyed participating in the research, as indicated by the 
mean response to question 3: 6.3 for the males and 6.2 for the females. This 
result may account for the high level of motivation shown by the subjects at 
the interview stage, and is of some importance to the validity of Experiment 6 
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as a whole. If the subjects had not enjoyed the experience, the results would 
have to be regarded as suspect, particularly considering the many hours of 
interviewing involved. All subjects responded positively to question 5, which 
can be interpreted as another indication that the subjects enjoyed participating 
in the research. 
(3) Did you enjoy being involved in the research? 
Not at all ..... 1. .... 1. .... 1. .... 1. .... 1. .... 1. .... Very much 
1 7 
(4) Would you have become involved if the experimenter was: 
(a) Female? yes..... No..... (d) A lecturer? yes..... No ..... 
(b) A lot older? yes..... No..... (e) An undergraduate? yes..... No ..... 
(c) A lot younger? yes ..... No ..... 
(5) Would you agree to be reinterviewed if I asked you in say 20 
years (for a suitable reward)? yes..... No ..... 
(6) If the nature of the research was different, that is, not 
concerned with memory, but rather focusing on, for example, 
(a) Developmental issues yes..... No .... . 
(b) Interpersonal relationships yes..... No .... . 
(c) Individuals thoughts and feelings towards specific events, 
would you still have participated? yes..... No ..... 
(Answer for each example given) 
Figure 5.1. Questions relating to research participation contained in the research 
participation questionnaire. 
Responses to part a and b of question 4 were all positive. However, five 
subjects responded negatively to parts c and e, and one to part d. These results 
indicate that certain characteristics of the experimenter might influence a 
subject's willingness to participate in this type of research. 
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Finally, the responses to question 6 were generally positive, but, one 
female subject responded negatively to parts a and c, and one male and two 
females gave a negative response to part b. These results indicate that the 
nature of the research might have an effect on subject availability. However, 
most responses to question 6 were positive indicating that other research topics 
could be investigated using the undirected-diary method. 
5.2 Experiment 6, Part A: Spontaneous Events - Results and 
Discussion 
Six hundred and eighty-seven spontaneous event questions were 
answered by the 14 subjects. Retention interval (the time between the date the 
event occurred on and the interview date) ranged from 226 days to almost 25 
years, with a median of 1333 days. The event aspect cue presentation 
sequences: 'Who, What, Where', 'Who, Where, What', 'Where, Who, 
What', 'Where, What, Who', 'What, Where, Who', and 'What, Who, 
Where' were used 109, 115, 127, 101, 121, and 114 times, respectively. 
5.2.1 Event Aspect Cuing Efficiency 
In this section the event aspect cues (what, where and who) are 
examined both as cues to prompt recall and as aspects to be recalled. Table 5.1 
shows the percentage of times each event aspect was given correctly after the 
presentation of one event aspect cue only. Examination of Table 5.1 indicates 
that the 'what' cue was the most efficient as a prompt to recall, followed by 
'where' and 'who'. This result is similar to that found by Wagenaar (1986), 
who suggested the power of a cue depends on its uniqueness. 'What', or the 
nature of an event, is more likely to be a unique aspect as one often engages in 
novel activities in familiar surroundings with the same individual or group of 
people. Thus the same where and who information may be associated with 
many specific events: for example, one might see, in the company of one's 
wife, ten different plays at the same theatre over a season. While in the above 
example the same where and who aspects are associated with each different 
play seen during the season, the what aspect is unique, in that each play would 
be different. 
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Cue Presented Correct Response Given to: 
What Where Who 
What 41.7 45.1 
Where 21.9 19.7 
Who 7.5 8.9 
Table 5.1. Percentage of each type of event aspect correctly recalled after the 
presentation of one event aspect cue only. 
Prompt efficiency was also examined for each subject separately. Table 
5.2 shows for each subject the percentage of the remaining two event aspects 
that were correctly recalled after the presentation of one cue for each cue type. 
Examination of Table 5.2 indicates that the ranking of cue efficiency for ten of 
Subjects Number of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
Spontaneous Remaining Two Remaining Two Remaining Two 
Events Event Aspects Event Aspects Event Aspects 
Correctly Correctly Correctly 
Recalled Mter a Recalled after a Recalled Mter a 
What Cue Only Where Cue Only Who Cue Only 
1 80 35.7 6.2 3.5 
2 23 62.5 0 12.5 
3 72 30.0 20.0 4.5 
4 77 20.3 20.0 2.0 
5 40 53.8 17.8 0 
6 28 43.7 20.0 10.0 
7 17 30.0 28.5 40.0 
8 22 75.0 42.8 14.2 
9 20 42.8 50.0 16.6 
10 19 14.2 50.0 0 
11 22 64.2 28.5 37.5 
12 16 28.5 10.0 12.5 
13 188 47.6 19.0 6.4 
14 63 70.4 23.S 10.0 
Table 5.2. Percentage of the two remaining event aspects correctly recalled after the 
presentation of one event aspect cue for each cue type. 
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the subjects follows the overall result pattern of what, where and who, from 
most to least efficient, For the other four subjects (subjects 7, 9, 10, 11) this 
pattern is not apparent, subject 7 provided the most correct responses on the 
bases of who cues, while subjects 9 and 10 achieved this on the bases of where 
cues. For subject 11 the what cue was the most efficiency, but who was slightly 
more efficient than where, 
Two factors need to be noted about subject's 7,9, 10 and l1's results. First, 
these subjects are generally those who responded to the smallest number of 
spontaneous event questions, thus the their cell percentages are calculated on 
very small sample sizes. Second, the results of these four subjects are not 
consistent, that is, their cue efficiency rankings are not all the same, which 
suggests their results can not be used to question the validity of the overall cue 
efficiency ranking. 
Further evidence of the usefulness of 'what' as a prompt to recall is seen 
in Table 5.3 in which the percentage of times each event aspect was given 
correctl y on the basis of two event aspect cues are shown. Providing subjects 
with a second cue resulted in an increase in the probability of recall of the third 
aspect, particularly if one of the two cues given was the 'what' cue. Table 5.1 
Table 5.3. Percentage of each type of event aspect correctly recalled after the 
presentation of two cues. 
Cues Presented Correct Response Given to: 
Where Who What 
What - Who 50.6 
What - Where 47.2 
Who - Where 25.2 
and 5.2 show that the presentation of a 'who' or a 'where' cue produced a 
relatively small number of correct responses, Table 5.3, on the other hand, 
shows that the 'who-what' and 'where-what' cue combinations produced a 
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reasonable number of correct responses. Furthermore, the percentage of correct 
responses after a what and who, and what and where cue, shown in Table 5.3 
are similar to percentage of correct responses after only a what cue shown in 
Table 5.1. Therefore, the prompt value of the 'who-what' and 'where-what' 
cue combinations probably reflects the fact that the 'what' aspect was part of the 
combination. In other words, providing the extra information of 'who' and 
'where' with a 'what' cue only slightly facilitated recall, while providing 
'what' as the second cue appears to have been a major factor contributing to the 
value of the 'who-what', 'where-what' cue combinations. 
The reasons subjects gave for making a 'pass' response also support a 
'uniqueness' explanation of event aspect efficiency as a prompt to recall. 
Overall, 74.9 percent of pass responses were stated as being made because there 
were 'too many possible answers', the remaining 25.1 percent being attributed 
to the cue or cues provided not being sufficient for recall. In other words, 
generally the presented event aspect produced some recall but the prompt 
aspect was not 'unique' (specific) enough for the subject to be certain which 
event was being referred to. In line with the above results suggesting 'what' 
was the most efficient prompt because it was more likely to be unique, when 
only a 'what' cue had been presented 67.5 percent of pass responses were 
attributed to there being too many possible answers compared to 84.9 and 82.9 
percent after the presentation of only a who or a where respectively. Thus, 
'what' alone as a prompt to recall apparently did not result in as many similar 
events being recalled as was the case when either a 'who' or a 'where' cue were 
presented. 
Table 5.4 shows for each subject the percentage of 'too many possible 
answer' passes after the presentation of one cue for each cue type, and the 
overall distribution of the two types of pass responses after one cue had been 
presented. In line with the overall results, 12 of the subjects made more too 
many possible answer passes than insufficient cue passes. Furthermore, 
examination of the percentage of too many possible answer passes across cue 
types shows that 7 of the subjects made fewer too many possible answer passes 
after a what cue than after a who or a where cue, which supports the validity of 
the overall result reported above. Of the other subjects, only subject 11 gave 
substantially more too many possible answer passes after a what cue than after 
other cues. 
129 
Subject Percentage of 'Too Many Possible Answer' Percentage of Each Type of 
Pass Responses Made After The Presentation Pass Response Made Overall 
of Only a: 
What Cue Where Cue Who Cue Insufficient Too Many 
Cues Answers 
1 48.2 95.4 92.5 14.5 85.5 
2 60.0 71.4 100.0 17.6 76.4 
3 75.0 80.0 71.5 24.5 75.5 
4 82.3 81.2 87.0 17.6 82.4 
5 66.7 100.0 66.7 25.0 75.0 
6 75.0 75.0 100.0 14.2 85.5 
7 100.0 40.0 100.0 30.0 70.0 
8 0 50.0 80.0 44.4 55.6 
9 75.0 100.0 100.0 8.3 91.7 
10 50.0 100.0 66.7 30.7 69.3 
11 50.0 25.0 20.0 72.7 27.3 
12 20.0 11.2 28.6 80.7 19.3 
13 75.0 90.0 93.2 11.7 88.3 
14 87.0 93.7 88.9 9.2 90.8 
Table 5.4. Percentage of 'too many possible answer' pass responses made after the 
presentation of one cue for each cue type, and the overall distribution of the two types of 
pass response after one cue. 
Overall, the reasons subjects gave for recalling an event aspect suggest 
that a conservative approach to recall was usually taken. After receiving one 
event aspect cue, subjects indicated that they 'guessed' the remaining two 
event aspects 2.2 percent of the time and inferred them 1.9 percent of the time, 
while after receiving two event aspect cues, 3.6 percent of responses were 
guessed and 3.8 percent were inferred. Hence, generally the subjects indicated 
responses were 'remembered'. The particularly small number of event aspects 
that were guessed or inferred suggests the subjects tended to prefer to feel they 
remembered the required information before providing it, rather than 
attempting to guess or infer it on the basis of limited cues. On the other hand, 
the small number of inferences may indicate that the subjects were not 
generally capable of inferring the required information. However, the finding 
that 77.2 percent of the 45 inferences made were correct is not consistent with 
this alternative explanation. 
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5.2.2 Retention Interval and Event Memory 
In order to examine the effect of retention interval on recall, retention 
interval was divided into 6 month blocks and the percentage of events 
remembered within each block calculated. Both recalled and recognized 
events were defined as remembered, that is, when an event aspect was correctly 
recalled on the basis of one event aspect cue or set of cues, or when the subject 
stated they recognized the event after all event aspect cues had been presented. 
Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of events 'remembered' plotted against 
retention interval. Only the first 14 six month retention interval blocks are 
shown, as a criterion of a minimum of 17 spontaneous events per block was 
set. 
Inspection of Figure 5.2 suggests that autobiographical event memory 
declines only gradually over time. Indeed over the first 7 years of retention 
interval (those shown in Figure 5.2) 80 percent of the events were remembered, 
while 57.2 percent of the events which occurred between 7 and 12 years before 
the interview, and 63.6 percent of the events which occurred between 12, and 
approximately,25 years before, were also remembered. Overall 76.4 percent of 
the events were remembered by the subjects. 
100 
90 
80 
Percentage 
Remembered 70 
60 
50 
Percentage 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Retention Interval 
(6 Month Blocks) 
Figure 5.2. Percentage of spontaneous events remembered in each 6 month retention 
interval block. 
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A simple power function of Y=1.99 x-0.13 (r=.84) was obtained for the 
retention interval curve shown in Figure 5.2. The exponent is somewhat 
smaller than the -0.36 obtained by Wagenaar (1986) and suggests that overall 
the subjects in this experiment were able to recall more autobiographical 
events. Indeed, inspection of Wagenaar's retention curve (Figure 2, p. 232) 
indicates that at his longest retention interval, 5 years, correct recall was only 30 
percent, compared to 68 percent at the same retention interval in this 
experiment. 
The retention interval curve shown in Figure 5.2 may of course reflect 
subject differences; this is possible because retention interval varied between 
the subjects. It is possible that subjects with long retention intervals were not 
very good at remembering their events and subjects with relatively short 
retention intervals were quite good. In order to examine this possibility 
retention interval was divided in half and the percentage of forgott~n events in 
each half calculated for the 9 subjects that forgot more than 5 events in total. 
Figure 5.3 shows for each subject the percentage of forgotten events in the 
remote and recent half of their retention interval. Examination of Figure 5.3 
100 IT:! Percentage Remote 
90 II Percentage Recent 
80 
70 
Percentage 60 
of Forgotten 50 
Events 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
2 3 4 6 10 12 13 14 
Subjects 
Figure 5.3. Percentage of events forgotten in the remote and recent half of subjects 
retention interval. 
indicates that 7 of the subjects forgot more remote events than recent events. 
Thus remembering decreased as retention interval increased. This within-
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subject result suggests the overall result (Figure 5.2) is a valid representation of 
the subjects autobiographical event memory. 
5.2.3 Forgetting 
One hundred and sixty-two events were 'not remembered' by the 
subjects. It is unlikely that these events were completely forgotten; rather, in 
line with Wagenaar's (1986) definition of forgetting, that they could not be 
remembered on the basis of the event aspect cues presented. It is probable, as 
Wagenaar (1986) found, that given more information, some of the forgotten 
events would have been remembered. This is particularly true of the 103 
forgotten events to which subjects reported that the presented event aspects did 
not stimulate a particular event memory 'but rather a lot of similar ones'. 
Probably here the subject was aware that the event had previously occurred, 
but was not sure exactly which event was being described. For the remaining 59 
forgotten events forgetting was attributed to the combination of event aspects 
presented 'not making any sense'. Thus the event described appeared foreign, 
and not something that the subjects remembered occurring in their lives. 
Table 5.5. Number of events remembered and frequency of reasons given for forgetting 
for each subject. 
Subject Number of Number of Number of Percentage of 
Remembered Forgotten - Forgotten - Events 
Events Similar Events Foreign Events Forgotten 
1 66 5 9 17.5 
2 14 4 5 39.1 
3 48 14 10 33.3 
4 49 21 7 36.3 
5 36 3 1 10.0 
6 21 3 4 25.0 
7 14 2 1 17.6 
8 20 1 1 9.0 
9 16 3 1 20.0 
10 10 5 4 47.3 
11 21 1 0 4.5 
12 11 3 2 31.2 
13 141 33 14 25.0 
14 58 5 0 7.9 
Total 525 103 59 23.6 
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Table 5.5 shows the number of events remembered and the frequency of 
attributed reasons for forgetting for each subject. The two groups of forgotten 
events are, for convenience, labelled as 'forgotten-similar' and 'forgotten-
foreign' in line with the above discussion. Inspection of Table 5.5 indicates 
that 10 of the subjects forgot more events because they were similar to other 
events, suggesting that the overall distribution of the reasons for event 
forgetting is a reasonably valid result. 
The percentage of events within each of the seven general event 
categories (defined in Section 4.4, Chapter 4) which were forgotten is shown in 
Table 5.6 separately for the forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign categories. 
Comparison of the percentage of forgotten-foreign events in each category 
Table 5.6. Percentage of forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign events within each of 
the seven general event categories defined in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
General Event Category Number of Percentage of Percentage of 
Events Forgotten - Forgotten -
Similar Foreign 
Social: A 233 10.3 7.2 
Social: B 135 16.2 6.6 
Advance Knowledge Events 43 30.2 6.9 
Object Association Events 123 21.9 8.9 
Mishaps 24 0 12.5 
Recreating 42 12.6 13.7 
Unclassified 87 12.6 13.7 
indicated they were similar X2 (6, N = 687) = 4.41, n.s.. The percentage of 
forgotten-similar events, on the other hand, does vary across the categories X2 
(6, N = 687) = 18.18, P < .01. However, it is not surprising that no events 
categorized as 'mishaps' were 'forgotten-similar', as one would not expect that 
the subjects would have experienced a large number of similar accidents, 
accidents being the type of event which make up the majority of this category. 
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In contrast, the advance knowledge event category which has the largest 
number of forgotten-similar events does contain events, such as baby-sitting, 
attending a meeting, visiting a doctor or dentist, which one might expect would 
occur reasonably frequently (see Table 4.3, Chapter 4, for the complete list of 
advanced knowledge events). 
The retention interval for the forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign 
events was compared, and no significant difference was found (F (1, 161) = 
1.955, n.s.), with the group mean retention intervals being 6.55 years and 6.92 
years, respectively. Thus, the type of forgetting was independent of retention 
interval. The results reported in Section 5.2.2, of course, indicate that overall 
forgetting is related to retention interval. Further evidence of this was found 
when the retention interval of the remembered events was compared with that 
of the forgotten events (F (2, 684) = 1.324, P < .0001). An a posteriori contrast 
using the Scheff'e test indicated that the remembered event retention interval 
mean of 4.57 years was significantly different (p < .05) from both the forgotten-
similar and forgotten-foreign event retention interval means. Thus, the 
forgotten events were generally older than the remembered events. 
5.2.4 Recall of Day of the Week 
Subjects were required to indicate which day of the week each event had 
occurred on, even if they could not remember the event. A correct day 
response was given for 252 or 36.6 percent of the events which is substantially 
greater than the 98 correct responses expected by chance (1 in 7). The relatively 
high proportion of events that were given a correct day response suggests the 
subjects were quite good at providing this type of event information. Table 5.7 
shows the distribution of response strategies the subjects indicated they adopted 
for the remembered, forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign events, and the 
I 
percentage of times each strategy produced a correct day response. 
Examination of Table 5.7 suggests that the percentage of correct guesses is 
only just above the chance level, while the percentage of day of the week 
responses that were correctly inferred and remembered is quite high. The 
subjects' ability to infer what day of the week an event occurred on appears to 
be particularly good. It is also interesting to note that a small number of day 
responses were stated as remembered even though the event was forgotten, 
none of these responses were, however, correct. 
Event Type 
Remembered 
Forgotten-Similar 
Forgotten-Foreign 
Total 
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Number of Percentage Number of Percentage Number of Percentage 
Guessed Correct Inferred Correct Remember Correct 
Responses 
242 
58 
45 
345 
16.9 
18.9 
15.5 
17.1 
Responses 
223 
42 
12 
277 
50.7 
61.7 
58.3 
52.7 
Responses 
60 
3 
2 
65 
78.3 
o 
o 
72.3 
Table 5.7. The day of the week response strategies distribution for the remembered, 
forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign events. 
Overall 38.2 percent of the remembered, and 31.4 percent of the forgotten 
(forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign combined), events were given a correct 
day of the week response. A comparison of these proportions revealed no 
significant difference (Z=1.623, n.s), suggesting that correctly identifying the day 
of the week an event occurred on was not dependent on actually remembering 
the event. Furthermore, both of the above percent values are more than twice 
the 14 percent correct expected by chance. 
Table 5.8 shows the distribution of response strategies adopted by each 
subject and the percentage of times each response strategy produced a correct 
day response, the overall percentage correct for each subject is also shown. 
Both remembered and forgotten events are included in the table. Inspection of 
the overall percent correct for each subject shown in Table 5.8 suggests the 
subjects were reasonably similar in their ability to correctly determine what day 
of the week an event occurred on. Furthermore, when each subjects overall 
percent correct was compared with their expected value based on chance, all 
subjects were found to have performed above the chance level, which is 
consistent with the overall result reported above. 
Examination of the distribution of response strategies and the percent of 
correct responses each strategy produced for each subject (Table 5.8) suggests 
that the subjects were similar in terms of their ability to guess and correctly 
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infer what day of the week an event occurred on. However, there is some 
evidence of individual differences in remembering this information. 
Subject Number of Percentage Number of Percentage Number of Percentage Overall 
Guessed Correct Inferred Correct Remember Correct Percentage 
Responses Responses Responses Correct 
1 36 11.1 40 45.0 4 25.0 28.7 
2 9 11.1 12 58.3 2 50.0 39.1 
3 32 9.3 36 41.6 4 0 25.0 
4 38 15.7 37 51.3 2 100.0 35.0 
5 21 9.5 15 46.6 4 100.0 32.5 
6 16 12.5 12 41.6 0 0 25.0 
7 7 28.5 3 33.3 7 100.0 58.8 
8 11 9.0 5 40.0 ' 6 33.3 22.7 
9 9 22.2 10 70.0 1 0 45.0 
10 12 16.6 5 20.0 2 0 15.7 
11 7 14.2 4 75.0 11 100.0 68.1 
12 8 25.0 8 37.5 0 0 31.2 
13 122 22.1 52 73.0 14 85.7 40.9 
14 17 23.5 38 52.6 8 87.5 49.2 
Table S.B. The distribution of the day of the week response strategies adopted by each 
subject, and the percentage of times each response strategy produced a correct response. 
The distribution of the response strategies, in terms of percentages, for 
each of the seven days of the week that the target event actually occurred on, 
and the percentage of times each strategy produced a correct day response are 
shown in Table 5.9. Both remembered and forgotten events are included in the 
table. Examination of Table 5.9 suggests that whether the subjects adopted a 
'guess' or 'inference' strategy when giving a day of the week response 
depended on what day of the week the event actually occurred on. Tests of 
proportional difference confirmed this with significantly more guessed 
responses for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday events (Z= 6.70), 
and significantly more inferred responses for Friday, Saturday and Sunday 
events (Z= 4.42). Correctly inferring what day of the week an event occurred on 
also depended on its actual day of occurrence; Friday, Saturday and Sunday 
events produced significantly more correct inferred responses (Z= 4.37), while 
significantly more Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday events were 
correctly guessed (Z=16.04). 
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Remembering what day of the week an event occurred on also varied 
with the actual day of the week the event occurred on. Significantly more 
responses to Friday, Saturday and Sunday events were stated to be remembered 
(Z=14.67). Furthermore, significantly more 'remembered' Friday, Saturday and 
Sunday responses were correct than remembered Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday event responses. It is also interesting to note that no 
Monday events were correctly remembered at all. 
Table 5.9. Percentage of response strategies, and percentage of times each strategy 
produced a correct day response, for each day of the week. 
Day of the N= Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Week Guessed of Correct Inferred of Correct Remembered Remembered 
Guesses Inferences Correctly 
Monday 79 64.6 9.8 30.4 4.1 5.0 0 
Tuesday 81 71.6 18.9 24.7 25.0 3.7 100.0 
Wednesday 90 60.0 25.9 36.7 24.2 3.3 66.6 
Thursday 74 58.2 16.2 33.7 44.0 8.1 50.0 
Sub-total 63.6 52.8 31.5 35.7 4.9 11.5 
Friday 150 43.4 13.8 40.6 56.0 16.0 70.8 
Saturday 150 31.4 23.4 56.0 80.9 12.6 89.4 
Sunday 63 42.8 7.4 47.7 56.6 9.5 83.3 
Sub-total 38.0 12.2 48.0 66.1 14.0 21.7 
The increase in inferred day of the week responses for events that 
occurred on a Friday, Saturday and Sunday is probably related to the types of 
events that occur on these days. Indeed, 5 types of event, attending a movie, 
retail purchase, attending a party, attending a play or musical, and restaurant 
meal, accounted for 51.2 percent of all the inferred day of the week responses, 
while 52.2 percent of these events actually occurred on a Friday, Saturday, or 
Sunday. 
5.2.5 Recall of Date of Occurrence 
In order to ensure the validity of the date response analyses, data from 
three of the subjects (subjects 5, 7, and 12) were not used, because the 
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spontaneous event questions of these three subjects (N =73 in total) were 
obtained from a single year of diary records. As each of these subjects knew 
what year their submitted diary related to, and thus what year the spontaneous 
events occurred in, their date responses would probably have over-estimated 
general dating accuracy. The remaining 11 subjects each submitted at least 3 
years of diary records, with a mean of 5 years. Six-hundred and fourteen 
spontaneous events were dated by these subjects. 
5.2.5.1 Dating Accuracy: Absolute Error 
The median actual date of the 614 dated events was the 30th January 1984 
while the median assigned date was the 25th March 1984. This result suggests 
that the subjects might have been quite accurate at determining when an event 
occurred. Further evidence of this accuracy is given by the high correlation (r = 
.98, P < .0001) between actual and assigned date. A similar correlation was 
obtained when only the remembered events were used in the calculation (r = 
.98, P < .0001). Also of interest are the correlations obtained when only the 
forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign events were examined (r = .97, P < 
.0001) and (r = .99, P < .0001) respectively. Overall, these results suggest that 
the subjects were capable of determining when their events had occurred, even 
when they could not actually remember the event. 
Assigned and actual event date were also correlated for each subject 
separately. Table 5.10 shows the obtained correlations. Also shown are the 
median absolute error, and median retention interval, and correlations 
between absolute dating error and retention interval (All results are ranked 
according to median retention interval). The results shown in Table 5.10 were 
calculated using all of the events dated by each subject. Calculating these 
results separately for the forgotten events only was impractical as the number 
of events forgotten by each subject was generally too small to produce 
meaningful data. Regardless of this point, combining all of each subject's data 
for this set of analyses seemed reasonable as the previous results suggest that 
the date responses to forgotten events are not unduly inaccurate. 
Inspection of the correlations between assigned and actual date shown in 
Table 5.10, all eleven of which are positive and significant, indicates that all 
the subjects were reasonably capable of determining when their events 
occurred, and suggests that the overall result is valid. However, examination 
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of the median· absolute error for each subject suggests that in general the 
assigned dates were not particularly accurate, with an overall median absolute 
error of 66 days. A slightly smaller overall median absolute error (52.1 days) 
was found when calculated using the remembered events only. 
Table 5.10. Median absolute dating error, median retention interval, and the correlation 
between absolute error and retention interval, and actual and assigned date, for each 
subject. 
Subject Median Correlation Correlation Median 
Absolute Between Between Actual 
Error (Days) Absolute Actual and Retention 
Error and Assigned Interval 
Retention Date 
Interval 
9 24.0 .09 .62 * 566.4 
3 83.2 .63 *** .64 *** 603.3 
8 23.7 .49 * .66 *** 655.5 
14 124.1 .29* .77 *** 849.7 
11 198.5 .33 .62 *** 1262.1 
13 65.7 .38 *** .94 *** 1272.3 
6 11.6 .07 .90 *** 1273.8 
10 17.1 -.47 * .93 *** 1282.9 
1 58.4 .16 .77 *** 2006.0 
4 77.0 -.61 *** .77 *** 4323.0 
2 120.0 -.65 *** .71 *** 8620.2 
Overall 66.0 .14** .98*** 1480.0 
Note - Significance levels are for two-tailed tests 
* P<.05, ** P<.01, **P<.OO1 
Although the above absolute error analyses do reflect dating accuracy, 
they do not take into consideration time scale differences. A date can be 
divided into three components: the year, month, and day of the month. 
Friedman and Wilkins (1985) found these components to be dated with 
differing degrees of accuracy. Table 5.11 shows, separately for the remembered 
and forgotten events, the percentage of events assigned the correct year, correct 
year and month, and correct year, month and day of the month. Inspection of 
Table 5.11 suggests that the subjects' ability to determine when an event 
occurred diminished as the time scale used became more precise. Therefore, 
the overall absolute error medians reported above reflect mainly the subjects' 
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inability to determine the month and day of the month when events occurred. 
It is also particularly interesting that this trend is similar for the remembered 
and forgotten events. 
Table 5.11. The percentage of remembered and forgotten events assigned the correct year, 
correct year and month, and correct year, month, and day of the month. 
Date Components Percentage Correct Percentage Correct Percentage Correct 
Remembered Forgotten Overall 
Events Events 
N=464 N=150 N=614 
Year 70.9 50.6 65.9 
Year and Month 26.9 14.6 23.9 
Year, Month, and 4.9 1.3 4.2 
Day of Month 
Overall a significant positive correlation was obtained between absolute 
error and retention interval (r= .14, P < .01) indicating that dating accuracy 
decreased with increasing retention interval. However, the within-subject 
correlations between absolute error and retention interval shown in Table 5.10 
are somewhat inconsistent with the overall result. While positive correlations 
were obtained for 8 of the subjects, 4 of these being significant at at least the 0.05 
level, significant negative correlations were obtained for 3 subjects (e.g., subjects 
4, 10 and 2). The correlation for subject 10 did become positive, but not 
significantly so, when calculated using only remembered events: the other 
subject's correlation remained essentially the same. Considering that the 
overall median absolute error decreased when calculated using only 
remembered events which suggests forgotten events were dated less accurately, 
and with reference to Figure 5.3 which shows that subject 4 and 10 generally 
forgotten recent events rather than remote ones, the negative correlations 
obtained for these subjects may indicate that their most recent events were 
dated less accurately because they were forgotten events. Thus overall it is 
probably fair to conclude that dating accuracy does generally decrease as 
retention interval increases, particularly if one only considers the dating of 
events that are remembered. 
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It has already been noted that overall a slightly smaller median absolute 
error was obtained when calculated using only the remembered events, which 
implies event knowledge had an effect on dating accuracy. In order to 
investigate the possibility that the actual degree of event knowledge, as opposed 
to just remembering the event, effected dating accuracy; event knowledge was 
scaled and the relationship between absolute dating error and event knowledge 
examined. 
Using the results of the event aspect cuing procedure, reported in 
Section 5.2.1, it was relatively easy to scale event knowledge. On the basis of 
these results four categories of event knowledge were formed. Category one 
(Recall 1) contains the 151 events that were recalled completely or partially 
(only one of the remaining aspects correctly recalled) on the basis of one cue 
only. The 165 events in the second category (Recall 2) were recalled on the basis 
of two cues. The third category (Recognized) contains 148 recognized events, 
events recognized or remembered after all three event aspect cues had been 
presented. The final category (Forgotten) contains the 150 events that the 
subjects could not remember at alL 
It was possible to define event knowledge more precisely by dividing up 
the events in categories one and two in terms of the event aspect(/s) that had 
been presented. For example, the results reported in Section 5.2.1 indicate that 
'who' was the least efficient cue for recall, therefore events recalled after 
receiving only this cue might be better remembered than those recalled after 
hearing a 'what' cue only. Adjusting the knowledge categories in line with the 
above discussion would, however, have greatly increased the number of 
event knowledge categories and thus drastically reduced the number of events 
in some groups. Thus it was decided to adopt the four categories of event 
knowledge outlined above, as an approximate measure of event knowledge. 
Table 5.12 shows the median absolute error and the correlation between 
assigned and actual date for each event knowledge category. The high 
correlations between assigned and actual date suggests that dating across the 
four categories was reasonably accurate. However, examination of the median 
absolute error of each category shows that dating error increased as event 
knowledge decreased. Analysis of variance supported this conclusion with a 
significant main effect of event knowledge category on absolute error (F (3, 610) 
= 10.606, P < .0.0001). An a posteriori contrasts using the Scheff'e test revealed 
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that the three remembered event knowledge categories, Recall 1, Recall 2, and 
Recognized, were all significantly different (p < .001), from the Forgotten 
category. However, no significant difference between these three categories was 
found. It appears that how well an event is remembered does not significantly 
effect dating accuracy, although the absolute error medians shown in Table 5.12 
suggest that there is at least a tendency towards more accurate dating as the 
degree of event knowledge increases. 
Table 5.12. Median absolute error and the correlation between assigned and actual date, 
for each event knowledge category. 
Event Knowledge 
Category 
Recall 1 
Recall 2 
Recognized 
Forgotten 
N= 
151 
165 
148 
150 
Correlation 
Between 
Assigned & 
Actual Date 
.98 ...... ... 
.98 ...... ... 
.99 ...... ... 
.98 ...... ... 
Note - Significance levels are for two-tailed tests 
... P<0.5, ...... P<.01, ...... P<.001 
Median Absolute 
Error (Days) 
37.5 
41.9 
63.1 
190.1 
Further evidence of this was found when the event rehearsal ratings 
(frequency and recency) were correlated with absolute dating error, r = -.06, n. 
s. and r = -.10, P < .05, respectively (These correlations were calculated using 
only the remembered events as no rehearsal ratings were obtained for the 
forgotten events). Presumably event knowledge would be related to event 
rehearsal, thus the significant correlation obtained for recency of rehearsal 
probably indicates that the actual extent of event knowledge affected absolute 
dating error. 
The finding that absolute dating error was significantly greater for the 
forgotten events is consistent with the explanation given earlier for the 
significant negative correlations obtained between retention interval and 
absolute error for subjects 4 and 10. These subjects generally forgot recent 
events and the above results suggest that dating error for these forgotten events 
would be greater than for the subjects remembered events. Thus dating error 
for these subjects would be expected to increase as retention interval decreased. 
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Absolute error was also compared between the forgotten-similar and 
forgotten-foreign events, and a significant difference found (F 0, 148) = 3.983, P 
< 0.05). Examination of the group medians indicates that there was more error 
associated with the forgotten-similar assigned dates (237 days) than with the 
forgotten-foreign assigned dates 024.1 days). Inspection of Figure 5.4 which 
shows the median absolute error of the remembered, forgotten-similar and 
forgotten-foreign events for subjects that had at least 4 events in each category 
suggests that the overall absolute error difference between forgotten-similar 
and forgotten-foreign events is a valid result. Five of the subjects shown in 
Figure 5.4 dated forgotten-foreign events more accurately than forgotten-
similar events. The within-subject results shown in Figure 5.4 also suggest that 
the overall finding that remembered events were dated more accurately than 
forgotten events is a valid result: 6 of the subjects show this tendency (Note the 
difference in median absolute error between the remembered and forgotten-
foreign events for subject 6 is .42 of a day, the remembered event absolute error 
median being the smaller). 
Median 
Absolute Error 
800 
600 
(Days) 400 
200 
o 
2 3 4 
Subject 
6 
III Forgotten-Similar 
Ell Forgotten-Foreign 
II Remembered 
10 13 
Figure 5.4. Median absolute error (days) for remembered, forgotten-similar and 
forgotten-foreign events for subjects with at least four events in each category. 
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5.2.5.2 Dating Accuracy: Signed Error 
While absolute dating error gives an indication of overall dating 
accuracy, it does not reveal the nature of the dating errors or whether dating is 
biased. Signed error, on the other hand, indicates whether an event was dated 
more recently or remotely than it actually occurred. 
An overall median signed error of + 1.0 day was obtained indicating a 
very slight tendency towards dating the events more recently than they actually 
occurred or under-estimating the time elapsed since the event's occurrence. 
This tendency, however, appears to be only associated with the remembered 
events, indicated by the zero signed error value ( a days) obtained for the 
forgotten events. Calculation of the median signed error for the remembered 
events only (+ 1.0 days) confirmed this. 
Table 5.13 shows the median signed error and retention interval, and the 
correlation between signed error and retention interval, for each subject, as 
Subject 
9 
3 
8 
14 
11 
13 
6 
10 
1 
4 
2 
Overall 
Median Signed 
Error (Days) 
-2.9 
9.8 
-1.8 
4.0 
3S.0 
0.0 
5.4 
4.7 
6.S 
-52.1 
-10.9 
1.0 
Correlation 
Between 
Signed Error 
& Retention 
Interval 
.43 
.57 *** 
.48* 
.52 *** 
.24 
.06 
.04 
.09 
.12 
.74 *** 
.44* 
-.08 * 
Note· Significance levels are for two-tailed tests 
*p<.OS, **P<.Ol, ***P<.OO1 
Median Retention 
Interval (Days) 
566.4 
603.3 
655.5 
849.7 
1262.1 
1272.3 
1273.0 
1282.9 
2006.0 
4323.0 
8620.2 
1480.0 
Table 5.13. Median signed error, median retention interval, and the correlation between 
signed error and retention interval, for each subject. 
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well as the overall correlation between signed error and retention interval 
(Both remembered and forgotten events are included in the table, and results 
are ranked according to median retention interval). Examination of the 
within-subject median signed errors shown in Table 5.13 indicates that 10 of the 
subjects did show a dating bias. Furthermore, the dating bias for 6 of the 
subjects is positive, suggesting the overall positive median signed error value 
is a reasonably valid result. 
As noted in Chapter I, some studies (e.g., Ferguson & Martin, 1983; 
Kemp, 1988; Lieury, Cap lain, Jacquet & Jolivet, 1979; Lieury, Aiello, Lepreux & 
Mellet, 1980; Loftus & Marburger,1983) have found that retention interval 
affects the nature of dating errors with recent events being dated too remotely 
and remote events being dated too recently. Evidence of this type of 
relationship between signed error and retention interval in the present study 
was found when the logarithm of assigned date was regressed on the logarithm 
of actual event date. The obtained exponent of .96 and correlation of .98 
indicating that the remotest events were dated too recently and the most recent 
events too remotely. The eleven positive within-subject correlations between 
signed error and retention interval shown in Table 5.13 are further evidence of 
this type of relationship between signed error and retention interval, 
indicating that all the subjects tended to date their events more recently as 
retention interval increased. 
However, the overall significant negative correlation between signed 
error and retention interval shown in Table 5.13 is not consistent with the 
within-subject correlations. It appears the overall result is rather misleading, it 
is in fact the result of between-subject retention interval differences. As shown 
in Table 5.12 the two subjects that dated the oldest events (e.g., subject 2 and 4) 
both have negative median signed errors, thus the overall negative correlation 
between retention interval and signed error is an artifact of these two subjects 
responses. 
For the subjects with a negative median signed error (e.g. subjects 9, 8, 
4, and 2) the positive correlation between signed error and retention interval 
probably indicates a tendency for the extent to which an event was dated too 
remotely to decrease as retention interval increased. The correlations between 
absolute error and retention interval for subjects 4 and 2 (r = -.61, P < .001 and 
r = -.65, P < .001, respectively) shown in Table 5.10, support this suggestion; 
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indicating that for these two subjects dating error decreased as retention 
interval increased. 
As noted in Chapter I, section 1.3.3 Brown, Rips & Shevell (1985) 
proposed an event memory explianation of systematic dating errors, the 
accessibility hypothesis. In order to investigate whether event memory could 
account for the relationship between retention interval and signed error in this 
study, signed error was compared across the four event knowledge categories 
defined earlier ( Recall I, Recall 2, Recognized, and Forgotten). Table 5.14 
shows the median signed error for each event knowledge category, 
examination of the table suggests that their was a tendency for the better 
remembered events to be dated more recently. However, analysis of variance 
indicated that the between category differences are not significant 
(F(3,610)=0.499, n.s.). 
Event Knowledge N= Median Signed Error 
Category (Days) 
Recall 1 151 1.0 
Recall 2 165 2.9 
Recognized 148 0.0 
Forgotten 150 0.0 
Table 5.14. Median signed error for each event knowledge category. 
The validity of the above results can be questioned on the basis of the 
finding that signed error varied somewhat between subjects, and the possibility 
that, for example, knowledge category Recall 1 contained subjects who had 
positive median signed errors, and knowledge category Recognized contained 
subjects who had negative median signed errors. However, the results 
reported in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 generally show that the subjects were 
similar in terms their event memory. That is, there is no reason to suspect that 
anyone of the four knowledge categories contains more events from one 
subject than another. 
The data was also examined for evidence of boundary effects consistent 
with the models of Huttenlocher, Hedges and Prohaska (1988), and Rubin and 
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Baddeley (1989). The period cover by a subject's submitted diaries was assumed 
to define a boundary, for example, subject 1 submitted diary material covering 
the years 1981 to 1984, thus the beginning of 1981 and end of 1984 defined the 
early and late boundary markers for this subject. Figure 5.5 shows a graphical 
representation of the boundary markers for each subject. Also shown is the 
earliest and latest date response made by each subject. Inspection of Figure 5.5 
indicates that 9 of the subjects dated all their events within their boundary 
markers. Subject 1 and subject 13, on the other hand, dated 10 and 2.6 percent 
of their events outside their early boundary respectively. However, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that generally the subjects assigned dates to their events 
which were within the boundaries defined by their submitted diary material. 
1990 -
. 
1985 -
. 
1980 -
Time 
1975 -
1970 
.: 
1965 
.' 
: 
I: .' 
2 3 4 6 8 9 
Subject 
1 0 1 1 1 
.' 
: 
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3 1 4 
• Remote Boundary 
IZI Earlest Assigned Date 
1m Latest Assigned Date 
o Recent Boundary 
Figure 5.5. Boundaries defined by subjects submitted diary material, and the earliest and 
latest date each subject assigned to their events. 
Figure 5.5 suggests that dating errors for events near each end of a 
subject's boundary markers must have been in the direction of the median 
actual date of their events. That is, signed dating errors for the recent events 
must have been generally negative and signed dating errors for remote events 
generally positive. Furthermore, the finding that absolute dating error 
generally increased as retention interval increased suggests that there was more 
dating error for remote events, more positive signed errors, which is what the 
overall positive signed error value reflects. Overall, a boundary effects 
explanation seems to adequately account for the signed error results obtained in 
this study. 
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5.2.6 Dating Strategies 
In this section the strategies that the subjects claimed to have adopted 
when generating a date response are examined. For this part of the analysis the 
data set was further reduced by the exclusion of subjects 1 and 2. These two 
subjects were the first to participate in the study and gave only one dating 
strategy response for each date. The other subjects, by contrast, indicated their 
adopted dating strategy for each component of a date response. That is, they 
indicated how they generated the year, month, and day of the month 
separately. Five-hundred and eleven events were dated by the 9 remaining 
subjects. 
The 'generative mechanism for dating' card (shown in Figure 4.5, 
Chapter 4) contained five defined dating strategies (Le., remembered, guessed, 
reconstructed using before event landmark events, reconstructed using after 
event landmark events, and reconstructed using information from the event 
aspect cues presented). The subject's indication of which dating strategy or 
combination of dating strategies defined on the card best described how they 
generated each date component resulted in ten different dating strategies being 
defined. 
Table 5.15 shows, separately for each date component, the percentage of 
events that were dated using each of the 10 dating strategies. Inspection of 
Table 5.15 indicates that a number of the dating strategies (e.g., strategies 6, 7, 
and 10) were not used very frequently. Strategies 6 and 7 both involve the use 
of landmark events but subjects were not very confident about their use as they 
indicated the date produced was also something of a guess. The low frequency 
of use of these dating strategies suggests that subjects only use landmark events 
to date events when they are reasonably confident they will enhance the date 
response given. Strategy 10, the other dating strategy not used very frequently, 
involved the use of a before event landmark event and information contained 
in the event description, this result suggests that subjects prefer to use either a 
landmark event or target event information but not both simultaneously 
when dating an event. The fact that no subject indicated he or she used an after 
event landmark event and information contained in the event description to 
produce a date component is further evidence that landmark events and event 
description information were not used in conjunction when generating date 
components (as no subject used this strategy it is not included in Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15. The percentage of events dated using each of the ten dating strategies defined 
by the subjects for each date component. 
Dating Strategy Year Month Day of the 
month 
(1) Remembered 37.7 9.3 3.7 
(2) Guessed 9.9 40.1 85.1 
Reconstructed using: 
(3) Before event landmark events 3.7 5.6 .5 
(4) After event landmark events 8.4 5.2 2.1 
(5) Targeteventcueinformanon 18.1 27.2 5.4 
(6) Before event landmark & guess .3 .7 .1 
(7) After event landmark & guess .5 2.1 .7 
(8) Event cue information & guess 4.3 3.3 .7 
(9) Before & after event landmark 16.0 5.6 .7 
(10) Before event landmark & cue information .5 .3 .3 
All reconstruction combined 52.2 50.5 11.1 
Examination of the distribution of dating strategies across date 
components shown in Table 5.15 indicates that remembering date components 
decreased as the time scale being defined became more precise, that is decreased 
progressively from year to month to day of the month. Guessing, by contrast, 
shows the opposite pattern, increasing progressively as the time scale became 
more precise. The pooled reconstructive strategy figures (strategies 3 to 10 
combined), also shown in Table 5.15, suggest that the date components year and 
month were equally likely to be reconstructed whereas the day of the month 
component was not frequently reconstructed. When considered together the 
distributions of the dating strategies also suggests that when recall fails, the 
adopted strategy depends on the date component being generated. Guessing 
appears to be the favoured alternative for the day of the month component, 
and reconstruction for the year component, while the month component 
appears to be roughly equally guessed and reconstructed. 
The dating strategies adopted by each subject for each date component are 
shown in Table 5.16, listed in order of median retention interval. Only the 
pooled reconstructive strategy figures (strategies 3 to 10 combined) are 
presented in order to make the table more re1adily interpretable. Examination 
of Table 5.16 suggests that the overall date component dating strategy 
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differences outlined above are valid as the overall tendencies are evident and 
reasonably consistent at the within-subject level. 
Subject Number of All Median 
Dated Events Remembered Guessed Reconstructive Retention 
Strategies Interval 
(Days) 
Year Component 
9 20 55.0 10.0 35.0 566.4 
3 72 55.5 25.0 19.5 603.3 
8 22 68.1 0 31.9 655.5 
14 63 14.2 4.7 81.1 849.7 
11 22 18.2 0 81.8 1262.1 
13 188 47.3 10.1 42.6 1272.3 
6 28 42.8 17.8 39.4 1273.0 
10 19 63.1 15.8 21.1 1282.9 
4 77 1.3 1.3 97.4 4323.0 
Month Component 
10.0 25.0 65.0 
8.3 48.6 43.1 
31.8 27.2 41.0 
1.6 50.8 47.6 
9.0 31.8 59.2 
11.7 43.6 44.7 
14.3 17.8 67.9 
15.7 26.3 58.0 
1.3 36.3 62.4 
Day of the Month Component 
10.0 SO.O 10.0 
1.4 91.7 6.9 
0 91.0 9.0 
1.6 76.2 22.2 
9.0 86.4 4.6 
4.8 81.9 13.3 
7.1 89.3 3.6 
5.3 73.5 21.2 
1.3 94.8 3.9 
Table 5.16. The dating strategies adopted by each subject for each date component. 
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5.2.6.1 Retention Interval Effects on Dating Strategies 
The dated events were divided into six groups on the basis of retention 
interval; subject 4 was excluded from this analysis because the median 
retention interval for this subject was substantially different from that of the 
other 8 subjects (see Table 5.16). Table 5.17 shows the retention interval range 
and the number of events dated in each group. Also shown, separately for the 
three date components, is the percentage of events whose date was 
remembered, guessed, and reconstructed (reconstructive strategies 3 to 10 
combined) within each retention interval group. 
Retention Interval N= Dated Remembered Guessed Reconstructed 
Blocks (years) Events Date Date Date 
Year Component 
.62- 1.999 127 59.0 12.5 28.5 
2.000 - 2.999 110 51.8 9.0 39.2 
3.000 - 3.999 60 41.6 6.6 51.8 
4.000 - 4.999 52 23.0 15.3 61.7 
5.000 - 5.999 41 36.5 9.7 53.8 
6.000 - 8.999 44 18.1 18.1 63.8 
Month Component 
15.7 35.4 48.9 
14.5 36.3 49.2 
11.6 40.3 48.1 
3.8 38.4 57.8 
4.8 48.7 46.5 
0 70.4 29.6 
Day of the Month Component 
7.0 77.1 15.9 
3.6 87.2 9.2 
5.0 80.0 15.0 
1.9 90.3 7.8 
2.4 82.9 14.7 
0 88.6 11.4 
Table 5.17. Percentage of events dated by dating strategy by retention interval for each 
date component. 
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Examination of Table 5.17 suggests that the time since an event's 
occurrence had an effect on the strategy used to generate a date component. 
There appears to be more actual remembering of date components as the time 
since the event's occurrence decreased, and more guessing as retention interval 
increased; tendencies which seem to be reasonably consistent across all three 
date components. Similarly date reconstruction of the year component appears 
to have increased as retention interval increased. However, date 
reconstruction of the month and day of the month components does not 
appear to be affected by retention interval. 
The apparent effect of retention interval on dating strategy adoption 
could of course reflect between subject differences, as the subjects did vary 
somewhat in terms of retention interval. However, examination of the 
within-subject results shown in Table 5.16, which as noted are ranked according 
to median retention interval, indicates no systematic changes in dating strategy 
adoption which might account for the retention interval analysis results. That 
is, for example, the increase in year component reconstruction as retention 
interval increased observed in Table 5.17, is not evident in Table 5.16. 
5.2.6.2 Event Knowledge Effects on Dating Strategies 
Using the procedure described in Section 5.2.5, the events were divided 
into four knowledge groups. Table 5.18 shows, separately for each date 
component, the percentage of events within each event knowledge group 
whose date was remembered, guessed and reconstructed (reconstructive 
strategies 3 to 10 combined). The most striking aspect of Table 5.18 is that the 
date components for a number of events, particularly the year component, 
were remembered even when the actual event being dated was not 
remembered. One possible explanation for this might be that some aspect of an 
event, such as the 'where' cue, tied it to a specific point in time, and although 
the subject could not remember the event, they knew when it must have 
occurred. 
Inspection of the percentage of date components stated as being 
remembered across the event knowledge groups suggests that remembering 
date information increased as event memory increased. Examination of the 
percentages confirmed this for all three date c~mponents, X2(3, N= 511) = 26.55, 
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P< .01, X2(3, N= 511) = 19.17, P<.Ol and X2(3, N= 511) = 9.02, P< .05 for the year, 
month and day of the month components respectively. 
Furthermore, when event memory was relatively strong but the date 
components could not be remembered, the subjects appear to have adopted a 
reconstructive strategy when giving a response, rather than simply guessing. 
In order to examine this further, the four knowledge groups were combined 
into two; Recall 1 and 2 being combined, and Recognized and Forgotten being 
treated similarly. Examination of the proportion of date components stated as 
Table 5.18. Percentage of events dated in each event knowledge category by dating strategy 
for each date component. 
Event Knowledge Category N= Dated Remembered Guessed Reconstructed 
Events Date Date Date 
Year Component 
Recall 1 134 47.7 5.2 47.1 
Recall 2 131 51.1 3.8 45.1 
Recognized 119 34.4 9.2 56.4 
Forgotten 127 15.7 22.0 62.3 
Month Component 
14.1 29.8 56.1 
15.2 31.2 53.6 
6.7 48.7 44.6 
.7 51.9 47.4 
Day of the Month Component 
7.4 76.8 15.8 
3.8 80.9 15.3 
2.5 89.0 8.5 
.7 94.4 4.9 
guessed performed for each date component found that for all three 
components significantly (P<.Ol) more date components were guessed for the 
recognized/forgotten events, Z=4.52, Z=4.65 and Z=4.19 for the year, month 
and day of the month respectively. A similar analysis on the proportion of date 
components stated as reconstructed confirmed that for the month (Z=2.04, 
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P< .05) and day of the month (Z=3.33, P< .01) significantly more Recall 1/2 
event date components were reconstructed. The year component, however, 
appears to show the opposite tendency, with year of occurrence reconstruction 
increasing as event knowledge decreased (Z= 3.02, P< .01). 
The apparent relationship between dating strategy adoption and event 
knowledge may account for the decrease in remembering and increase in 
guessing of the month, and day of the month date components as retention 
interval increases. Furthermore, the increase in year component 
reconstruction as event knowledge decreased is consistent with the observed 
tendency for year component reconstruction to increase as retention interval 
increased. 
5.2.7 Events Dated Exactly 
The events that were dated exactly have some theoretical importance in 
that they may represent landmark events or events that provide temporal 
reference points. Twenty-five events were dated exactly, the subjects indicating 
they remembered the year, month, and day of the month, 21, 14, and 12 times, 
respectively. There is, therefore, some support for the suggestion that these 
events may be temporal reference points. However, the number of 
remembered date components is somewhat less than the overall number of 
events dated exactly, thus date components for some of the exactly dated events 
were not actually remembered by the subjects. It also appears that the number 
of date components actually remembered decreased as the date component 
became more precise, that is from year to month to day of the month. 
The number, and categorization label, of events that were exactly dated 
are shown in Table 5.19, as are a number of unsolicited responses that subjects 
made when dating these events. Comparison of the event categorization labels 
and the subject's responses when dating the events suggest that the former do 
not adequately describe landmark events. Rather it would appear that 
birthdays and public holidays are the types of event for which one might have a 
temporal reference point. 
Inspection of the Table 5.19 indicates that no single type of event stands 
out as being particularly applicable to exact dating. The percentage of some of 
the types of events that were exactly dated is reasonably high, however, the 
155 
actual number of these types of events was very low. For example, only one 
event was categorized 'Tramp/walk' and one event categorized 'Flying', and 
both of these events were dated exactly. 
The number of events each subject dated exactly varied from 0 to 8, with 
11 of the subjects managing to date at least 1 event exactly. It is particularly 
interesting to note that two events which where rated as forgotten-similar were 
actually dated exactly, these events are shown by an * in Table 5.19. For one of 
these events the subjects response at the time of dating (that shown in Table 
5.19) might indicate why it was exactly dated and why it was forgotten similar. 
Table 5.19. The number and types of event exactly dated, and responses some subjects 
made when dating these events. 
Event Type 
Restaurant 
Retail purchase 
Attending movie/theatre 
Party 
Saw Band! Orchestra 
Received present 
Canoeing 
Picked something up/organized 
Sking 
Public performance 
Cabera 
Swimming 
Field trip 
Car broke down 
Drinks out! hotel 
Lost something 
Flying 
Horseriding 
Tramp/walk 
Number of 
Exactly 
Dated Events 
2 
1 
7 
1* 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1* 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Subject Responses 
Friends birthday, Own birthday 
Waitangi Day, New Years Eve, First 
date with long time friend, 
Own birthday, Mothers birthday 
Friends birthday 
New Years Eve 
Waitangi day 
First meeting with long time friend 
Mothers birthday 
Friends birthday 
Friends birthday 
Note - * indicates the event was rated as forgotten-similar. 
The subjects response suggests it was a friends birthday party, while the exact 
date suggests the subject knows the date of the friends birthday. Furthermore, 
it was perhaps a forgotten-similar event because it was one of many birthday 
parties the friend had had and which the subject had attended. 
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5.3 Experiment 6, Part B: Duration Events - Results and Discussion 
The 14 subjects responded to a total of 187 duration questions. Actual 
event duration ranged from 3 to 550 days with a median actual duration of 9 
days. Estimated event duration ranged from 2 to 700 days with a median 
estimated duration of 10 days. Seventeen of the events were not remembered 
by the subjects, indicated by being given a '1' rating on the knowledge scale. 
The mean overall knowledge rating was 3.7, a '3' rating being defined as 'I 
remember it but not so well', and a '4' rating as 'I remember it fairly well'. 
Table 5.20 shows the median actual duration, median estimated 
duration, median absolute error and median signed error, and the correlation 
between actual and estimated duration for each subject, and overall (error 
scores were calculated by subtracting actual event duration from estimated 
event duration, in the case of absolute error the sign of the error was ignored). 
Subject Number of Median Median Median Median Correlation 
Duration Actual Estimated Absolute Signed Between 
Events Duration Duration Error Error Actual & 
(Days) (Days) (Days) (Days) Estimated 
Duration 
1 17 16.0 21.0 4.0 1.0 .46 
2 11 22.0 14.0 7.0 0 .25 
3 16 7.0 11.0 5.0 2.5 .94*** 
4 20 9.0 10.0 3.5 .5 .50* 
5 6 4.0 5.0 2.0 -1.0 .96** 
6 5 8.0 5.0 7.0 -2.0 .75 
7 7 4.0 4.0 1.0 0 .97*** 
8 5 4.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 .66 
9 7 36.0 60.0 5.0 4.0 .97*** 
10 5 26.0 14.0 6.0 -1.0 .86 
11 4 5.5 6.0 2.5 -1.0 .97* 
12 9 5.0 4.0 2.0 -1.0 .47 
13 49 9.0 14.0 9.0 1.0 .92*** 
14 26 10.0 7.0 1.5 0 .82*** 
Overall 187 9.0 10.0 4.0 0 .85*** 
Note - Significance levels are for two-tailed tests 
*P<.05, **P<.Ol, ***P<.OOl 
Table 5.20. Median actual duration, median estimated duration, median absolute error and 
median signed error, and the correlation between actual and estimated duration, for each 
subject. 
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Inspection of the within-subject correlations between actual and 
estimated event duration shown in Table 5.20 suggests that all the subjects were 
reasonably capable of estimating the duration of their events. The within-
subject correlations are also reasonably consistent with the overall correlation 
obtained between actual and estimated duration (r = .85, P < .001) and suggest 
that the overall result is valid. Further evidence of the subject's ability to 
estimate event duration is seen in the error scores shown in Table 5.20. Overall 
estimates were in error by only 4 days (absolute error), while the signed error 
median of 0 days indicates no overall tendency to either over- or under-
estimate event duration. Furthermore, inspection of the within-subject 
median absolute and signed errors indicates both values are generally quite 
close to the overall values which suggests the overall results are a valid 
representation. 
Table 5.21 shows the median actual duration, median estimated 
duration, median absolute error, median signed error and mean knowledge 
rating for each type of event within the filled and empty duration event 
categories. Inspection of Table 5.21 indicates that the overall median actual and 
median estimated event duration are identical for both the filled and empty 
duration events. These results are further evidence of the subject's ability to 
estimate event duration, and also suggests that the type of event being 
estimated did not have a marked effect on the accuracy of the estimate 
provided. 
Further evidence of an overall similarity in the accuracy of the estimates 
provided for the filled and empty duration events was found when actual and 
estimated duration were correlated: r= .74, P < .001 and r= .93, P < .001 for the 
filled and empty duration events respectively. These two correlations are 
similar to the overall correlation between actual and estimated duration 
reported above and provide further evidence that the different types of event 
did not produce markedly different duration estimations. These correlations 
also suggest that estimated duration increased as actual duration increased, a 
trend which is evident in both Table 5.20 and 5.21. 
Event Type 
Filled Duration Events 
Friend/s come to stay 
Official trip 
Holiday 
Acted in play 
Hospitalized 
Employed in job 
Medical treatment 
Have a pet 
Take course 
Construct something 
Relationship 
Overall 
Empty Duration Events 
Have something done - have it redone 
Receive invitation -attend 
Buy something - pick it up 
Friend Irelative goes away - returns 
Sit test - get result 
Loose something - find it 
See a movie - see it again 
Apply for position - hear result 
Order something by mail- receive it 
Photograph taken - view it 
Buy concert ticket - attend 
Finish course - start related course 
Overall 
N= 
8 
16 
49 
2 
5 
8 
4 
5 
10 
6 
1* 
114 
3 
13 
15 
7 
3 
8 
2 
12 
3 
3 
3 
1* 
73 
Median 
Actual 
Duration 
(Days) 
3.5 
3.5 
7.0 
8.0 
11.0 
17.5 
25.5 
30.0 
47.5 
55.5 
170.0 
7.0 
5.0 
7.0 
9.0 
12.0 
12.0 
13.0 
14.0 
14.5 
38.0 
58.0 
86.0 
91.0 
14.0 
Median 
Estimate 
Duration 
(Days) 
4.0 
4.0 
10.0 
14.0 
5.0 
15.0 
51.0 
30.0 
56.0 
14.0 
150.0 
7.0 
3.0 
14.0 
9.0 
10.0 
14.0 
21.0 
5.5 
20.5 
30.0 
60.0 
42.0 
7.0 
14.0 
Note- * Indicates table values are actual rather than median or mean 
Median 
Absolute 
Error 
(Days) 
1.0 
0.0 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
8.5 
81.5 
20.0 
13.0 
33.5 
20.0 
2.0 
2.0 
8.0 
5.0 
2.0 
2.0 
12.0 
9.5 
9.5 
6.5 
3.0 
22.0 
84.0 
7.0 
Median 
Signed 
Error 
(Days) 
-1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
-5.0 
6.0 
11.0 
0.0 
9.0 
-18.5 
-20.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
.5 
-2.0 
1.0 
2.0 
-8.5 
3.0 
-3.5 
2.0 
4.0 
-84.0 
1.0 
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Mean 
Knowledge 
Rating 
2.6 
4.4 
4.0 
2.5 
3.8 
5.0 
5.2 
4.0 
4.3 
2.6 
6.0 
4.2 
4.3 
3.5 
2.9 
3.1 
3.6 
3.3 
4.5 
3.8 
2.6 
4.0 
3.6 
1.0 
3.7 
Table 5.21. Median actual duration, median estimated duration, median absolute error, 
median signed error, and mean knowledge rating for each type of event within the filled 
and empty duration event categories. 
In order to examine the relationship between estimated and actual event 
duration, the logarithm of the duration estimates was regressed on the 
logarithm of actual event duration. An exponent of .87 and a correlation of .81 
were obtained, indicating a tendency to overestimate short and underestimate 
long duration events. Similar exponents (.88 and .85) and correlations (.84 and 
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.75) were obtained when the analysis was performed using only the filled and 
empty duration events respectively. Furthermore, the obtained exponents are 
very similar to the .90 typically found in traditional duration estimation 
research (e.g., Eisler, 1976), in which markedly shorter actual durations (less 
than one minute) are generally used. 
Within-subject regression analysis results are shown in Table 5.22, as are 
the within -subject correlations between retention interval and actual event 
duration, retention interval and estimated event duration, and knowledge 
Subject Number Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation Regression 
of Between Between Between Between Exponent 
Duration Retention Retention Knowledge Log-Actual 
Events Interval & Interval & Ratings & Duration & 
Actual Estimated Estimated Log-Estimated 
Duration Duration Duration. Duration 
(Remembered 
Events Only) 
1 17 .53* .48* .64** .85 .77 
2 11 .06 .21 .14 .70 .83 
3 16 -.02 .01 -.00 .85 .89 
4 20 .34 .26 .24 .69 .81 
5 6 
6 5 
7 7 .06 .05 .15 .98 .91 
8 5 
9 7 -.47 -.48 -.76* .97 .92 
10 5 
11 4 
12 9 -.05 -.03 .72* .80 .87 
13 49 .08 .02 .07 .77 .96 
14 26 -.08 -.14 -.40* .87 .96 
Overall .09 .03 .05 .81 .87 
Note - Significance levels are for two-tailed tests 
*P<.05, **P<.Ol, ***P<.OOl 
Table 5.22. Within-subject correlations between retention interval and actual event 
duration, retention interval and estimated event duration and knowledge ratings and 
estimated event duration; and regression analysis results. 
ratings and estimated event duration for subjects with at least 7 duration 
events. Examination of the within-subject regression analysis results suggests 
that the overall result is reasonably valid, with most subject's exponents and 
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correlations indicating a tendency towards over- and under-estimation of short 
and long duration events respectively. 
5.3.1 Ornstein's (1969) 'Storage Size" Hypothesis 
Further analyses were performed in order to examine Ornstein's (1969) 
'storage size' hypothesis. Retention interval (the time between the beginning 
of an event and the interview date) which ranged from 222 days to almost 25 
years (median 3.7 years), was not significantly correlated with either actual 
event duration (r = .09) or estimated event duration (r = . 03). The latter result 
is inconsistent with Ornstein's model which predicts an inverse relationship 
between retention interval and estimated duration based on the assumption 
that storage size decreases over time (memory trace decay). The result is, 
however, similar to that obtained in Experiment 2, Chapter 2; as is the finding 
of no relationship between retention interval and actual duration, which 
largely rules out the possibility that the nonsignificant correlation between 
retention interval and estimated duration resulted because the older events 
were actually of long duration and the recent events of short duration. 
The within-subject correlations between retention interval and 
estimated and actual event duration shown in Table 5.22 generally support the 
validity of the overall results. Subject 1 does have a significant correlation 
between retention interval and estimated duration, but the correlation between 
retention interval and actual duration is also significant for this subject, which 
makes the former correlation rather suspect. 
Ornstein's prediction is, as noted, based on the assumption that storage 
size decreases over time. The negative correlation between retention interval 
and knowledge ratings (r = -.09) was, however, not significant; which raises the 
possibility that Ornstein's predicted relationship between retention interval 
and duration estimation may not have been found because 'storage size' (event 
memory) did not significantly decreased with retention interval. 
The knowledge ratings did, however, vary between events; with 17, 21, 
37, 53, 35, 19, and 5 events being given knowledge ratings of I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 respectively. Thus it was possible to use the knowledge ratings to 
investigate Ornstein's 'storage size' hypothesis. The 17 events that the subjects 
could not remember (those given a 1 rating on the knowledge scale) were 
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excluded from these analyses. Knowledge ratings and estimated duration were 
found to be uncorrelated for the remaining 170 events (r = .05, n.s.). Thus, 
contrary to Ornstein's prediction, the better remembered events were not 
estimated to have lasted longer. 
The possibility that a relationship between knowledge ratings and 
estimated duration was not found because the better remembered events were 
actually shorter in duration and the less well remembered events actually 
longer can be discounted, as the correlation between the knowledge ratings and 
actual event duration (r = -.01) was not significant. 
Within-subject analyses were performed to determine the validity of the 
group results. As noted, Table 5.22 shows the within subject correlations 
between knowledge ratings and estimated event duration Inspection of Table 
5.22 indicates that two significant positive correlations were obtained between 
knowledge ratings and estimated duration i.e., r = .64, P < .01 for subject 1 and 
r = .72, P < .05 for subject 12. The significant correlation obtained for subject 12 
might, however, be an artifact of a relationship between knowledge ratings and 
actual event duration as these two variables were significantly correlated for 
this subject (r = .77, P < .05). No significant correlations were obtained 
between knowledge ratings and actual event duration for the other 13 subjects. 
Overall the within-subject correlations between knowledge ratings and 
estimated event duration are reasonably consistent with the overall result. 
Rehearsal ratings, frequency and recency, which were both found to be 
positively correlated to knowledge ratings, r = .57, P < .001 and r = .49, P < .001 
respectively, were also correlated with estimated event duration (events given 
a '1' knowledge rating were excluded from these analyses as they were not rated 
on the rehearsal scales). The obtained non-significant correlations, r = .05 for 
frequency and r = .04 for recency, provide further evidence that estimated 
event duration was not related to event knowledge. Furthermore, no 
significant correlations were obtained between the rehearsal ratings and actual 
event duration suggesting the above results are not a reflection of the short 
duration events being given larger rehearsal ratings and the longer duration 
events smaller ratings. 
Comparison of the knowledge ratings of the filled and empty duration 
events (remembered events only) indicated that they were significantly 
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different (F (1, 168) = 6.570, P < .01). The filled duration events were on 
average given a higher knowledge rating (4.24) than the empty duration events 
(3.73), which is not unexpected as filled duration events by definition contain 
more associated information. Furthermore, examination of Table 5.23, which 
shows the filled and empty duration event mean knowledge rating for each 
subject, suggests that the observed overall mean knowledge rating difference 
between the filled and empty duration events is a reasonably valid result. In 
ten of the twelve cases where a comparison could be made, the filled duration 
events received a higher average knowledge rating. These results suggest that 
comparing the duration estimates of the filled and empty duration events 
would provide another means of testing Ornstein's model. 
Subject N= Filled N= Empty Filled Empty 
Duration Duration Duration: Duration: 
Events Events Mean Mean 
Knowledge Knowledge 
Rating Rating 
1 11 6 4.6 4.5 
2 11 3.9 
3 10 4 5.2 3.0 
4 6 9 4.3 4.0 
5 4 2 5.0 3.5 
6 3 2 4.3 3.0 
7 5 2 3.6 4.0 
8 5 5.2 
9 3 4 6.3 4.5 
10 1 3 5.0* 3.6 
11 3 1 4.3 3.0* 
12 6 2 3.3 4.0 
13 25 19 3.7 3.1 
14 18 7 4.1 3.5 
Overall 106 66 4.2 3.7 
Note- * indicates actual knowledge rating, not mean. 
Table 5.23. Number of filled and empty duration events, and mean knowledge rating for 
each subject (only remembered events are included). 
Analysis of covariance, with actual event duration as the covariate, was 
used to compare the filled and empty duration event estimates (this procedure 
adjusted for between-group actual event duration differences and in doing so 
produced a dependent variable which reflected both signed error and estimated 
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duration characteristics). The obtained non-significant result (F (2, 167) = 0.128, 
n.s.) is consistent with those reported earlier in that the better remembered 
events (the filled duration events) were not estimated to have lasted longer. 
Furthermore, this result is inconsistent with the results of traditional duration 
estimation research on the filled-duration illusion, which has generally found 
filled duration intervals to be estimated significantly longer than unfilled or 
empty intervals of equal actual duration (e.g., Buffardi, 1971; Burnside, 1971; 
Frankenhaeuser~ 1959; Fraisse, 1963; Hall & Jastrow, 1886; Ornstein, 1969; 
Poynter & Homa, 1983; Roeloefs & Zeeman, 1951; Schiffman & Bobko, 1977; 
Thomas & Brown, 1974); a result which is frequently explained using 
Ornstein's 'storage size' model. 
The relationship between event knowledge and duration estimation was 
also investigated by examining the effect of the order in which the subjects gave 
the knowledge rating and duration estimate. As noted in Chapter 4, section 
4.5, this order was randomly assigned across events. It is probable that, in 
gIving a knowledge rating for an event, the subject actively searched memory 
for the relevant information. Therefore, when the subject was required to 
give a duration estimate after a knowledge rating, it might be expected that the 
estimate would be based on more information than when the estimate was 
given first. 
The events were divided into two groups according to whether the 
duration estimate was given before or after the knowledge rating ( events given 
a '1' knowledge rating were excluded). Duration estimates between the groups 
of events were compared using analysis of covariance with actual event 
duration as the covariate. In line with the preceding results, no significant 
difference was found between the two groups (F (2, 167) = 3.693, n. s.). 
The preceding analyses, as noted, used only the remembered events. In 
order to examine the estimates of the 'forgotten' events, those given a '1' 
knowledge rating, and as a further test of Ornstein's model, the events were 
divided into three groups on the basis of event knowledge. Group one 
contained events given a 5 to 7 rating on the knowledge scale (N=59), group 
two events given a 2 to 4 rating (N=111), and group three events given a 1 
rating (N=17). Estimated event duration was compared between the groups 
using analysis of covariance with actual event duration as the covariate. Again 
no indication that event knowledge was positively related to estimated event 
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duration was found (F (3, 184) = 2.458, n.s.). In particular, the finding that the 
duration estimates of the forgotten events (group 3) were not significantly 
different from the remembered event estimates (groups 1 and 2) argues against 
an effect of event knowledge on the length of an event's estimated duration. 
5.3.2 Duration Estimation Accuracy 
The above analyses found little evidence of Ornstein's predicted positive 
relationship between event knowledge and estimated event duration. These 
analyses did not, however, address the question of whether duration 
estimation accuracy was related to event knowledge. Estimation error 
(absolute) was therefore compared using analysis of covariance, with actual 
duration as the covariate, between the knowledge rating/estimate and 
estimate/knowledge rating groups defined earlier (F (2, 167) = 3.80, n.s.), the 
filled and empty duration events (F (2, 167) = 0.074, n.s.), and the three event 
knowledge groups defined above (F (3, 183) = 0.312, n.s.). All of the analyses 
produced non-significant results and are consistent with the non-significant 
correlation obtained between the knowledge ratings and absolute error scores (r 
= -.06). These results suggest that duration estimation accuracy is also not 
significantly related to event knowledge. 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
The overall finding that event knowledge does not affect the estimated 
duration of a personally experienced event suggests that the subjects may have 
simply guessed the durations. However, the relationship between actual and 
estimated duration, and the more than reasonable degree of estimation 
accuracy achieved by the subjects, argues strongly against this conclusion. 
Indeed, the subjects estimated the duration of 15.5 percent of the events exactly. 
Furthermore, the finding that the duration estimates for the forgotten events 
were not significantly different, in terms of absolute error, to the remembered 
event estimates is similar to that observed in Experiment 2. Overall these 
results suggests that the reconstructive model of duration estimation, proposed 
to account for the results obtained in Experiments 2 and 4, may also adequately 
explain the results obtained in this experiment. 
No aspect of the obtained results suggest that another explanation of the 
retrospective duration estimation of autobiographical events is necessary. The 
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lack of an event knowledge effect on estimation accuracy (absolute error), 
which is in contrast to that observed in Experiment 2, is probably due to the 
subjects in this experiment having actually experienced the events. Thus, the 
advantage of actually remembering a specific event, in terms of duration 
estimation accuracy, observed in Experiment 2, was probably always available 
in this experiment. Finally, it is difficult to imagine why the processes 
involved in the estimation of autobiographical event duration should be 
different from those involved in the estimation of public event duration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into five sections. First, the undirected diary 
method is discussed. This section focuses on the potential of the research 
method and its use in this research. The second section deals with Experiment 
6, Part a; specifically, the results relating to the remembering and forgetting of 
the spontaneous autobiographical events. These results are examined in 
relation to other research, and as a basis for theorizing about the nature 
(organization) of autobiographical memory. The third section also discusses 
the results of Experiment 6, Part a; those relating to event dating. A 
reconstructive model of event dating is outlined and factors relating to event 
dating research in general discussed. Section four discusses retrospective 
duration estimation. Ornstein's (1969) storage size hypothesis is examined in 
relation to the results obtained in Experiments 1 through 4, and Experiment 6, 
Part b; and the reconstructive model of duration estimation outlined in 
Chapter 2 is discussed. The effect of ecological validity on duration estimation, 
and the relationship between event dating and duration estimation is also 
examined in this section. Finally, the imp1cations of this research for 
retrospective recall are discussed. 
6.1 The Undirected-Diary Method 
The undirected-diary method, as noted in Chapter 3, overcomes some of 
the problems associated with conducting ecologically valid memory research. 
The number of diarists that participated in Experiment 6, in contrast to Angell 
and Freedman's (1953) suggestion, allowed the development of scientific 
generalizations. Further support for the generalizability of the results obtained 
using the undirected-diary method was found in the results of Experiment 5. 
The majority of the student sample were or had been diarists, and overall, 
diarists did not appear to be a special subgroup. 
Experiment 6, Part a, attempted to replicate some of the findings of 
Wagenaar (1986) relating to the recall of autobiographical event information, 
167 
and the findings of a number of studies on event dating (e.g., Thompson, 1982, 
1985b). The fact that Wagenaar's results were replicated, and event dating 
results consistent with those found in other studies were obtained, both 
overall, and at the level of within-subject analyses (see Sections 6.2. to 6.3.4), is 
further evidence in support of the reliability of the results, and suggests the 
undirected-diary method is a valid way to assess autobiographical memory. 
Furthermore, the undirected-diary method in relation to the main 
objective of this study, - an examination of retrospective duration estimation 
under ecologically valid conditions - proved particularly useful. It is hard to 
imagine how verifiable data on events such as the empty duration events used 
in Experiment 6, Part b, could have been otherwise obtained. Admittedly, the 
diary method, as described in Chapter 3 Table 3.1 Section 1, could have been 
used, but considering I found only 187 duration events in 48 years of diary 
records, employing this method would probably have involved unrealistic 
delays. Furthermore, such delays could not be avoided by having a large 
sample record events over a short period. Although a number of duration 
events would undoubtedly have been recorded, knowledge ratings between the 
events would probably not have varied sufficiently to provide an adequate test 
of Ornstein's (1969) storage size hypothesis (see Section 6.4.1 for further 
discussion of duration event knowledge ratings). 
The general consistency of the within-subject analyses in both Parts a and 
b of Experiment 6 suggests that the fact that each subject's interview schedule 
contained some events which were unique to them (see Tables 4.3 & 4.4) did 
not affect the results. A criterion of 'equivalence' of the material obtained from 
subjects' diaries could have been employed. However, this would have 
reduced the amount of usable material for anyone subject. Furthermore, 
autobiographical memory, which naturally involves individual differences, 
was being investigated. It was, therefore, perhaps advantageous to use as wide 
a variation of event types as possible. 
One analysis in Experiment 6, Part a - correlating signed dating error and 
retention interval - did produce rather inconsistent results. The inconsistency 
was, however, between the overall result and the within-subject results, rather 
than within the within-subject results. As noted when these results were 
reported, the overall result is an artifact of between subject retention interval 
differences, and, in fact, the individual results are reasonably consistent with 
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retention interval effects which have been observed in other studies. Between-
subject retention interval differences could, of course, have been avoided by 
using subjects with diary material from the same years. However, examining 
Ornstein's storage size hypothesis required a large overall retention interval, 
and it would have been difficult to find, say, 10 subjects who had all kept a diary 
for the == 10 year period. 
The between-subject retention interval differences do illustrate a very 
useful feature of the undirected-diary method. Normally if a researcher 
wanted to obtain very long retention intervals, a longitudinal research method 
would have to be employed. With the undirected-diary method it is relatively 
easy to obtain autobiographical event information which varies in terms of 
retention interval. Thus the undirected-diary method is particularly suited to 
investigations of the effect of retention interval on autobiographical memory. 
However, equating subjects' retention interval may be advisable. 
The potential of the undirected-diary method is, however, not limited to 
its ability to produce very long retention intervals. One of its strongest points is 
its ability to produce verifiable autobiographical event information which can 
form the dependent measure in a study of memory. As well as the aspects of 
memory investigated in Experiment 6, the undirected-diary method might also 
be useful for the investigation of, for example, emotional aspects of 
autobiographical memory: Experiment 5 found that a considerable amount of 
material relating to emotional aspects of autobiographical events is contained 
in diaries. 
Overall, the undirected-diary method appears to be a valuable method for 
the investigation of autobiographical memory, and, as noted in Chapter 3, 
overcomes some of the problems associated with conducting ecologically valid 
memory research. It provides the opportunity for an experimenter to increase 
the control he or she has over an experimental set-up; for example, it allows 
one to be reasonably sure that subjects actually experienced the events which 
they are attempting to recall. Furthermore, diary records, recorded with no 
prior knowledge of their use in research, are likely to contain information 
unobtainable by any other means. Finally, the success of Experiment 6, Part b, 
(the investigation of retrospective duration estimation of autobiographical 
events), in particular, is in part the direct result of the use of the undirected-
diary method. 
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6.2 Autobiographical Event Memory 
Autobiographical memory plays an important part in conversation 
(Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Larsen & Plunkett, 1987; Linton, 1986; Reiser, 
Black & Kalamarides, 1986), and in the determination of one's activities and 
responses (Kolodner, 1983; Ross, 1984). Conversation frequently centres around 
one's recent experiences, while one's activities and responses are often 
mediated by past experience. Autobiographical memory, therefore, directly 
affects our behaviour. Without the ability to recall past experiences, one might 
have difficulty coping in a social situation where 'striking up' a conversation 
might be appropriate; and, perhaps most importantly, one may make the same 
'mistake' twice. Hence, there are very good reasons for studying 
autobiographical memory. 
6.2.1 Remembering 
As an answer to the question 'What did the subjects in Experiment 6, 
Part a, remember?', one could provide an overall percent value, such as the 
subjects indicated they remembered 76.4 percent of the spontaneous events. 
However, because recognized events, that is events the subjects claimed to 
have recognized after all the event aspect cues had been presented, were 
counted as remembered, this proportion may be an overestimation of 
autobiographical event memory. It is possible subjects claimed they recognized 
an event when in fact they did not. 
The inverse relationship between remembering an event and retention 
interval (shown in Figure 5.2), which is reasonably consistent with the studies 
of Linton (1982), Wagenaar (1986), and White (1982), however, suggests that the 
subjects may have been accurate when stating they recognized an event. A 
similar relationship between autobiographical event memory and retention 
interval has also been observed in studies which have used Galton's method, 
that is, where subjects have been required to recall and date specific experiences 
in response to word prompts (e.g., Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; McCormack, 
1979), and in studies which have examined the temporal distribution of the 
free-recall (i.e., without prompts) of autobiographical memories (e.g., Rubin, 
1982; Rubin & Kozin, 1984). 
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It was, however, noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 that the subjects' 
remembering of spontaneous events appeared to be better than that achieved 
by Wagenaar (1986), in that overall more events were remembered. This result 
could indicate that the subjects' claims of event recognition were not accurate. 
An alternative, and perhaps more likely reason for this result is that the 
spontaneous events used in this study were more salient than those used by 
Wagenaar. Wagenaar recorded 2402 events over a five year period which 
suggests some of his events may have been reasonably 'trivial'. In contrast, the 
spontaneous events used in this study were significant enough for the subjects 
to have recorded them in their diaries. On the other hand, inspection of the 
spontaneous event categorization labels shown in Table 4.3, suggests that the 
spontaneous events used in this study are typical of the sort of autobiographical 
events one might routinely recall in conversation. 
More detailed information on event memory is given by the results of 
the event aspect cueing procedure. These results, of course, relate to the recall 
of specific aspects of an event, but probably also reflect remembering of the 
event. That is, if a subject, for example, remembered correctly who was 
involved in an event and its general nature, after having only been told where 
it occurred, it is probably fair to assume he or she remembered the event. 
Consistent with Wagenaar's (1986) study, the different event aspects were 
found to have different values as retrieval cues, and their efficiency as a 
prompt to autobiographical event recall can be ordered 'what', 'where' and 
'who' from the most to least effective (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3). As suggested in 
Chapter 5, this ranking probably reflects differences in the uniqueness of the 
three event aspects and may suggest that autobiographical events are stored in 
memory in terms of their most distinct or unique aspect. In general the 'what' 
of an event is likely to be its most unique aspect. 
If autobiographical events are stored in memory in terms of a 
uniqueness criterion, 'who' and 'where' would not generally meet this 
criterion. Storing an event in terms of 'who' or 'where' would be useful if one 
was involved in the same activity in a new location with different people every 
day. However, in reality this is rarely the case. Rather the opposite is generally 
true. That is, one tries to engage in different activities as frequently as possible, 
but because one usually lives in one place and knows a limited number of 
people, such activities frequently involve the same people and occur in the 
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same places. Indeed, examination of the subjects' diary material suggested this 
was true for the subjects in this study; events often involved the same 
individuals in the same place, but the nature of the event was different. For 
example, a subject and his or her close friend may have seen 25 movies at the 
same cinema, the Who and Where of the events are the same, but the What -
the movie - is different in each case. 
The subjects' indications of why they could not give a response in the 
event aspect cueing procedure also suggests the unique aspect of an event is 
stored in memory. Subjects generally indicated they could not recall other 
event aspects on the basis of a single cue because the cue applied to too many 
events, particularly if the cue provided was 'who' or 'where' (see Table 5.4). In 
other words, it was difficult to recall an autobiographical event on the basis of 
non-unique event aspect information. These results are also consistent with 
the overall nature of forgetting. The failure to recall a complete event was 
frequently attributed to there being too many similar events. 
6.2.2 Failure to Remember 
Failure to remember autobiographical events has been attributed to 
insufficient distinguishability of the events to be recalled ( Linton, 1975, 1979, 
1982; White, 1982), insufficient retrieval cues (Linton, 1982), and the 
transformation or abstraction of memory content over time (Linton, 1982); the 
latter two reasons being somewhat related. 
As noted, subjects in Experiment 6, Part a, generally reported they could 
not remember a spontaneous event because it was too similar to other events 
they had experienced - defined as forgotten-similar (see Table 5.5). Essentially, 
these events were not 'forgotten'. Rather, the subject determined that the 
described event could be one of many similar events and that the probability of 
recalling the specific event in a reasonable time, with the limited cues 
available, was too small to justify continuing. Marshall and Fryer (1978) 
suggested that this situation can be seen as a 'trade-off', where search time and 
effort are weighed against the probability of retrieving the required 
information. 
It is not surprising that similarity to other events was the main reason 
given for forgetting; individuals do engage in many events which are 
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essentially the same. Although any event has the potential to become a 
frequently occurring event, some events are more likely to fall into this 
category than others. Indeed, analysis in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3 found that 
some types of events were particularly likely to be forgotten-similar (e.g., baby-
sitting) when compared to other events such as accidents (see Table 5.6). 
Furthermore, the more trivial the event, perhaps the more likely it is to be one 
of many similar events, which may account for Wagenaar's (1986) memory 
performance. 
In addition to events not recalled because of similarity to other events, a 
number of events were not recognized at all by the subjects (defined as 
forgotten-foreign), suggesting that the required event information may have 
been lost from memory. Alternatively, the retrieval cues provided may have 
been insufficient. That is, an event a subject did not recognize at all may have 
been remembered if sufficient information had been supplied. Furthermore, 
no indication of why the forgotten-foreign events were forgotten was found 
when this type of event forgetting was examined across different types of 
events: type of event was not related to this reason for event forgetting (see 
Table 5.6). 
Relating to the value of retrieval cues, Linton (1982) noted that: 'With 
the passage of every year the cues become more 'contrived' and removed from 
both my contemporeous memory organization and from cues that I would 
spontaneously employ to elicit these memories" (p. 79). The possibility of 
transformation of memory content over time suggests that the cues provided 
in Experiment 6, Part a, may have been insufficient for recall because they 
described the event at the time of its occurrence (its diary description) rather 
than its present memory representation. Evidence of the transformation of an 
event's memory with time is seen in the unsolicited responses made by some 
subjects when dating 'exactly dated' events (see Table 5.19). For an 'Attending 
movie/ theatre' event and a 'Field trip' event the subjects indicated at the time 
the events were dated that they were the 'first' date/meeting with a long time 
friend (boyfriend/girlfriend). Hence, the subject's memory of these events 
probably had changed with the passage of time. 
An event may also have been encoded in memory at the time of its 
occurrence in a different way to that described by the event aspect cues (its diary 
description). Evidence in support of this also comes from the events in 
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Experiment 6, Part a, that were exactly dated. The unsolicited subject responses 
indicated the hidden nature of some of these events, for example, the horse 
riding event was dated exactly because it occurred on a friend's birthday, it may 
therefore have been encoded in memory as part of a friend's birthday 
celebration rather than a ride on a horse. It is, therefore, possible that subjects 
would have remembered some forgotten-foreign events if they had been 
described in a different way. 
The above discussion of why events were forgotten might also explain 
why no significant difference in retention interval between the forgotten-
similar and forgotten-foreign events was found. As time passes, more 
occurrences of similar events are likely to occur. Therefore, the 
distinguishability of one particular occurrence, be it a recent or remote 
occurrence, will diminish over time. Hence, forgotten-similar events can be 
both recent and remote events. 
Forgotten-foreign events, on the other hand, could also have occurred 
recently or long ago. Both recent and remote forgotten-foreign events could be 
the result of insufficient retrieval cues, specifically, the possibility the event 
might have been described in a different way by the presented cues to the way it 
was originally encoding in memory. Furthermore, remote forgotten-foreign 
events, in particular, may also reflect the abstraction or transformation of 
memory content over time; the other reason why retrieval cues may have been 
insufficient. 
6.2.3 Organization of Autobiographical Memory 
The results outlined above, and their interpretation, provide a basis from 
which to discuss the organization of autobiographical memory in terms of the 
processes of encoding, storage and retrieval. In this section, these three aspects 
of memory are discussed both separately, and in terms of how they relate to 
each other. 
Fitzgerald (1986), in defining autobiographical memory, suggested that 
such memories are "stored without the benefit of conscious memory goal 
activities on the part of the individual" (p. 122). This may be generally true: 
one does not usually think, for example, 'I must remember this game of 
tennis'. However, autobiographical experiences (events) form the basis of 
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semantic memory, or, as defined in Chapter 1, 'the generalized knowledge a 
person has about the world'. Semantic memory is the product of 
autobiographical experiences. Hence, specific aspects of an autobiographical 
experience may be actively encoded in a learning type manner. For example, 
one probably learns how to make toast by actually making it. When learning 
the task, the individual notes the steps involved (tries to remember them). 
However, at the same time, the individual probability does not consciously 
think of remembering his or her first experience of making toast. 
It is, therefore, perhaps best to consider the encoding of autobiographical 
experiences, a process which can involve the active encoding of specific aspects 
of general knowledge (e.g., how to make toast). However, generally the 
experience of an event is all that is registered in memory, and this encoding is 
probably not the consequence of a conscious activity. 
Autobiographical event information stored in memory may take the 
form of unique event information, one remembers having experienced an 
event. Furthermore, a specific aspect of knowledge obtained from an 
experience may also be stored in memory. The storage of unique event 
information and specific aspects of knowledge are both probably effected by 
repeated experience, although in a different way. Learning or the storage of 
specific knowledge is enhanced with repeated experience, and, at the same 
time, the unique event memory is transformed into a generalized 
representation or schema (Schank & Abelson, 1977) which contains the 
distinguishing feature of the particular type of event or experience. As 
illustrated in Experiment 6, Part a, the occurrence of many similar events is 
paralleled by an inability to recall a specific occurrence. Yet the s~bjects knew 
the event described had actually occurred (recognized the event), which 
suggests such events are stored in memory as a generalized representation. 
Such reasoning suggests that retrieval from autobiographical memory 
can be either reconstructive or represent the direct access of a unique 
experience, or specific piece of knowledge. Evidence of the direct access of 
unique experiences was found in Experiment 6, Part a, in that the subjects were 
able to recall some events correctly on the basis of a single cue. Some of these 
events were undoubtedly 'once in a life time' experiences which are unlikely to 
be represented in memory in a schematic form. Furthermore, the subjects' 
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indication of how they generated the responses was overwhelmingly, "I 
remembered", rather than I guessed or inferred. 
The notion that recall is often reconstructive is not new in the field of 
memory research, and it is frequently cited as Bartlett's (1932) principal legacy to 
modern psychology (Edwards & Middleton, 1987). More recently Barclay (1986) 
has provided empirical evidence for the reconstructive nature of 
autobiographical memory. Evidence was also found in Experiment 6, Part a, 
that memory is often reconstructive. The day of the week on which an event 
had occurred was frequently reconstructed rather than remembered, similarly 
the dating of events was found to generally involve reconstructive processes 
(see Section 6.3.4). Furthermore, a reconstructive model is used to explain the 
estimates of autobiographical event duration obtained in Experiment 6, Part b 
(see Section 6.4.2). 
The subjects in Experiment 6, Part a, were reasonably good at 
determining what day of the week an event had occurred on, even if they could 
not actually remember the event (see Tables 5.7 & 5.8). However, the processes 
involved in determining this information were mediated by the actual day of 
the week that the event occurred on (see Table 5.9). Day of the week 
reconstruction, in particular, was associated with events that actually occurred 
on a Friday, Saturday or Sunday. As already suggested in Chapter 5, this is 
probably due to particular activities occurring almost exclusively on these days 
of the week. These results are in disagreement with those obtained by 
Friedman and Wilkins (1985), who found no evidence for day of the week 
reconstruction, although they did find that recall of day of the week 
information did not exhibit a systematic increase in error with increasing 
retention interval. Thompson (1982) also examined subjects' ability to recall 
day of the week information, noting that it was no better than the recall of date 
information. 
Day of the week information may be part of an event's schema if it is 
consistent enough to be a frequently occurring aspect of an event. For example, 
if a particular event almost always occurs on a Friday, part of the generalized 
representation of this event might be that it is a 'Friday' event. Friedman and 
Wilkins (1985) also noted that various events might be associated with a 
specific day of the week. 
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Furthermore, Friedman and Wilkins (1985) suggested th.at "several days 
might share many of the same associations" (p. 175), which might explain why 
the day of the week of events that actually occurred on Mondays, Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays and Thursdays were not frequently reconstructed in Experiment 6, 
Part a. Studies of temporal orientation (e.g., Koriat & Fischhoff, 1974; Koriat, 
Fischhoff & Razel, 1976; Shanon, 1979) support this interpretation. Week days 
(Monday through Thursday) appear to be relatively indistinguishable: the time 
a subject will take to tell you what day of the week it is for these week days are 
similar, whereas the response times for Friday, Saturday and Sunday are also 
similar, but generally shorter than for week days. Such results might also 
account for Thompson's (1982) findings, as the events that his subjects 
attempted to recall the day of the week for all occurred on week days (e.g., 
Monday through Friday). 
Overall, the organization of autobiographical memory seems to follow 
some reasonably straight forward steps. Memory routinely records that one has 
experienced an event. If some aspect of the event might be a useful piece of 
knowledge one may consciously register this information in memory. If one 
experiences an event similar to one previously experienced, the original event 
memory is updated if some aspect of the second experience suggests it should 
be. Hence, memory of a frequently occurring event becomes more abstract as 
more occurrences of this type of event are experienced, and at the same time it 
becomes more difficult to recall an actual occurrence. One's memory of an 
autobiographical event is likely to be directly accessed if (a) sufficient cues are 
provided for recall, and (b) the event is unique, not one of many similar events 
that have been experienced. If one tries to recall information about an event 
which is one of many similar events experienced the task is likely to be 
particularly difficult, although the abstract memory representation of the event 
will probably be sufficient for one to reconstruct some event information. 
6.3 Dating Autobiographical Events 
Three different situations in which an individual might make a 
duration estimate were used in this thesis. However, it was noted in Chapter 1 
that, although the dating of an event can be interpreted as a duration estimate 
(the date assigned to an event defines the time elapsed since its occurrence), the 
memory processes involved may be somewhat different to those used where 
the response is an actual duration estimate (e.g., 43 days). In order to examine 
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this possibility, and to allow the results obtained in Experiment 6, Part a, to be 
compared to other research on event dating, the subjects were asked to recall 
the date when their events had occurred, rather than how long ago they had 
occurred. 
6.3.1 The Relationship Between Actual and Assigned Date 
The relationship between actual and assigned date found in Experiment 
6, Part a, is similar to that reported in a number of other studies (e.g., Baddeley, 
Lewis & Nimmo-Smith, 1978; Brown, Rips & Shevell, 1985; Brown, Shevell & 
Rips, 1986; Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Lieury, Caplain, Jacquet & Jolivet, 1979; 
Livson & McNiell, 1962; Underwood, 1977; White, 1982 ), the two variables 
being positively correlated. The size of both the overall correlation and the 
within-subject correlations were also reasonably consistent with those reported 
in the above studies (see Table 5.10). 
Also of relevance to the present discussion is the remarkably high 
correlation obtained between actual and assigned date for the forgotten events. 
The subjects do appear to have been able to determine when an event they 
could not actually remember had occurred. A possible explanation for this was 
suggested in Chapter 5: the description of the event may have tied it to a 
particular point in time. For example, an individual named in a 'who' cue 
may have been someone the subject had had contact with only once, and, 
although the specific event being described could not be recalled, the 
approximate date of the event's occurrence could be reconstructed from this 
inform a tion. 
The subjects' ability to date forgotten events with some accuracy provides 
support for a reconstructive model of event dating. If date information was 
stored in memory as part of the memory trace for the event as a whole, and the 
event memory could not be accessed (remembered), the date information 
would also be unavailable. It is quite probable that the subjects' ability to 
produce a date for a forgotten event reflects the general nature of event dating; 
event dating does not generally involve direct access to date information, but 
rather the reconstruction of a date using the available information. 
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6.3.2 Dating Error: Absolute 
Overall, the subjects were about two months out in their determination 
of when their events had occurred (see Table 5.10). Although this is less than 
that found by Brown et al. (1985) and Underwood (1977), and more than that 
reported by Rubin (1982), and Loftus and Marburger (1983), methodological 
differences across the studies probably account for most of the between study 
variation. For example, as noted in Chapter 1, Loftus and Marburger (1983) 
counted dating errors greater than 7 days as 7 days (also see Section 6.3.5 in 
which a possible reason for between study absolute dating error differences is 
outlined). 
The obtained positive relationship between retention interval and 
absolute dating error (see Table 5.10) is consistent with that found in previous 
studies (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; Barclay & Wellman, 1986; Friedman & 
Wilkins, 1985; Lieury et al., 1979; Linton, 1975; Thompson, 1982, 1985a, 
1985b; Thompson, Showronski & Lee, 1988), as is the observed tendency for 
absolute dating error to decrease as event knowledge increased (e.g., Friedman 
& Wilkins, 1985; Kemp, 1988; Thompson,1982; 1985a; 1985b; White, 1982). The 
latter trend was, however, not significant in Experiment 6, Part a, when 
examined across events that varied in the degree to which they were 
remembered, but was significant when the comparison was between 
remembered and forgotten events; the latter events being dated significantly 
less accurately (see Table 5.12). This result suggests that the extent to which an 
event is remembered has only a limited effect on dating accuracy. 
The finding in Experiment 6, Part a, that the degree of event knowledge 
for remembered events did not significantly affect dating accuracy (absolute 
error), may indicate that the knowledge ratings used in other studies which 
have found a significant relationship between event knowledge and dating 
accuracy (e.g., Kemp, 1988; Thompson, 1982; 1985a; 1985b; White ,1982) are not a 
particularly sensitive measure of event knowledge. Event knowledge in 
Experiment 6, Part a, was objectively assessed through the use of the event 
aspect cueing procedure, which may be more sensitive to between event 
knowledge differences than scale ratings. Alternatively, the autobiographical 
events used in this study may have generally been better remembered than the 
events used in the above studies. Hence, between event knowledge differences 
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in this study may not have been sufficient to produce an overall significant 
effect of event knowledge on dating accuracy. 
Dating accuracy (absolute error) also varied significantly between the 
forgotten-similar and forgotten-foreign events, the latter events being dated 
more accurately (see Figure 5.4). This result is consistent with the explanation 
proposed above to account for the subjects' .ability to date events they could not 
actually remember: the forgotten-similar events were probably more difficult to 
tie to a specific point in time. By definition, this type of event forgetting 
resulted because the event was possibly one of many similar events which 
might well have occurred over a number of years, thus making the task of 
determining the date of a specific occurrence particularly difficult. 
Similarity between the remembered and forgotten events was found 
when dating error was examined in terms of the time scales used, that is, in 
terms of the subjects' ability to assign an event to the correct year, correct year 
and month, and correct year, month and day of the month (see Table 5.11). For 
both the remembered and forgotten events, the subjects' ability to correctly date 
an event diminished as the time scale used became more precise. Placing an 
event in the correct year was achieved quite frequently, while getting the actual 
day of the month right was a relatively rare occurrence. Again date response 
characteristics appear to be largely independent of event memory, which argues 
for date reconstruction. This result also suggests that the subjects' ability to 
reconstruct a date may be limited. Reconstruction may provide a means of 
generating an approximate date, perhaps year and month, but is not very 
efficient as a means of providing the more precise component of day of the 
month. 
6.3.3 Dating Error: Signed 
Overall, the events dated in Experiment 6, Part a, were dated more 
recently than they'had actually occurred (see Table 5.13). That is, there was a 
slight tendency for event age to be underestimated, a result frequently found in 
dating studies (Kemp, 1988). The regression analysis, however, indicated that 
the actual age of the event affected the sign of the dating error, with the age of 
recent events tending to be overestimated and the age of remoter events being 
underestimated, a finding which is also typically found in studies which have 
examined event dating (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; Brown et al., 1985; Ferguson 
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& Martin, 1983; Gibril, 1976; Kemp, 1988; Lieury, Aiello, Lepreux & Mellet, 1980; 
Lieury et a1., 1979; Loftus & Marburger, 1983). Further evidence of a 
relationship between signed error and retention interval was found when 
these two variables were correlated for each subject; all of the obtained 
correlations were positive (see Table 5.13). 
Signed error was also examined in relation to event knowledge, but no 
significant trends were observed (see Table 5.14). Thus in contrast to Brown et 
al. (1985), but consistent with the findings of Kemp (1988) and Thompson et al. 
(1988), the age of the better remembered events was not significantly 
underestimated. There was also no significant difference in the sign of dating 
error between the remembered and forgotten events, which suggests that the 
tendency for the older events to be dated too recently was not due to the age of 
forgotten events being underestimated (as already noted, more events were 
forgotten as retention interval increased). 
The effect of boundaries on event dating was also examined. As noted in 
Chapter I, Section 1.3.3, Huttenlocker, Hedges and Prohaska (1988) and Rubin 
and Baddeley (1989) have suggested that systematic dating errors may be the 
result of boundary effects: i.e., assigned dates will move towards the centre of 
the boundaries defined by a subject's submitted diaries because the subjects will 
not assign dates outside the boundary markers. Figure 5.5 generally supported 
this suggestion showing that most of the subjects gave date responses which 
were inside the boundaries defined by their submitted dairies. Therefore, 
signed dating errors for the remote and recent events probably were generally 
positive and negative respectively. 
Furthermore, Experiment 6, Part a, established that absolute dating error 
was positively related to retention intervaL Thus there was more dating error 
associated with the older events and the boundary effects would suggest the 
signed error for these events would be positive. Hence, more dating errors 
would be positive, which is in fact what the overall positive signed error 
obtained in Experiment 6, Part a, indicated. 
In conclusion, the date assigned to an event is not very likely to be 
exactly correct. Dating accuracy appears to vary systematically with retention 
interval. In this respect the recall of date information is similar to the recall of 
other event information in that recall performance decreases as retention 
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interval increases. There is some evidence that how well one remembers an 
event will affect the accuracy of a date assigned to it. However, an approximate 
date can usually be assigned even if one can not remembered the event being 
dated (it is forgotten). Although the reason why one can not remember an 
event will generally determine how accurate this approximate date will be. 
Finally, the nature of dating errors (under- or over-estimation of event age) 
also varies with retention interval. No evidence that this effect is the result of 
between event knowledge differences was found. Some evidence of boundary 
effects were, however, found, and which appear to adequately account for the 
signed error results obtained in this experiment. 
6.3.4 A Model of Autobiographical Event Dating 
Overall, the subjects' indications of how they dated their events both 
support a reconstructive model of event dating and are consistent with other 
studies which have examined how events are dated (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1978; 
Brown et al., 1986; Friedman & Wilkins, 1985; Linton, 1975; Loftus & 
Marburger, 1983; Robinson, 1986; Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1988; 
Wagenaar, 1986; White, 1982). Furthermore, some of the results discussed 
above, as noted, suggest that the date assigned to an event is reconstructed 
rather than directly accessed. 
Reconstructive dating in Experiment 6, Part a, was generally based on the 
use of before and after event landmark events, and information given in the 
event aspect cues presented (see Table 5.15). The unsolicited responses 
(statements) that some subjects made when dating events provide. some 
information on the nature of landmark events (see Table 5.19). The actual date 
of birthdays and public holidays appear to be particularly likely to be 
remembered and were apparently used by the subjects to date events: used as 
landmark events. Furthermore, more of the unsolicited responses referred to 
autobiographical events (birthdays) than public events which is consistent with 
other research which has found that subjects generally prefer to use personal 
landmark events when dating events (e.g., Brown et al., 1986; Friedman & 
Wilkins, 1985; Lieury et al., 1980). 
Examination of the dating strategies adopted for each date component 
(see Table 5.15), however, suggests that the year and month component were 
quite frequently reconstructed, whereas the day of the month component was 
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more often guessed than reconstructed. Describing event dating as generally 
reconstructive may, therefore, be an overgeneralization: generally only part of 
an event's date is reconstructed. This, of course, suggests that reconstructed 
dates may be in error because the reconstructive process is limited in its ability 
to generate a complete date: some guessing is still required. Furthermore, 
dating strategy adoption also varied with retention interval and event 
knowledge; these results are, however, interpretable within a reconstructive 
model of event dating. 
Examination of the relationship between dating strategy adopted and 
retention interval (see Table 5.17) indicated that more date information was 
said to be remembered at shorter retention intervals and that guessing 
increased as retention interval increased for all three date components. The 
proportion of reconstructive dating, on the other hand, was relatively constant 
as retention interval increased for the month and day of the month 
components. Together these results suggest, in relation to month and day of 
the month date components, that when a relatively recent event's date can not 
be recalled an attempt is made to reconstruct it, but when the event is relatively 
old, a guess is made rather than an attempt at reconstruction. These results are 
consistent with date reconstruction using landmark events: fewer events are 
recalled as retention interval increases, thus fewer landmark events may be 
available for the reconstructive dating of relatively old events. 
Robinson (1986) suggested that landmark events "may be said to 
constitute a person's 'temporal frame of reference'" (p. 162), and that any 
particular month may vary in its importance for this temporal reference system 
because of the density of marker events it contains. The above results suggest 
that years may also vary in their importance in a temporal reference system; 
not, however, because a particular year is likely to have more or less marker 
events, but because fewer of these events are likely to be recalled as time passes. 
Thus landmark event availability might be inversely related to -retention 
interval. 
The observed relationship between event knowledge and date 
reconstruction (see Table 5.18) for the month and day of the month date 
components is also consistent with the above interpretation. When event 
memory was relatively strong, but the subject could not remember the date of 
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the event, the subject preferred to try and reconstruct the date, whereas the 
dates of the poorly remembered events were guessed. 
The year component appears to have shown a quite different 
relationship between retention interval and date reconstruction, and between 
event knowledge and date reconstruction. Reconstruction of the year 
component increased as retention interval increased and event knowledge 
decreased. Such results, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
preceding reasoning. Perhaps fewer landmark events are needed to reconstruct 
the year than the month or day of the month: subjects were able to produce 
more correct year of occurrence information than month or day of the month 
information (see Table 5.11). 
The reconstruction of an event's date is a rather complex process, and 
may only be used to generate part of an event's date, generally year and month 
information. Furthermore, the age of the event and how well it is 
remembered appear to determine if these date components, particularly the 
month component, will be reconstructed. Event dating is ,therefore, not 
generally reconstructive. Rather, when the conditions are right a conscious 
attempt will be made to reconstruct the date using landmark events and 
information recalled about the event; otherwise a date response will generally 
be a guess. 
6.3.5 Inconsistencies in Event Dating Studies 
A number of dating studies have produced inconsistent results. For 
example, Brown et aL (1985) found a mean absolute dating error of 11 months, 
and Underwood (1977) a similar value of 15 months, while Rubin (1982) found 
an overall median absolute error of only 3 days. Although the former studies 
reported a mean value and the latter a median value it seems unlikely the 
choice of statistic would account for the marked difference. Furthermore, 
between study retention interval differences seem unlikely to account for the 
absolute error difference: the events in Brown et aI's study occurred up to five 
years before the experiment, while Rubin's subjects used their diaries to check 
assigned dates and these diaries covered on average 6 years. It is more likely 
that the difference is related to the type of events dated. Brown et aL (1985) and 
Underwood (1977) both had subjects date public events, whereas Rubin's 
subjects dated autobiographical events. 
184 
One difference between dating studies which use autobiographical events 
and those which use public events is that in the latter type of study it is 
generally assumed that the subjects learnt of the events at the time of their 
occurrence. Two factors primarily affect the validity of this assumption; (a) the 
diffusion of public event information and, (b) the possibility of acquisition of 
event information long after an event's occurrence. 
Information on events 'covered' by the media has the potential to 
become public knowledge, but at the individual level one's exposure to media 
sources (e.g., newspaper reading, watching television) largely determines if an 
individual will have heard of a specific event. The extent of media coverage is 
also important, although generally public events used in dating research have 
received extensive media coverage. This situation has prompted some authors 
to suggest that research using public events can not be validly conducted using 
subjects that are not interested in 'news' (e.g., Erickson and Scott, 1977; Sander, 
1972). Support for this position was found in a study by Johnson and Klingler 
(1976) in which rated interest in 'news' was found to be positively correlated 
with public event knowledge. 
Furthermore, interest in the 'news' is a complex dimension mediated by 
at least age and education and possibly also sex differences. Education is 
reported to be positively correlated to self-exposure to public event information 
(e.g., Gaziano, 1983; Robinson, 1967; Schramm and White, 1949; Tichenor, 
Donohue and O'lien, 1980; Wade and Schramm, 1969), and to public event 
knowledge (e.g., Botwinick and Storandt, 1974; Deutschmann and Danielson, 
1960; Johnson & Klingler, 1976). Similarly, media use increases significantly 
with age (e.g., McCombs & Poindexter, 1983; Schramm & White, 1949). 
However, not only does the amount of self exposure to the media increase with 
age but also the type of information sought changes. Primarily, individuals 
first seek entertainment from the media, and around the age of 12 they begin to 
use the media to obtain information on public events (Peterson, Jensen and 
Rivers, 1965; Schramm & White, 1949). This increase in media use and change 
in emphasis with age has been found to be positively related to public event 
knowledge (e.g., Atkin and Gantz, 1978; Chaffee, Ward and Tipton, 1970; 
Conway, Stevens and Smith, 1975; Johnson & Klingler, 1976). 
The evidence relating to a sex difference in media use is unclear: Weber 
and Fleming (1983) found that males used the media as a source of public event 
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information more than females. However, a similar study by McCombs and 
Poindexter (1983) did not find a sex difference. A sex difference such as that 
observed by Weber & Fleming might, however, account for the finding that 
males consistently score higher on tests of public event knowledge (e.g., 
Botwinick and Storandt, 1974; Deutschmann and Danielson, 1960; Robinson, 
1967; Weber and Fleming, 1983). 
There are, therefore, a number of factors which can affect whether an 
individual learnt. of a specific public event at the time of its occurrence. Careful 
selection of the public events used in research can increase the likelihood that 
events are used that were learnt of when they occurred. Some events, for 
example the assassination of J. F. Kennedy, have such an impact and have 
drawn the concentrated and simultaneous focus of all the media, that over 90 
percent of public samples report knowing of the event's occurrence within one 
day (Deutschmann and Danielson, 1960; Gaziano, 1983). However, a percentage 
of the population, often referred to as 'chronic knownothings' (Gaziano, 1983) 
or 'the unenlightened' (Robinson, 1967), will never hear of such events. 
Using well-known public events in research can, unfortunately, increase 
the likelihood that the subject learnt of the event long after its occurrence, as 
information about 'significant' public events is available in, for example, 
historical texts and almanacs. However, studies that have investigated the 
extent of post-event information acquisition (e.g., Squire, 1974; Squire, Chase 
and Slater, 1975) have generally found that it is minimal. Furthermore, 
research on media behaviour has reported that daily sources (e.g., newspapers 
and television and radio news broadcasts) are generally where people obtain 
information on public events (e.g., Adams, 1981; Weber and Fleming, 1983). 
Overall, there is some basis for questioning the validity of the 
assumption that individuals learn of public events at the time of their 
occurrence. Thus, there is a possible discrepancy between the date an event 
occurred on and the date the subject learnt of its occurrence. In terms of 
reconstructing the date of a public event this situation could produce an 
increase in dating error. 
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6.4 Retrospective Duration Estimation 
In Experiments 2 and 4, retrospective duration estimates of public events 
were obtained, while in Experiment 6, Part b, similar responses were obtained 
for autobiographical events. Overall, the experimental design was dictated by 
the experimental hypothesis being tested; Ornstein's (1969) 'storage size' 
hypothesis. However, failure to find support for this hypothesis in Experiment 
2 prompted the formulation of a reconstructive model of duration estimation, 
and largely determined the experimental design of Experiments 3 and 4. 
Experiment 6, Part b, also failed to find any support for Ornstein's hypothesis, 
and as noted in Chapter 5, produced results which are consistent with the 
subjects reconstructing event duration. 
6.4.1 Ornstein's Model of Duration Estimation 
The fact that event knowledge was found to be variable over the 
different public and autobiographical events used, enabled a test of Ornstein's 
model. In Experiments 1 and 2, the significant negative correlation between 
retention interval and event knowledge was consistent with Ornstein's (1969) 
prediction that "when some period elapses before an interval is to be 
judged ... some items should drop out of storage" (p. 48). Retention interval 
was, however, not significantly correlated with event knowledge in 
Experiment 6, Part b, although the knowledge ratings did vary between events, 
allowing Ornstein's model to be tested. 
The lack of a systematic decrease in rated knowledge as retention interval 
increased observed in Experiment 6, Part b, might cast doubt on the validity of 
the ratings, but there is an alternative explanation. It may be that the retention 
interval range used in Experiment 6, Part b, was not sufficient for the older 
duration events to have faded from memory. In relation to event dating, 
events which occurred within a duration eventp such as the filled duration 
events used in Experiment 6, Part b, have been found to be dated quite 
accurately (e.g., White 1982). Furthermore, the reasonably small number of 
duration events that were found in the subjects' diaries suggest they are 
reasonably rare and thus are perhaps rather unique. It is therefore possible, 
particularly considering the amount of information which might be encoded 
during a duration event, that one's memory of such events might be 
reasonably good for a considerable period of time. 
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Overall, very little support was found for Ornstein's suggestion that the 
size of a duration estimate is directly proportional to the amount of 
information stored in memory from the interval which is being estimated. 
The results of Experiment 2, which did appear to support the storage size 
hypothesis, were more adequately interpreted through the formulation of the 
reconstructive model of duration estimation. This model suggests that the 
positive relationship found between event knowledge and estimated event 
duration reflects an increase in estimation accuracy as event knowledge 
increases. 
In Experiment 6, Part b, despite extensive analyses, little support was 
found for Ornstein's model. Overall, the subjects were very accurate at 
estimating the duration of events they had experienced (see Table 5.20). On the 
basis of this observation alone, one would be tempted to conclude that the 
subjects either actually remembered the duration of their events or 
reconstructed them. The duration of some of the events was perhaps actually 
remembered, although the majority were probably reconstructed. The 
reconstructive model of duration estimation is, of course, based on the 
assumption that duration information is encoded in memory at the time of an 
event's occurrence, thus there is the possibility of actually remembering an 
event's duration. 
6.4.2 The Reconstructive Model of Duration Estimation 
The reconstructive model of duration estimation outlined in Chapter 2 
is similar to other reconstructive accounts of memory. Information about 
unique experiences is encoded in memory, and repeated exposure to similar 
events creates or results in the formulation of a generalized representation or 
schema relating to that type of event. This form of abstraction provides a way 
of recalling information about particular types of events when the type of event 
is a frequently occurring one and one for which it is difficulty to keep track of 
specific occurrences. Evidence of this type of abstraction and retrieval failure 
was seen in the results of Experiment 6, Part a, relating to the forgotten-similar 
events. 
It has already been noted that the dating of events sometimes involves 
the use of general temporal knowledge. Thus one's representation of some 
events contains or has associated with it time information, in this case when 
188 
the particular event is likely to occur (e.g., in the summer). Furthermore, 
evidence was found in Experiment 6, Part a, that time information relating to 
the day of the week a particular type of event usually occurs on is also stored in 
the representation of some events. Overall, such findings support the 
suggestion that duration information may be stored in the memory system in a 
similar way. Indeed, why should the temporal aspect of duration be treated in a 
different way to, for example, the temporal aspect of day of the week by the 
memory system? 
Duration information is probably also a significant feature of some 
events, and as such would need to be included as an aspect of the memory 
representation of such events. Duration certainly is an essential aspect when 
defining some events. For example, one would need to emphasise the feature 
of duration when explaining to someone what a holiday was. A holiday 
without duration would not be a holiday. 
Duration information may, however, be slightly different to other 
aspects of information stored in an event's schema representation. Consider, 
for example, day of the week information. An event, such as going for drinks 
with your work colleagues, may almost always occur on a Friday, but 
sometimes occur on a Thursday. It is possible that the abstraction of day of the 
week information will ignore the occasional Thursday occurrence. Thus a 
Friday response would be given when asked what day of the week a particular 
drinks occasion took place on. Duration is also likely to vary over a definable 
range, or within specific boundaries for any specific type of event. For example, 
a holiday might last 2 or 22 days (Indeed, the events used in Experiment 6, Part 
b, are testimony to this; events given the same categorization label frequently 
varied slightly in terms of actual duration). However, in contrast to day of the 
week information, the memory system, when abstracting duration information 
may store duration range information rather than the most frequently 
occurring duration. That is, one remembers that a particular type of event lasts 
between X and Y days. This duration range information may be updated if an 
event occurs with a duration which is outside the stored range. 
Duration estimation, however, normally requires a single value rather 
than a range. A reconstructed duration estimate, therefore, represents a point 
somewhere within the stored range, perhaps near the most frequently 
occurring point or some other central value unless some information is 
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available which results in another point on the range being selected. This is 
where specific event knowledge, or actually remembering the event for which 
a duration estimate is being made, helps to increase estimation accuracy. The 
extent to which actual event knowledge will increase estimation accuracy will, 
however, probably depend on: (a) how typical, in terms of duration, the event 
being estimated is, and (b) the type of event's duration range. 
In the situation where the particular event for which duration 
information is required has an usually long or short duration ( in terms of 
duration, is very atypical), specific event knowledge may significantly increase 
estimation accuracy. However, if the duration is only slightly atypical, the 
effect on estimation accuracy of specific event knowledge would be less marked. 
Consider, for example, a type of event with a duration range of 6 to 10 days. An 
individual who can not recall the specific event may reconstruct a duration 
estimate somewhere between 6 and 10 days, perhaps 8 days. Now if the event 
being estimated had an atypical duration of, say, 12 days, the reconstructed 
duration estimate would be in error by 4 days. However, if the event's actual 
duration was 50 days (very atypical) the reconstructed duration estimate would 
be in error by 42 days. Thus the extent to which a specific event's duration is 
atypical determines the extent to which specific event knowledge can increase 
estimation accuracy, or inversely, decreases the estimation error associated with 
a reconstructed duration estimate. 
Evidence of the effect of how typical the duration of the event being 
estimated is and event knowledge was found in Experiments 2 and 4. The Pope 
John Paul I event (estimation of the reign of Pope John Paul I who died 
suddenly of a heart attack) might be considered to have an atypical duration, 
his reign of 33 days is reasonably short. Inspection of Table 2.3 indicates that the 
median duration estimate of the subjects who did not remember the event (330 
days) is reasonably large, while the median duration estimate of the subjects 
that did remember the event (73.5 days) is somewhat closer to the event's 
actual duration. Table 2.5 shows a similar pattern for this event. 
As noted, the duration range of an event can also effect the accuracy of a 
reconstructed duration estimate. If the duration range is relatively large, say a 
particular type of event could last from 20 to 80 days, a reconstructed duration 
estimate for this type of event may be somewhere around 60 days. If its actual 
duration was 79 days, estimation error would be 19 days. On the other hand, if 
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the event's duration range was relatively small, say the event could last from 
70 to 80 days, a reconstructed duration estimate might be 75 days, and the 
estimation error would only be 4 days. Thus the duration range of a type of 
event also affects the accuracy of a reconstructed duration estimate, and the 
extent to which actual event knowledge can increase estimation accuracy. 
This discussion of the reconstructive model of duration estimation has 
gone beyond a simple interpretation of the experimental results, but in doing 
so has illustrated the complex nature of the model. Experiments designed to 
test factors such as the storage of event duration range information in memory, 
the proposed links between how typical a specific event is in terms of duration 
and the accuracy of a reconstructed estimate, and the relationship between the 
size of the duration range of a type of event and a reconstructed duration 
estimate's accuracy, would help refine the model. However, even in its 
present form it appears the most adequate account of retrospective duration 
estimation currently available. 
6.4.3 The Effect of Ecological Validity on Duration Estimation 
Characteristics 
Two factors primarily distinguish the duration estimation experiments 
used in this study ( Experiments 1 through 4 and Experiment 6, Part b) from 
those which have typically been used to investigate duration estimation. First, 
the events were typical of those experienced in everyday life, and for which 
duration information might be routinely recalled. That is, in contrast to 
traditional duration estimation research, the intervals which subjects estimated 
the duration of were not manufactured by the experimenter. Rather they were 
specific events in the past that were identified as having a definite duration. 
Second, actual event duration was relatively long. 
Hence, Experiments 1 through 4 and Experiment 6, Part b, in contrast to 
previous investigations of the estimation of duration, have a degree of 
ecological validity. The most obvious effect of this was that it allowed the 
subjects the opportunity to reconstruct event duration. They were able to use 
past experience in a way not permit by Ebbinghaus type experiments. It is 
therefore, not surprising that little support for Ornstein's model was found; his 
model was based on the results of Ebbinghaus type experiments. 
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A number of studies which have reported duration estimates of 
everyday life events were discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.5. The general 
tendency observed in these studies was for event duration to be overestimated 
(e.g., Douglas & Blomfield, 1956; Mednick & Shaffer, 1963; Schneider, Griffith, 
Sumi & Burcart, 1978). Little evidence of a general tendency towards event 
duration overestimation was, however, found in Experiment 6, Part b. 
Although the overall median estimated duration was 1.0 day larger than the 
overall median actual duration, the overall median signed error of 0.0 days 
indicates the estimates were not generally over- or under-estimations of actual 
event duration (see Table 5.20). The overall median signed error for the empty 
duration events was, however, 1.0 day indicating a slight tendency towards 
event duration overestimation for these events (see Table 5.21), although, as 
noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1, the duration estimates of the filled and empty 
duration events were not significantly different. 
Two conclusion can be draw from the above results. First, type of event, 
filled or empty duration, did not have a marked effect on duration estimation, 
a result which is inconsistent with traditional duration estimation research i.e., 
the filled duration illusion. Indeed, the overall median actual and median 
estimated duration were identical for both the filled and empty duration events 
(see Table 5.21). Second, duration estimates of autobiographical events are 
equally likely to overestimations as underestimations. In fact the results 
suggest they are quite likely to be very accurate. 
There is, however, some similarity between the duration estimation 
results obtained in Experiment 2 and Experiment 6, Part b, and those typically 
obtained in traditional duration estimation studies. As noted in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1.1, the actual duration of the stimulus interval has been found to 
affect duration estimation, with duration over- and under-estimation typically 
being associated with short and long stimulus intervals, respectively (Eisler, 
1976; Kane & Lown, 1986; Kowal, 1987). Stimulus interval duration has, 
however, generally been manipulated within a rather small range, that is, long 
stimulus intervals have generally not exceeded one minute. In contrast, actual 
duration in this study ranged from 2 to 448 days in Experiments 2 through 4, 
and from 3 to 550 days in Experiment 6, Part b. However, despite this marked 
actual duration difference, the regression analysis of both Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 6 , Part b, indicated a tendency for short duration events to be 
overestimated and long duration events to be underestimated. Furthermore, 
i 
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the exponent of .86 obtained in Experiment 6, Part b, is particularly close to the 
.9 value which Eisler (1976) obtained in his review of 111 duration estimation 
studies. It might, therefore, be concluded that the duration estimation of 
relatively long events is subject to similar actual duration effects to those 
observed in the duration estimation of relatively short intervals. This overall 
result also suggests that duration estimates under laboratory conditions, and 
somewhat more ecologically valid conditions, are in some respects similar. 
The exponent of .86 obtained in Experiment 6, Part b, is, however, 
somewhat different to the exponent of .50 obtained in Experiment 2. Although 
the latter exponent does indicate a systematic change in duration estimation 
with actual duration, the tendency is not as evident as in Experiment 6, Part b. 
The regression analysis correlations of .69 for Experiment 2 and .81 for 
Experiment 6, Part b, as well as the correlations between estimated and actual 
duration r= .66, P< .05 and r=.85, P< .001 for Experiment 2 and Experiment 6, 
Part b, respectively, also vary somewhat between the experiments. 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 6, Part b, are different in that the former 
obtained duration estimates of public events, and the latter duration estimates 
of autobiographical events. Section 6.3.5 discussed the possible effect such a 
difference might have on event dating, suggesting that the uncertainty 
surrounding the acquisition of public event knowledge may be responsible for 
dating accuracy differences between public and autobiographical events, 
particularly if, as it appears, such dates are reconstructed. This discussion 
suggests autobiographical duration events may be better remembered than 
public duration events because obtaining information about the latter is largely 
mediated by one's exposure to the media, and may explain the between 
experiment differences noted above. 
The overall mean knowledge rating obtained for the public events 
(Experiment 2) of 2.6, and the autobiographical events (Experiment 6, Part b) of 
3.7 support the above suggestion: the autobiographical events were on average 
better remembered. Furthermore, comparison of the accuracy of the public and 
autobiographical event duration estimates indicates that generally the latter 
were more accurate (see Table 2.2 and Table 5.20). The correlations between 
actual and estimated event duration obtained in Experiment 2 and Experiment 
6, Part b, are further evidence of this. These results are also consistent with the 
positive effect of event knowledge on estimation accuracy proposed in the 
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reconstructive model of duration estimation, and may account for the public 
event/ autobiographical event exponent difference. 
The large exponent obtained for the estimation of autobiographical event 
duration in Experiment 6, Part b, probably reflects the fact that the estimates 
were closer to actual event duration because the events were reasonably well 
remembered. The small exponent obtained in Experiment 2, on the other 
hand, may reflect the fact that estimated duration was not closely related to 
actual event duration because the events were not particularly well 
remembered. 
The overall mean knowledge rating difference between the public 
duration events and the autobiographical duration events is consistent with 
the suggestion made in Chapter 1; that a depth of processing distinction might 
be made between these two types of event. Furthermore, examination of Table 
2.2 and Table 5.20 indicates that overall, the duration of public events was 
underestimated and the duration of autobiographical events was 
overestimated. This result could be interpreted as support for Ornstein's 
model of duration estimation, the better remembered events (the 
autobiographical events) were given larger duration estimates. However, 
considering the experiments generally did not find much evidence in support 
of Ornstein's model, it is more likely the above results reflect between 
experiment actual duration differences. The overall mean actual duration of 
the autobiographical events (29 days) is somewhat smaller than the average 
actual duration of the public events (58 days), therefore the above result may 
reflect the tendency for duration to be over- and under-estimated for short and 
long durations respectively. 
6.4.4 The Relationship Between Event Dating and Duration Estimation 
As noted, some authors have interpreted event dating as a type of 
retrospective duration estimate (e.g., Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Fraisse, 1984; 
Furlong, 1951). Essentially, the quantitative response given when dating an 
event can be transformed into a duration estimate: the estimate being the 
interval between the assigned date and the time or date when the event was 
dated. Date responses obtained in Experiment 6, Part a, were, however, not 
transformed into duration estimates. Despite this, the event dating results 
obtained in Experiment 6, Part a, are in one respect similar to the duration 
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estimation results obtained in Experiment 6, Part b, and Experiment 2. 
Furthermore, there are similarities in the processes proposed to account for 
duration estimation and event dating. 
Duration estimation and event dating appear to be similar in the 
relationship between actual and assigned values. In Experiment 6, Part a, the 
logarithm of assigned date was regressed on the logarithm of actual date and an 
exponents of .96 obtained. This exponent is very similar to that obtained in the 
regression analysis of the duration estimation data obtained in Experiment 6, 
Part b (e.g., .86) and indicates a similar tendency for assigned values to vary 
systematically with actual values. That is, the age of recent and remote 
autobiographical events was generally over- and under-estimated respectively, 
and for the autobiographical duration events the duration estimates were 
generally overestimations for short duration events and underestimations for 
long duration events. 
As noted, the models proposed to account for date and duration estimate 
responses are also similar in some respects. The discussion of event dating 
strategies suggests dates are sometimes reconstructed on the basis of generalized 
event knowledge (e.g., natural temporal patterns: one usually goes swimming 
in the summer), while the reconstructive model of duration estimation also 
suggests this reconstructive process is based on generalized event knowledge 
(e.g., a particular type of event usually lasts between X and Y days). 
Overall, there do appear to be similarities between date and duration 
estimation responses. Furthermore, it can be argued that responding to when 
questions and estimating the duration of an event involve to some extent 
similar memory processes. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The results of this study suggest that retrospective recall frequently 
involves reconstructive processes. Evidence was found in Experiment 6, Part a, 
that the date of an event is often reconstructed rather than directly accessed. 
Similarly, the day of the week on which an event occurred is often 
reconstructed. Furthermore, the results relating to subjects' failure to 
remember events because they were too similar to other events suggest that the 
general details of such events if requested are likely to be reconstructed rather 
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than directly recalled. Finally, the results of Experiments 2 through 4, and 
Experiment 6, Part b, suggest that the duration of both public events and 
autobiographical events are estimated using reconstructive processes. 
The apparent frequent use of reconstructive processes when recalling 
information suggests that one does not necessarily have to remember the 
required information in order to provide a reasonably accurate response. 
Subjects in Experiment 2 and 4 that could not remember the public events were 
able to provide reasonably accurate estimates of event duration. Similarly, the 
duration estimates of forgotten events in Experiment 6, Part b, were not unduly 
inaccurate. The accuracy of day of the week and date responses also appears to 
be somewhat independent of actual event memory. It is, of course, 
advantageous in terms of response accuracy for the event for which one is 
trying to recall information about to be actually remembered. But, on the other 
hand, one probably can be reasonably confident that, for example, a date and 
day of the week response for an event that can not be actually remembered will 
be reasonably accurate. 
In the course of everyday life, recalled temporal information which is 
only reasonably accurate may have to be sufficient. Indeed, even where the 
event for which such information is recalled is well remembered the temporal 
response is still likely to be inaccurate. If the accuracy of temporal information 
is vital, one might well be advised not to rely on recall, as on this dimension 
the memory system will generally fail. Recall accuracy is, of course, not usually 
vital, a reasonably accurate response will generally meet the requirements of 
everyday life. 
In conclusion, two aspects have been identified ,as the main features of 
this thesis, the development of the undirected-diary method, and 
reconstructive model of retrospective duration estimation. The development 
of a research method which is consistent with the scientific temper of 
contemporary memory research, in terms of its high ecological validity, might 
be considered a significant advance in terms of cognitive science. The 
reconstructive model of duration estimation, has also perhaps advanced 
cognitive science, in that it further illustrates the potential of the memory 
system to reconstruct information, and perhaps makes the concept of time in 
retrospect more readily interpretable. 
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APPENDIX A: Event Descriptions and Associated Duration 
Questions Used in Experiments 1 Through 4 
Event Description and Event 
Description Abbreviation 
(AM) Mr Aldo Moro, former 
Prime Minister of Italy I was 
kidnapped by the Red Brigade 
urban-guerrilla group. Some time 
later his body was found in the 
boot of a car in central Rome. 
(SAH) An argument developed 
over the legality of Sir Albert 
Henry's election tactics when his 
Cook Island Party flew a number 
of voters from Auckland to the 
Cook Islands to vote. His win in 
the elections was subsequently 
overturned and the Cook Island's 
Democratic Party assumed office. 
Duration Question 
How long after being kidnapped 
was AIdo Moro's body found? 
How long after the election was 
Sir Albert's party removed from 
office? 
(PPI) The previous Pope of the How long did Pope John Paul I 
Catholic Church, Pope John Paul reign for? 
I, died suddenly of a heart attack 
(PPII) Pope John Paul II went to How long was Pope John Paul II 
Poland to visit his homeland. It in Poland for? 
was the first visit by a Pope to a 
communist country. 
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(CD) 'Carless days' were 
introd uced in New Zealand as a 
petrol saving measure. The 
restrictions were relaxed on a 
number of occasions and finally 
completely withdrawn. 
(A) Landslips at Abbotsford, 
Dunedin, led to a state of 
emergency being introduced. 
(SB) United States officials held a 
Soviet airliner on the tarmac at 
New York's Kennedy Airport 
while they determined whether 
the Soviet ballerina on board, 
Lydumilla Vlasosa, was leaving 
the country of her own free-will. 
How long after their introduction 
were the 'carless days' restrictions 
completely withdrawn? 
How long did the state of 
emergency at Abbotsford last for? 
How long was the plane held at 
Kennedy airport for? 
(OUE) In Iran, students occupied How long were the United States 
the United States Embassy, taking Embassy hostages held for? 
a large number of hostages. They 
demanded the return of the Shah 
who was in hospital in the United 
States. Some time later the 
hostages were released and the 
occupation of the embassy ended. 
(GMM) In Saudi Arabia 300 
armed Shi'a rebels seized the 
Great Mosque at Mecca. Saudi 
troops later took the mosque by 
force. 
How long didShi'a rebels occupy 
the mosque for? 
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(PMC) Ex-BeatIe, Paul McCartney, 
was arrested at Narita 
International Airport, Japan, 
when customs inspectors alleged 
they found 220 grams of 
marijuana in his suitcase. He was 
later deported. 
(IEL) Gunmen burst into the 
Iranian Embassy in London and 
took a number of hostages. Some 
time later British troops stormed 
the embassy and freed the 
hostages. 
(MP) A play based on Maori 
protest issues, performed at 
Mangere College by the Maranga 
Mai cultural group, resulted in 
considerable controversy. 
(TJC) Terrence John Clark, alias 
Alexander James Sinclair, was 
tried and convicted in England for 
the murder of the drug boss 
Christopher Martin Johnstone. 
(L W) Polish trade union leader 
Lech Wales a led a solidarity 
delegation on an official visit to 
Rome. While he was there he 
was received by Pope John Paul II. 
How long after his arrest was 
McCartney deported? 
How long was it until British 
troops freed the hostages? 
How long did the play run for? 
How long did the trial run for? 
How long was Lech Wales a in 
Rome for? 
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(TPF) New Zealand's agricultural 
industry was relieved when tests 
revealed that the outbreak of 
vesicular disease on a Temuka pig 
farm was not foot and mouth. 
How long was it until the tests 
revealed that the disease was not 
foot and mouth? 
(PC) The freighter Pacific Charger, How long was the Pacific Charger 
on its maiden voyage from Japan, grounded for? 
had to be refloated after it ran 
aground on rocks at Boring Head, 
southwest of Wellington. 
(ST) The last South African 
Springbok rugby team's tour of 
New Zealand sparked off a 
sustained and violent protest 
against South Africa's apartheid 
policies. 
(RCF) In New Zealand's first 
industrial sit-in, 27 women and 2 
men, seeking redundancy 
payments, occupied the Rixen 
clothing factory in Levin. 
(SS) A Soviet submarine ran 
aground in Swedish territorial 
waters. Swedish officials detained 
the vessel. Some time later they 
released it. 
(F) Argentine Armed Forces 
invaded the Falkland Islands. 
How long were the Springboks in 
New Zealand for? 
How long did the sit-in last for? 
How long did Swedish officials 
detain the Soviet submarine for? 
How long did the Argentine 
Armed Forces have control of the 
Falkland Islands for? 
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(MC) A storm traps Mark Inglis How long were Mark Inglis and 
and Philip Doole on Mount Cook. Philip Doole trapped on Mount 
Cook for? 
(JD) In Italy, Brig-Gen James 
Dozier (Nato Deputy Chief of 
Staff) was kidnapped by Red-
Brigade terrorists. Some time 
la ter they released him 
unharmed. 
(AB) Savage bush-fires swept 
through parts of South Australia 
and Victoria. Sixty-nine people 
died and millions of dollars worth 
of property was destroyed. 
How long did the Red-Brigade 
terrorists detain James Dozier for? 
How long did the bush-fires last 
for? 
(R) Prince Charles, Prince of How long did the Royals stay in 
Wales, and Diana, Princess of New Zealand for? 
Wales, visited New Zealand with 
their son Prince William. It was 
Diana and William's first visit to 
New Zealand. 
(S) The West German magazine 
'Stern' announced the discovery 
of 60 volumes of Adolf Hitler's 
diaries. Some time later it 
announced that these were in fact 
forgeries. 
How long was it until the 
magazine announced that the 
diaries were forgeries? 
(H) More than 2000 people were How long did it take the march to 
involved in a hikoi or peace walk reach Waitangi? 
to protest against Waitangi Day 
celebrations. 
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(BDC) Bruce Douglas Cameron 
escaped from Oakley Psychiatric 
Hospital and threatened to release 
nerve gas. This initiated a 
nation-wide search resulting in 
his capture. 
How long was Bruce Douglas 
Cameron at large for? 
(YF) British police laid siege to the How long did the police siege last 
Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) for? 
after W.P.C. Yvonne Fletcher was 
killed when a gunman fired from 
the building. 
(GK) Gloria Kong was kidnapped 
at gunpoint from her Oamaru 
home. Some time later she 
managed to free herself. 
How long after being kidnapped 
did Gloria free herself? 
UK) John Kirk left New Zealand How long was John Kirk in the 
for the United States taking a large United States for? 
amount of money with him and 
leaving many debts behind. 
These led to his extradition from 
the United States to face 
bankruptcy charges. 
(W) The Christchurch Wizard 
resigned after his attempt to 
ensure the success of the 
Canterbury Rugby Team with a 
'spell' failed. Some time later he 
returned to the Christchurch 
Square. 
How long did the Wizard's 
resignation last for? 
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(BF) A baby, nicknamed "Baby How long after the operation did 
Fae", received a baboon heart in a "Baby Fae" die? 
life-saving transplant operation. 
However, sometime later 
complications developed and she 
died. 
(WC) White settlers rioted in 
New Caledonia over the French 
Socialist Government's handling 
of the Kanak (Melanesian) 
independence movement. 
How long did the rioting last for? 
(AL) Four Palestinian guerrillas How long were the guerillas in 
hijacked a cruise ship, the Achille charge of the ship for? 
Lauro. Some time later they 
surrendered and left the ship. 
(ND) American reporter Nicholas 
Daniloff was arrested by the KGB 
in Moscow and charged with 
espionage. He was later released 
by the KGB into the custody of his 
embassy. 
How long was Nicholas Daniloff 
detained by the KGB for? 
(KZ7) New Zealand's entrant in How long was it before Stars and 
the Americas Cup, KZ7, began Stripes interrupted KZ7's winning 
the first elimination round in streak? 
great style, constantly winning its 
races. However, its race against 
Stars and Stripes interrupted its 
winning streak. 
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APPENDIX B: Events and Associated TntelFalse Recognition Task 
Propositions Used in Experiment 1 
(R) Prince Charles, Prince of Wales, and Diana, Princess of Wales, visited 
New Zealand with their son Prince William. It was Diana and William's first 
visit to New Zealand. 
(T) 1. 
(F) 2. 
(F) 3. 
(F) 4. 
(T) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(F) 7. 
(T) 8. 
(F) 9. 
(T) 10. 
Police were quick to arrest an individual who bared his buttocks 
in the presence of the Royal couple in Wellington. 
The Royals left New Zealand from Christchurch. 
As part of their South Island itinerary the Royals 
visi ted Dunedin. 
No photos of Prince William were allowed during the 
tour. 
Prince Charles announced to a mass rally of Auckland 
school children that he had arranged a day's holiday 
for them. 
The Royal couple and William arrived in New Zealand at 
Auckland Airport. 
The Royals arrived direct from the U.K. 
During the Royals' Auckland engagements the vice-regal 
Rolls-Royce failed to start. 
No mention was made of the Falklands War by the 
Royals during their visit. 
British news media covering the tour protested at the 
lack of access they had to the Royals. 
231 
(TPF) New Zealand's agricultural industry was relieved when tests revealed 
that the outbreak of vesicular disease on a Temuka pig farm was not foot and 
mouth. 
(T) 1. During the outbreak animal movements between the 
North and South Island were stopped. 
(T) 2. The pigs were fed on garbage from hotels and 
restaurants. 
(F) 3. 5000 sheep, also on the property, were killed. 
(T) 4. Specimens from the diseased pigs were sent to 
England so the disease could be identified. 
(F) 5. It was suspected that the pigs may have got the disease 
from the special 'pig pellets' they were fed on. 
(F) 6. The farmer was advised that no compensation would 
be paid to cover his losses. 
(T) 7. Australia placed a ban on the importation of animals 
and animal products from New Zealand. 
(T) 8. More than 750 pigs were destroyed. 
(F) 9. Army personnel were used to destroy the animals. 
(F) 10. Ministry of Agriculture officials were called to the 
farm after 27 pigs died suddenly. 
232 
(GMM) In Saudi Arabia 300 armed Shi'a rebels seized the Great Mosque at 
Mecca. Saudi troops later took the Mosque by force. 
(F) 1. 
(T) 2. 
(T) 3. 
(T) 4. 
(T) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(F) 7. 
(F) 8. 
(F) 9. 
(F) 10. 
The rebels killed a number of hostages. 
The rebels entrenched themselves in basements of 
the Mosque 
The occupation of the Mosque provoked violent 
protests elsewhere in the Islamic world. 
The rebels demanded that the Muslims recognize one 
of their number as the new messiah. 
Many people were killed or injured when the rebels 
seized the Mosque. 
The rebels held a number of hostages in the Mosque. 
The rebels demanded the release of some of their 
sympathizers in a nearby prison. 
The rebels set fire to large sections of the Mosque. 
Saudi troops flooded the basements of the Mosque 
drowning all the rebels. 
The rebels took the Mosque during the night. 
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(BDC) Bruce Douglas Cameron escaped from Oakley Psychiatric Hospital and 
threatened to release nerve-gas. This initiated a nation-wide search resulting 
in his capture. 
(F) 1. 
(F) 2. 
(T) 3. 
(F) 4. 
(T) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(T) 7. 
(F) 8. 
(F) 9. 
(T) 10. 
Cameron had the ingredients to make the nerve-gas 
with him when he was caught. 
The antidote to the nerve-gas was being distributed 
to strategic locations when Cameron was caught. 
The Police believed Cameron was capable of making 
the nerve-gas. 
Cameron demanded 500,000 dollars or he would 
release the gas. 
The police first learnt of th~ threats after Cameron 
telephoned his Auckland solicitor. 
The antidote to the nerve-gas was readily available. 
Cameron was reportedly seen photocopying chemistry 
books in the library at the University of Canterbury. 
Cameron was caught at Christchurch Airport. 
Cameron escaped from Oakley Psychiatric Hospital by 
hiding in a rubbish bin. 
Cameron had the formulae to make the nerve-gas 
with him when he was caught. 
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(H) More than 2000 people were involved in a hikoi or peace walk to protest 
against Waitangi Day celebrations. 
(T) 1. 
(F) 2. 
(T) 3. 
(T) 4. 
(F) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(F) 7. 
(F) 8. 
(T) 9. 
(F) 10. 
Mrs Eva Rickard was the march leader. 
The protest marchers walked across the Auckland 
Harbour Bridge 
A meeting between the Governor-General and the 
marchers never took place. 
Members of the Koahitonga Movement organized the 
march. 
The marchers carried with them a petition signed by 
400,000 people protesting against the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The march began at Ngaruwahia. 
The Governor-General, Sir David Beattie, refused to 
meet with the marchers. 
Many marchers were arrested at Waitangi. 
All the marchers wanted to meet with the Governor-
General at the Waitangi Treaty House grounds. 
The Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon addressed the 
marchers at Waitangi. 
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(ND) American reporter Nicholas Daniloff was arrested in Moscow. He was 
later released by the KGB into the custody of his embassy. 
(T) l. Daniloff's assignment was due to end the week following 
his arrest. 
(F) 2. Daniloff's wife was immediately deported following 
his arrest. 
(F) 3. He was held at the KGB headquarters. 
(F) 4. Daniloff had top secret plans of military weapons in 
his possession when arrested. 
(T) 5. The USSR officially charged Daniloff with espionage. 
(T) 6. His wife was allowed to visit him. 
(F) 7. Daniloff's soviet contact was also arrested and 
charged with spying. 
(T) 8. The USA stated that Daniloff's arrest was a set-up in 
retaliation for the arrest of a Soviet United Nations 
employee on spy charges in New York. 
(F) 9. Daniloff was arrested at Moscow's international airport 
boarding a flight to the USA. 
(T) 10. Daniloff had no diplomatic immunity. 
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(PMC) Ex-BeatIe, Paul McCartney, was detained at Narita International 
Airport, Japan, when customs inspectors alleged they found 220 grams of 
marijuana in his suitcase. He was later deported. 
(F) 1. 
(F) 2. 
(T) 3. 
(T) 4. 
(T) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(F) 7. 
(T) 8. 
(F) 9. 
McCartney gave a free concert before being deported. 
McCartney was entering Japan with his family for a 
holiday when he was arrested. 
McCartney was held in jail after his arrest. 
McCartney's wife and four children had accompanied 
him to Japan. 
No tour concerts were played before McCartney was 
deported. 
He was entering Japan with his band 'Wings' when he 
was arrested. 
McCartney was fined 10,000 US dollars. 
Commercial and Government owned radio stations in 
Japan stopped broadcasting 'Wings' songs. 
McCartney was placed in the custody of the British 
Embassy after his arrest. 
(F) 10. McCartney alleged the drugs were planted in his suitcase. 
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(PC) The freighter Pacific Charger, on its maiden voyage from Japan, had to be 
. refloated after it ran aground on rocks at Boring Head southwest of Wellington. 
(F) 1. 
(F) 2. 
(T) 3. 
(T) 4. 
(F) 5. 
(T) 6. 
(F) 7. 
(T) 8. 
(F) 9. 
(T) 10. 
A Southerly storm freed the ship. 
All the crew were taken off the ship soon after it ran 
aground. 
Among the ship's cargo were tonnes of car parts. 
A salvage expert was flown in from Singapore to 
survey the ship. 
A rescue base was set up in a cave near the ship. 
A tug was brought specially to New Zealand to help in 
the salvage operation. 
No sightseers were allowed near the ship. 
A causeway was built to the ship. 
One crew member was killed when the ship ran aground. 
Oil escaping from the ship had little effect on local 
bird-life. 
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(SS) A Soviet submarine ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. Swedish 
officials detained the vessel. Some time later they released it. 
(F) 1. 
(T) 2. 
(F) 3. 
(F) 4. 
(T) 5. 
(F) 6. 
(T) 7. 
As soon as it was freed from the mud the Soviet 
submarine made for international waters. 
The submarine's commander was taken off the 
submarine and interrogated by Swedish naval experts. 
The submarine was hauled off the mud by a Soviet tug. 
The Soviet Union made no attempt to salvage the 
submarine. 
Swedish commandos carried out exercises on land near 
the submarine. 
The Swedish authorities confiscated a number of 
documents from the submarine. 
Soviet warships arrived in nearby international 
waters. 
(F) 8. One of the submarine's crew was killed when it ran 
aground. 
(T) 9. The submarine ran aground near Sweden's main 
Naval base. 
(T) 10. The grounded submarine was found by a Swedish 
fishing boat. 
239 
APPENDIX C: General Event Descriptions Used in Experiment 3 and 
4 
(AM) A prominent politician is kidnapped by an urban-guerrilla group. Some 
time later his body is found. 
(SB) An international flight is detained while officials determine if a foreigner 
on board is leaving the country of his/her own free-will. 
(OUE) A foreign embassy is occupied and a number of hostages taken. Some 
time later they are released and the occupation of the embassy ends. 
(GMM) A group of armed rebels seize a place of religious significance and are 
later removed by force. 
(PMC) A pop-singer is arrested while entering a foreign country on drugs 
charges and is later deported. 
(IEL) Gunmen occupy a foreign embassy and take a number of hostages. Later 
troops storm the embassy and free the hostages. 
(MP) A theatrical production about sensitive political issues results in 
considerable controversy. 
(ST) A rugby tour sparks off protests against South Africa!s apartheid policies. 
(JD) A high-ranking military person is kidnapped and later released by a 
terrorist group. 
(5) Historically significant documents are discovered but are later denounced 
as forgeries. 
(YF) Police lay siege to an embassy after an individual is killed when a gunman 
fires from the building. 
(GK) An individual is kidnapped but later escapes. 
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(ND) An individual is arrested and charged with espionage in a foreign 
country. Later he is released into the custody of his embassy. 
(PPII) A prominent religious 
leader made an official visit to a 
foreign country. 
(A) A natural disaster resulted in 
a state of emergency being 
introduced. 
Duration Question for the Ten 
Selected High Frequency 
Events. 
How long did the visit last for? 
How long did the state of 
emergency last for? 
(PC) A ship ran aground and had How long did it take to refloat the 
to be refloated. ship? 
(RCF) Workers staged a sit-in How long did the sit-in 
(occupation) of their factory over (occupation) last for? 
redundancy payments. 
(MC) Climbers were rescued after How long were the climbers 
a storm trapped them on a trapped on the mountain for? 
mountain. 
(AB) Savage bush-fires claimed 
lives and destroyed millions of 
dollars worth of property. 
(R) Members of a royal family 
visi ted a foreign country. 
(H) A large number of people 
undertook a march in protest 
against some issue. 
How long did the bush-fires last 
for? 
How long did the visit last for? 
How long did the march last for? 
(BF) An individual had a heart 
transplant operation but later 
died. 
(NC) Individuals rioted over 
political issues. 
(SAH) A newly elected 
government was removed from 
power because of corrupt election 
tactics. 
(PPI) A prominent religious 
leader died suddenly from a heart 
attack. 
(TIC) An international drug boss 
was tried and convicted of 
murder. 
(LW) A prominent trade union 
leader led a delegation on an 
official visit to a foreign country. 
(TPF) A suspected outbreak of 
foot and mouth disease was 
reported but tests revealed it to be 
some other disease. 
How long after the operation did 
the individual die? 
How long did the rioting last for? 
Duration Question for the Ten 
Selected Low Frequency 
Events 
How long after the election was 
the government removed form 
power? 
How long did his reign last for? 
How long did the trial last? 
How long did the visit last for? 
How long was it until the tests 
revealed that the disease was not 
foot and mouth? 
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(55) A naval vessel ran aground 
and was detained in a foreign 
country's territorial waters. Some 
time later it was released. 
(BDC) A patient escaped from a 
psychiatric hospital and 
threatened to release a dangerous 
chemical. This initiated a nation-
wide search resulting in his 
capture. 
How long was the vessel detained 
for? 
How long was the patient at large 
for? 
(JK) A prominent politician left How long was the politician 
the country with a large amount abroad for? 
of money and leaving many debts 
behind. He was later extradited to 
face bankruptcy charges. 
(W) A prominent community 
figure resigned but later returned 
to his job. 
(AL) Terrorists hijacked a cruise 
ship but later surrendered. 
How long did his resignation last 
for? 
How long were the terrorists in 
control of the ship for? 
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